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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays in Monetary Policy Rules 
                                             by Postrick Lifa Mushendami 
  
John Taylor‘s (1993b) rule has revived the interest and usefulness of instrument rules in 
the formulation of monetary policy both among academics and practitioners.  
Consequently, research in this area has increased to answer among other things, which 
policy rule closely represent the actual monetary policy formulation of the central bank, or 
what is the performance of these Taylor rules compared to alternative rules.  
 
This thesis intends to add both to the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary 
policy rules and structured as follows: Chapter 2 attempts to examine the implication of 
interest rate smoothing on the persistence of a technology and monetary policy shock. 
Using a closed economy model of Galí (2008), I show that interest rate smoothing (Taylor 
rule with lagged interest rate and backward looking Taylor rule) tend to protracts the 
persistence of a monetary policy shock, while it truncates the persistence of a 
technological innovation.  
The persistence due to a monetary shock from the Taylor rule is however shorter, while 
that from a technology shock is longer.  Thus, Taylor rule is considered superior to the 
Taylor rule with lagged interest rule or the backward looking Taylor rule when the 
economy is hit by a monetary policy shock. On the contrary, the Taylor rule with lagged 
interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule is considered superior to the Taylor 
rule when the economy is faced with a technology shock. These results tend to suggest 
that a policy maker faces a trade off regarding the Taylor rule or the interest smoothing 
rules.   
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Chapter 3, attempts to rank the performance of targeting rules against instrument rules in 
the presence of a cost push shock. In particular, it compares the performance of the three 
targeting rules (namely domestic inflation targeting rule (DIT), consumer price inflation 
(CPI) based targeting rule, exchange rate peg (PEG) with the original Taylor rule and the 
Forward looking Taylor rules of Clarida, Galí and Gertler(1998), commonly known as the 
CGG(+1) and CGG(+4).  
 
Using a small open economy, I show that the domestic inflation targeting rule 
simultaneously stabilizes the output gap and domestic inflation in the presence of a 
domestic technology shock and a foreign output innovation and hence superior. Among 
instrument rules I show that the Taylor rule is superior to its forward looking specifications 
CGG(+1) and CGG(+4). However, in the presence of a cost push shock the results are 
mixed. The domestic inflation targeting rule only stabilizes the domestic inflation, while 
the CGG(+1) minimizes the output gap volatilities the most. The CGG(+4) is the most 
inferior rule in this model and calibration, given that it maximizes the volatilities in the 
domestic inflation and the output gap.  
 
Chapter 4, empirically tests whether developing countries respond to domestic demand 
conditions or merely responds to developments in international interest rates in their 
interest rate reaction function. I show that developing countries do not strictly subscribe to 
the Taylor principle in setting nominal interest rate. Moreover, they tend to respond to 
international interest rates, inflation and past interest rates. Chapter 5, concludes. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly introduces the New Keynesian School of thought in the new section. 
In the subsequent sections, I discuss the monetary transmission mechanism in the New 
Keynesian Model and also give a short history of monetary policy rules. There after I 
review the Rules vs. Discretion debate. In the last section I discuss the contribution of 
this thesis to literature. 
 
The real business cycle (RBC) school of thought which is ascribed to Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) does not recognise the role of monetary policy in the transmission of 
business cycle shocks in the economy. Prescott and Kydland (1982) develop a class of 
model called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) based on microeconomic 
behaviour of forward looking economic agents (rational expectations) in the economic 
system. In this model however, prices and wages are perfectly flexible. Consequently, 
only real economic shocks can propagate business cycle shocks in the RBC models.  
 
Despite for the ability to replicate the dynamics of the real economy, the assumption of 
the RBC models particularly that of flexible prices; leaves little space for the prognosis of 
macroeconomic policies. Moreover, the RBC school of thought fails to recognize the role 
of nominal rigidities as possible candidate for propagating shocks in the economy. The 
weaknesses posed by the RBC, led to the development of the New Keynesian 
Economics (NK) school of thought. The latter attempts to integrate the assumptions of 
monopolistic competition and the nominal rigidities into the RBC. The presence of 
nominal rigidities subsequently ensure that monetary policy have non-trivial effects on 
real variables. Thus, the NK school of thought has become one of the most prominent 
tools in the parley on monetary policy and welfare analysis.  
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1.0  The Transmission Mechanism in the New Keynesian Model 
 
Understanding the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is critical to the 
discussion of monetary policy rules. Therefore, this subsection highlights the monetary 
transmission mechanism. In the basic closed economy New Keynesian model, the 
transmission mechanism operates through two main channels: the interest rate channel 
and expectations channel. The interest rate channel (inter-temporal substitution) 
operates in the short run when prices are sticky. Accordingly, a rise in the nominal 
interest rate translates into higher real interest rate which subsequently influence 
demand decisions of the private sector.  
 
For instance, an increase in the real interest rate causes households to buy more bonds, 
leading to a decline in consumption in the current period. Similarly, the higher real 
interest rate dissuades corporate bodies from investing more given that only fewer 
projects can be profitable. The two factors tend to reinforce each other and subsequently 
lower the aggregate demand. The fall in demand dampens inflationary pressures 
through the aggregate supply (Phillips curve).  
 
The expectations channel. Monetary policy affects the expectations of economic agents 
given the fact that the model is forward looking. For instance, when inflation is below the 
target, economic agents anticipate a relaxation of the monetary policy stance and hence 
increase the expectation of future inflation. This in turn affects the pricing or wage setting 
behaviour (Svensson, 1999). Moreover, because of rational expectations, agents might 
not react to temporal shocks in the economy which might have no second round effects.  
 
In an open economy, there is an exchange rate channel in addition to the interest rate 
and expectations channels. The exchange rate is affected by changes in domestic 
nominal income relative to foreign nominal income as well as the expected future 
exchange rate. The latter operates through the interest parity condition. When prices are 
sticky, changes in the nominal exchange rate affects the real exchange rate.  
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Thus, the real exchange rate in turn affects the demand for domestic as well as foreign 
goods via the relative prices. This in turn adds to the interest rate channel. For instance, 
a rise in the domestic nominal interest rate above the foreign interest rate requires a 
depreciation of the domestic currency for equilibrium in the foreign exchange to hold 
(uncovered interest parity condition). Other things being held equal, a rise in the 
domestic interest rates increases the attractiveness of domestic debt instruments and 
hence causes an appreciation of the domestic currency. That is, if nominal prices are 
slow to adjust, domestically produced goods become more expensive than their foreign 
counterparts. Consequently, net exports, employment, domestic output and inflation falls 
causing a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  
 
On the other hand, an appreciation of the exchange rate might cause an increase in 
demand and subsequently lead to increase in inflation. The latter effect might be realised 
in case where domestic agents hold substantial amount of foreign denominated debts. 
i.e. An appreciation may lead to an increase in income of domestic households on 
account of reduced loan repayments, which might also lead to an increase in domestic 
demand and inflation. Moreover, the exchange rate (appreciation or depreciation) affects 
the consumer price inflation (CPI), through import prices. The exchange rate may affect 
domestic prices through input prices, which subsequently affect the nominal wages and 
the CPI. A number of studies which examines the effects of monetary policy on real 
effects include King and Wolman (1996), Rotemberg & Woodford (1997, 1999), Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Fuhrer (2000) and 
Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001).  
 
1.1  Monetary Policy Rules 
 
Monetary policy rules have a long history. Adam Smith considered being the father of 
economics contends that ―a well-regulated paper-money‖ could have very significant 
advantages in enhancing economic growth and stability in contrast to a pure commodity 
standard.  
14 
 
At the beginning of the 19th century, Henry Thornton and later David Ricardo similarly 
put emphasis on the importance of monetary policy rules following the monetary induced 
crisis which was ascribed to the Napoleon Wars. In the 20th century Knut Wicksell 
advanced the need for monetary policy rules as a way to avoid monetary expansion 
which brought the hyperinflation that followed the First World War. Milton Friedman after 
studying the monetary policy mistakes of the Great Depression proposed a constant rule 
to avoid the re-occurrence of a similar mistake. In the 1980‘s financial institutions 
developed substitutes for money which brought instability of the demand for money. In 
this vein, Svensson (1999a), contends that in the short run money and inflation are 
uncorrelated, despite for the existence of a stable long run relation between the two 
variables.   
 
The extant literature in monetary economics on monetary policy often classifies 
monetary policy rules into two main strands: instrument rules and targeting rules. 
Instrument rule refer to a function which prescribes setting the instrument of the central 
bank in response to changes in the observed predetermined or forward-looking 
macroeconomic variables or both. They are simple feedback rules which tie the policy 
instrument to forecasted variables if they deviate from a set target. Examples of 
instrument rules includes among others: Taylor Rule, McCallum Rules, Open Economy 
Rules and Forward looking Rules. I briefly discuss these rules in the next section.  
 
Taylor rule 
 
Taylor‘s (1993b) famous Taylor rules captures the most recent research on monetary 
policy rules in which the instrument rate responds to inflation and output gap according 
to:  
 
 0.5 0.5 2 2;t t tr y               1.1  
 
15 
 
where 
t  stands for the rate of inflation during the previous four quarters ty  is the per 
centage deviations of the real GDP from the growth trend, 
tr  is the short-run nominal 
interest rate. The inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate are equal to 2. The 
rule recommends that the short-term interest rate be lowered (raised) when the output 
gap or inflation is below (above) a specified target. Taylor (1993b) finds the rule fitting the 
monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) for the period 1987 to 1992. Mankiw 
(2001) suggests that central banks should target a positive inflation rate in order to avoid 
liquidity traps and also because inflation greases the wheels of the labour market, as it 
ensures that the labour market work better.   
McCallum Rule 
McCallum (1988) proposed a rule which adjusts the monetary base growth rate up or 
down when the nominal GDP growth is below or above a chosen target value as follows:  
 * * 10.5 ;t t tb x v x x                                               (1.2) 
where tb denotes the change in the log of the adjusted monetary base, tx is the rate of 
growth of nominal GDP, *x is the desired or targeted growth of nominal GDP, specified 
as * *,y  (targeted inflation plus the expected long run average growth rate of the real 
output). Where * where is the targeted inflation and *y is the long run average rate of 
growth of real GDP. For the U.S. economy McCallum assumed *x  of 5 percent, 
calculated as the sum of targeted inflation rate of 2 percent and the average rate of real 
GDP of 3 percent per year.  
tv

1is the average growth of base velocity over the 
previous 16 quarters. Given that changes in technology and regulation affects the growth 
of the base velocity from year to year, a problem that undermined Friedman‘s rule; 
tv

is instead an average of the past four years intended to forecast the average growth rate 
of the velocity in the foreseeble future rather than reflect current cyclical conditions 
represented by the term *
1tx x   .  
                                                          
1
t t tv x b  is the log base velocity of demand for the monetary base.  
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The growth in the monetary base must thus be equal to the targeted growth of the 
nominal GDP, thus there is a comparative feedback to the growth rate of the monetary 
base coming from the gap between the nominal GDP and its targeted growth rate. If the 
relationship between the monetary base and the nominal GDP change due to financial 
innovations for instance, the growth rate of the monetary base must be accordingly 
adjusted. Other implication of the McCallum rule is that the monetary policy rule should 
use information which is explicitly available when the instrument is set. Besides, it must 
take account of the fact that data for variables such as GDP is only available with a lag. 
Thus, the policy rule should use nominal GDP from the previous quarter; alternatively it 
should use forecasts of the predetermined variables.   
Empirically, the Taylor rule and the McCallum rules have coincided over many periods in 
the past. They however produced divergent results in two cases (UK using the data for 
the late 1980s and Japan using data between 1972-1998). In case of the former, the 
Taylor rule pointed to an easing in policy, while McCallum rule prescribed a tighter policy. 
In case of Japan, McCallum (1993) provides evidence that the policy rules that used 
monetary base as a variable would have identified that the policy was too tight after the 
1991. He thus suggests that targeting the monetary base would have been a better 
monetary policy for Japan then.  
 
McCallum (1999) however states that the Taylor rule is more popular because it captures 
the tendency of most central banks that conducts monetary policies by changing interest 
rates rather than the growth rate of the adjusted monetary base (currency plus bank 
reserves). The weakness of the Taylor rule nevertheless is that it requires estimating the 
output gap which is difficult. On the contrary the McCallum rule does not require the 
estimation of the output gap. Debelle (1999), evaluates the performance of different 
monetary policy rules in terms of reducing the volatilities of inflation and output. He argues 
that the Taylor rule outperforms other monetary policy rules such the inflation only rule, 
price level rule, nominal income level rule, nominal income growth rule.  
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Hamalainen (2004) presents a comprehensive review of the Taylor rule when contrasted 
to the behaviour of the FED and observes the following. He first notes that, the Taylor 
rule in its generic form does not capture the effect of the exchange rate. Second, there is 
no agreement regarding interest rate smoothing, backward-looking and forward-looking 
expectations in the Taylor rule. Third, the weights on the inflation and output can be 
estimated directly or be inferred through minimising the loss function where the 
fluctuations between the output and inflation are explicitly expressed. Thus, there have 
been several attempts to achieve an improved Taylor rule by inter-alia, including 
forward-looking variables, exchange rate or using forecast values of the output and 
inflation.  
Open-Economy Rules 
Svennson (1998) claims that in the Taylor rule, the instruments are restricted to respond 
only to the deviations between the variables and their target level and lagged instrument. 
Hence, in its standard form the Taylor rule is backward looking and is meant for a closed 
economy of the USA. Ball (1998) and Svensson (1998b) also argue that in an open 
economy, Taylor rules are sub-optimal given that they ignore the role of the exchange 
rate which is very important in the transmission mechanism of shocks. Thus, Ball (1999b), 
recommends the inclusion of the exchange rate in the policy design to take into account 
the open economy. Moreover, Debelle (1999) suggests that by including the exchange 
rate, the central bank can reduce the variability of both the output and inflation. Adding 
the exchange rate, the Taylor rule can be expressed as:  
   * * * ,
y et t t t t
i i y y e

                                                   1 . 3 
where  , y  and e are the coefficients on inflation, output and the exchange rate 
respectively. Ball (1999b) suggests two changes to the optimal rule in an open economy. 
(1) The policy instrument becomes a weighted average of the interest rate and the 
exchange rate which is called the Monetary Condition Index (MCI). (2) Given that 
inflation targeting in open economies may lead to a high erraticism of the exchange rate 
and output, those fluctuations can be evaded by targeting the long run inflation. 
18 
 
Therefore, the second change consists of substituting the inflation with the long inflation 
to filters out the effects of the exchange rate volatilities.Thus the main difference 
between the closed economy and the open economy resides on two aspects (the index 
and the long run inflation). Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden which follows the 
Canadian monetary policy closely follow the MCI approach. The rationale for using a 
(MCI) is that it measures the overall stance of policy, including the incentives through 
both the real interest rate and the exchange rate. According to Ball (1998) the optimal 
policy for a central bank which follows the MCI is as follows:   
   11 ,t t t t twr w e y b e                                                  1 . 4  
tr  is the real interest rate, ty is the log of real output,  , b  are positive constants to be 
determined, and   is a positive coefficient, w  is the weight on the real interest rate 
(0 1w  ) and (1 )t twr w e  is the monetary conditions index (MCI).  1te  is interpreted 
as a long-run forecast of inflation, assuming that output is kept at its natural level. In the 
closed economy this is represented by the current inflation, in the open economy 
however current inflation changes due to the exchange rate. Ball (2000) suggested that 
theoretically  1.3  and  1.4 are identical; the only difference is the choice of the policy 
instrument (i.e. interest rate or an MCI). This choice depends on the degree of flexibility 
available to the policy makers.  
Longworth and O‘Reilly (2000), contend that Ball‘s results depend on the assumptions 
that shocks are white noise and uncorrelated across equations, which do not hold for a 
small open economy. Accordingly, they extend Ball‘s rule to include new exogenous 
explanatory variable x due to the fact that foreign output and commodity prices affects 
both the exchange rate as well as the demand. Hence, the optimal policy rule becomes:  
   11 ,t t t t t twr w e y b fe cX                                               1 . 5                                                                           
 
where all the variables are measured as deviations from their average values, 
(1 )t twr w e   represents the monetary conditions index (MCI), ty is the output gap, 
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1( )tfe  is the core inflation, (i.e. inflation measure which excludes the direct but 
temporary effects of the exchange rate movements). c is a constant vector that depends 
on the parameters of the model, 
tX is the exchange rate. The instrument responds to 
changes in tX  given that it affects the future path of output and inflation. According to 
Srour (1999) for instance, an autonomous rise in the exchange rate needs constant 
monetary conditions, while a rise caused by an increase in real commodity prices 
necessitate tighter monetary conditions. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) dispute that 
policies which include asset prices such as the exchange rate increase the aggregate 
volatility of the policy instrument and thus do not improve macroeconomic performance.  
 
Forward looking Rules 
The standard Taylor rule is a backward-looking rule in form, while inflation targeting is a 
forward-looking rule. Thus, Svensson (2000), states that given that inflation reacts with 
long and variable lags, the central bank has to adopt a forward-looking perspective by 
attempting to control inflation a few years ahead. The magnitude of forward lookingness 
is supposed to be determined by the transmission lag. This forward-looking perspective 
of monetary policy is not new. For instance Keynes observed in his 1923 Tract on 
Monetary Reform that,‖if we wait until a price movement is actually a foot before applying 
remedial measures, we may be too late‖.  
Therefore a policy rule is considered forward looking if it includes explicit forecast values 
of output and inflation. According to Debelle (1999) a policy rule which take lags may 
reduce the variability of both inflation and output. Therefore the commonly used Taylor 
rule uses estimated (forecasted) values of inflation rather than the current inflation. 
Collectively these rules are called inflation forecasting based (IFB) rules. In this case, the 
reaction function involves adjusting interest rates to the expected future deviations of 
inflation from its target level. The rules may include interest rate smoothing or 
contemporaneous output gap (Canada for example) or other terms. These kinds of rules 
are used by the central Bank of Canada. Batini and Haldane (1999) examined the IFB 
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rules for the UK. They conclude that those rules are efficient in terms of minimizing the 
inflation and output variability compared to the standard Taylor rule.  
Similarly, Longworth and O‘Reilly (2000) contend that forward-looking rules perfoms 
better than Taylor-type rules in terms of average stability (reducing the variability of the 
interest rate, inflation and output). Their argument was based on a study that compared 
the results from non-linear rules (rules which do not respond until inflation falls outside the 
bands), Taylor-type rules which respond both to deviations of inflation from its targeted 
level and to deviations of output from its potential using current or lagged information and 
the IFB rules. Moreover, to obtain more information an output gap term was also included 
to the forward-looking rule, to bring it much closer to Taylor Rule.  
Furthermore, Srour (2003) observes that IFB rules are as efficient as the optimal rules 
and also easier to monitor than other rules. Other types of instrument rules include 
several interest rate rules studied by Henderson and McKibbin (1993a, 1993b) as well as 
the activist monetary base policy rules of Meltzer (1987). Despite that there are many 
instrument rules, in this thesis I compare the performance of the various formulations of 
Taylor rules. This due to the superior performance of Taylor type rules compared to other 
policy rules and their wide usage by most central banks in the world (McCallum 1999, 
Debelle 1999).  
Targeting Rules  
Svensson (1997, 1999 and 2003) defines Targeting rules as ―General targeting rules 
essentially specifying the operational objectives for monetary policy and specific 
targeting rules essentially specifying the operational Euler conditions for monetary policy. 
In particular, an optimal targeting rule expresses the equality of the marginal rates of 
transformation and the marginal rates of substitution between the target variables in an 
operational way‖. Thus, the term targeting rules links the general target rule to the 
specification of the objective function of the central bank whilst specific target rule is 
linked to the setting of the policy instrument to achieve a specific target which is not 
essentially optimal.  
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Examples of targeting rules are inflation targeting, money-growth targeting, nominal 
GDP targeting and price-level targeting. Specific targets can be the exchange rate, 
nominal income or inflation. Svensson(1997), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) however 
suggest that it is better for instruments to respond to both the current inflation and the 
output gap, given that they both determine future inflation. The section which follows 
discusses the rules vs. discretionary monetary policy in the context of instrument and 
targeting rules. 
 
1.2  Rules vs. Discretionary Monetary Policy 
 
The discretion versus rules debate is at the centre of monetary economics. In a rule 
based monetary policy, the monetary authority commits to a specified path of the 
instrument variable. Under discretion monetary policy, the monetary authority 
re-optimises the choice of the instrumental variables from time to time. Bernanke and 
Mishkin (1997) suggest that classifying targeting rules as ―constrained discretion‖ serves 
as a middle ground between targeting and instrument rules. Taylor (2000) warns against 
mechanical application of monetary policy rules without judgement. Similarly, McCallum 
(2004) stresses that central bankers should be flexible decision makers who allow 
deviations from the rule, as long as such deviations are rational and explained to the 
general public.  
 
McCallum and Nelson (2000) disputes that no central bank has ever announced and 
committed itself to a targeting rule, a point Svensson (2003) contend. Moreover, 
Svensson (2004) claims that only targeting rules involve discretion while instrument rules 
do not provide any judgement. Thus, he argues that a firm commitment to instrument 
rules is not attractive; rather instrument rules should serve as guidelines for conducting 
monetary policy. In a discretionary monetary policy, the central bank identifies the shock 
as well as its effect on the economy and subsequently chooses a policy action to follow 
based on its judgement. Likewise, in instances where a rule based policy does not 
provide a good guide for the economy or where the relationship between variables does 
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not follow a well-established pattern, discretionary monetary policy is unavoidable.   
 
On the contrary, Taylor (2000) suggests that an inflation target is not sufficient given that 
it requires an instrument rule to achieve the set target. Taylor (2000, p.11) uses the 
analogy of sailing a boat to describe an instrument rule and inflation targeting: ―Inflation 
targeting is like the destination for a sail boat. A policy rule is how to sail the boat to get to 
the destination: for this you need to describe the angle of the attack, the sail trim, the 
contingency for the wind change, and so on2‖. The general consensus is that, if the 
performance of the economy is measured in terms of the stability of the output and 
inflation, then monetary policy rules are preferred over discretion. The other consensus 
is for policymakers to shun the time-inconsistency problem when following rule based 
monetary policy. Therefore, policymakers should communicate their actions to the public 
to enhance accountability and credibility. In this way uncertainty is reduced given that 
households can predict the actions of the central bank.  
 
Friedman (2000) lists the following advantages of rule based policies: First, unlike a 
discretionary policy the central bank cannot exploit the inflation-output trade-off which 
might cause a rise in inflation in the future and subsequently lead to unemployment in 
case when an aggressive disinflation strategy is taken. Therefore, policymakers should 
commit to a fixed monetary policy rule. Second, the social welfare may increase when 
the central bank adopts and commit to a rule which can be predicted by private agents. 
This can be due to the fact that the uncertainty in investment and consumption is 
reduced. Third, policy rules may decrease the risk premium in the financial markets and 
thus increase the predictability of returns in the short run. Proponents of rule based 
policy assume that policymakers have a thorough knowledge of the operations of the 
economy and the relationship among variables. Furthermore, they assume that the 
relationship between the variables is constant over time.  
 
                                                          
2
 Taylor (2000, p.11). 
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1.3 Thesis objectives and contribution 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary 
policy rules. Specifically, it raises the following three questions: Firstly, what are the 
implications of interest smoothing on the persistence and transmission of a monetary 
policy and technology shock? Secondly, which monetary policy rule (targeting or 
instrument rule) performs better in light of a cost push shock? Thirdly, do developing 
economies react to international interest rate(s) when setting their interest rates?  
 
The objective of my thesis is to respond to the three questions above. Its trajectory is 
organised along five chapters. Chapter two addresses the first question posed in the 
thesis. It draws mainly from the research and findings of Taylor (1993), Amato and 
Laubach (1999), Mishikin (1999), Srour (2001), Rudebusch (2002), Woodford (2003) 
and Castelnuovo (2005). All the above work bears a homogenous quality with Amato 
and Laubach providing an exception. Whilst the other research empirically examine 
whether central banks undertake interest rate smoothing or not, Amato and Laubach 
(1999) serve as a precursor in incorporating interest rate smoothing in a New Keynesian 
Closed Economy Model. They find interest rate smoothing to increase the persistence of 
a demand shock (government expenditure shock), on inflation, output gap and nominal 
interest rate.  
In chapter two I examine the implications of interest rate smoothing on the persistence of 
a monetary and technology shock in a New Keynesian Closed Economy Model of Galí 
(2008). I contribute to the model by including two additional monetary policy rules in 
particular the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule. I 
model interest rate smoothing by including lagged interest rate in the two policy rules. 
Gerlach and Tillmann (2010) contend that monetary policy is viewed as effective when its 
persistence on inflation is short lived in contrast to long live persistence. The intuition is 
that the central bank is able to achieve its objective of fighting inflation in a very short time 
when persistence is short lived. On the contrary when the persistence of inflation is long 
lived, the central bank is only able to achieve its objectives after a long period of time and 
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thus considered as ineffective (Gerlach and Tillmann, 2010). Thus the significance of the 
persistence of shocks on inflation and output cannot be overemphasized.  
I show that interest rate smoothing (Taylor with lagged interest rate or the backward 
looking Taylor rule) elongates the persistence of a monetary shock on inflation and 
output gap, while it truncates the persistence of a technology shock of the same 
variables, when compared to the Taylor rule. Thus, the Taylor rule is considered superior 
to the Taylor rule with lagged interest rule or the backward looking Taylor rule when the 
economy is hit by a monetary policy shock. On the contrary, the Taylor rule with lagged 
interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule is considered superior to the Taylor 
rule when the economy is faced with a technology shock. These results tend to suggest 
that a policy maker faces a trade off. 
Chapter three responds to the second question. The chapter draws from two different 
strands on monetary policy rules in an open economy. The first strand comprises of: Aoki 
(2001), Clarida et al. (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2002) and Galí (2008), who 
recommend monetary policy to stabilise the domestic price inflation and let the exchange 
rate float. The second strand includes: Smelts and Wouters (2002), Sutherland (2002), 
Benigno and Benigno (2003) and De Paoli (2009) who argues that optimal monetary 
policy in an open economy should take the volatility of exchange rate into account.  The 
common link of the extant literature is their use of a welfare based method of evaluation. 
In a theoretical situation it is easy to include a cost push shock and evaluate the optimal 
policy. In practice however, the welfare maximising strategy is difficult and complicated. 
Therefore the optimal policy may involve responding to variables which cannot be 
measured or observed. In this case, the monetary authority might find it impractical to 
follow an optimal policy.  
Therefore, it may be helpful to analyse the performance of simple targeting and 
instrument rules using the impulse response functions and volatilities. This is the 
approach embraced in this chapter and marks a point of departure from similar studies. 
The chapter builds on Galí (2008) who use a small open economy and compare the 
performance of the DIT, CIT, Taylor rule and the Peg. He concludes that the DIT rule can 
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simultaneously stabilise the output gap and domestic inflation in the presence of a 
technology shock. I make the following contributions and extensions to the model. 
Firstly, I include a cost push shock and a foreign output shock. Secondly, I include the 
DIT, CIT, of Galí and Monacelli (2002) and thirdly, I incorporate Forward looking Taylor 
rules of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), commonly known as the CGG(+1) and the 
CGG(+4) rules. To date, no other study exists which incorporates the Forward looking 
Taylor rules into the small open economy, characterised by a cost push shock. I show 
that the DIT continues to stabilise the output gap and domestic inflation in the presence 
of a technology and foreign output shocks and hence superior to other rules. Moreover, I 
show that the Taylor rule is superior to the CGG(+1) and the CGG(+4).  
However, the results produced have the tendency to be mixed when a cost push shock 
hits the economy. In this case, the DIT only stabilises the domestic inflation, while the 
CGG(+1) minimizes the volatilities of the output gap the most. The CGG(+4) is the most 
inferior policy rule, because it worsens the wealth of the consumer. Thus these results 
suggest that the central bank faces a policy dilemma as to which policy rules is superior 
in terms of stabilising both the output gap and domestic inflation in the event of a cost 
push shock. This dilemma is caused by the fact that in practise policy makers cannot 
alter policy rules with each shock hitting the economy.      
Chapter four examines the third question by empirically testing whether developing 
countries respond to international interest rates in setting their policy rates or observe the 
Taylor rule. It draws mainly from Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Calvo and Reinhart 
(2001 and 2002), Filosa (2001), Corbo (2002), Frankel et al. (2004) and Boamah (2012). 
These studies show that emerging market economies respond to other factors such as 
the exchange rate in setting their interest rate policy in addition to inflation. This is 
attributed to the fear of floating which might be caused by among other things: lack of 
credibility, exchange rate path through to inflation and foreign currency liabilities which 
may prevent developing countries from undertaking independent monetary policies. 
Frankel et al (2004) argues for example that even developing countries with fully flexible 
exchange rate tend to import price stability from developed countries similar to countries 
whose exchange rates are fixed.  
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A related characteristic of the extant literature is the propensity of most researchers 
focusing on either individual country or regional experiences, apart from Filosa (2001) 
and Frankel et al. (2004). This chapter studies the interest rate setting behaviour of 
central banks in three regions (Latin America, East Asia and Southern Africa, using data 
from 1999 to 2012 and hence its first contribution to literature. It differs from Filosa, (2001) 
in that he examines the interest setting of developing countries across two regions (East 
Asia and Latin America). Also other variances stems from the number and selection of 
countries and the research question at hand.  
 
The chapter is also different from Frankel et al. (2004) who test how the exchange rate 
(independent, pegs or managed floats) affects the transmission of international interest 
rates to local interests. While they use data on a large number of developing and 
industrialised countries during the 1970 to 1999, in this chapter I consider eight 
developing countries, during the period 1999 to 2012. In particular, this chapter builds on 
Forward looking Taylor rule proposed by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998).  
 
As the second and third contributions, I make two modifications to their rule: First I 
replace the output with the expected output as in Javanovic and Petreski (2012). Second 
I include the U.S. interest rate, to test the claim by Frankel et al (2004) that interest rates 
in developing countries with flexible exchange rates might sometimes be more 
responsive to the international interest rates in addition to domestic economic 
considerations. The chapter is estimated using the GMM methodology as in Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler (1998). I show that developing countries respond to past interest rates, 
expected inflation and U.S. interest rates when setting their interest rates. The coefficient 
of the expected inflation is however less than unity in all countries. These results are 
similar to Corbo‘s for Latin American countries. A distinct finding of this chapter is the 
significance of the U.S. interest rate in the monetary policy rules of most countries, when 
they are inflation targeters. Chapter 5 concludes.    
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Chapter 2  Interest Rate Smoothing and Persistence 
 
2.0  Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The Taylor (1993) rule has re-kindled the attention of researchers involved in monetary 
policy.  Its success has been that by linking the inflation rate and the measure of the 
output gap to the monetary policy rule; it provided a good description of the monetary 
policies practiced by many central banks in the Euro area (Castelnuovo, 2005). 
Nevertheless the Taylor rule of 1993 is a purely contemporaneous rule, i.e. it makes the 
current nominal interest a linear function of the current output gap and current rate of 
inflation only.  
 
However, many econometricians find that the fit of the Taylor rule improves when lagged 
interest rate is added into the objective function of the central bank (Castelnuovo, 2005). 
The practice of including lagged values of interest rate among the regressors of the 
monetary policy rule is often referred to as interest rate smoothing or monetary policy 
inertia. Such kind of smoothing means that changes in the targeted interest rate are 
dampened (Amato and Laubach, 1999). Interest rate smoothing is relatively broad and 
includes the actions of the central bank to change the policy interest rates in small steps 
(Goodhart, 1997) as well as moving the interest rates in small steps without reversing the 
direction quickly (Amato and Laubach, 1999).  
 
Amato and Laubach (1999) list other kinds of interest rate smoothing such as seasonal 
smoothing, day to day smoothing and event smoothing. Seasonal smoothing is defined 
as the efforts of the central bank to reduce calendar patterns in the interest rate. Event 
smoothing is when the central bank provides liquidity to the market to avoid large swings 
in the interest rate. This kind of smoothing may be considered during the occurrence of a 
crisis which might put pressure on interest rate.  
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Day-to-day smoothing on the other hand means that the average level of the interest rate 
over a period of days is close to the target desired by the central bank. However, this 
chapter uses the earlier definition of interest rate smoothing (i.e. inclusion of lagged 
interest rate into the monetary policy rule). Many researchers agree that most central 
banks engage in interest rate smoothing. For instance Amato and Laubach (1999) argue 
that there is ample evidence which points that the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) undertook 
interest rate smoothing in the past. Srour (2001) provides evidence that the Bank of 
Canada reaction function shows the propensity to have been smoothed. Similarly, 
Castelnuovo (2005) found that the Taylor rules for the Euro area tend to show interest 
rate smoothing. Nevertheless, Rudebusch (2002) argues that at quarterly frequencies 
interest rate smoothing is just an illusion.   
 
Moreover, he argues that if partial adjustment strategy is accorded high importance in the 
setting of the interest rate, rational agents would be capable of predicting the future 
values of the policy rate with a relatively high degree of precision. However, he states that 
results obtained from the standard term structure regressions shows that the policy rate is 
unpredictable over one period. There are several reasons which justify central banks‘ 
preference to smooth the interest rates, which I discuss in the rest of this section.  
 
(1)  Stability.  Woodford (2003) states that ―central banks seek to smooth interest rates, 
in the sense that they seek to minimize the volatility in the interest rates, in addition to 
other objectives‖. This is due to the fact that large swings in interest rate can cause large 
fluctuations in the cash flow of individual corporate institutions, financial intermediaries 
and government with large debts which may destabilize the financial and exchange 
markets.   
 
(2)  Commitment and Credibility.  Mishkin (1999) argues that the credibility problem 
may preclude the monetary authority from reversing the policy rate too frequently, as 
sudden large reversals in policy may cause the public to lose confidence in the central 
bank. Furthermore, given that private agents are forward looking, small movements in the 
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interest rate which persist over time may be more effective than large and transitory 
changes (Amato and Laubach, 1999). Therefore, policy makers may be effective if they 
commit to a certain course of action over an extended period (Srour, 2001). For example, 
suppose that a firm which finances its investment by borrowing short term expects an 
increase in the interest rate which is short lived. The firm will borrow and roll over its debt 
at a lower interest rate. Similarly, if the firm borrows long term, it will do so at unchanged 
long term interest rates. The latter is based on the fact that when financial markets are 
efficient, a temporary increase in the short-term interest rates will have little effect on long 
term interest rates. In both scenarios, the borrowing costs of the firm will remain 
unchanged due to short lived persistence and hence monetary policy will be less 
effective.  
 
On the contrary, if the firm expects the increase in the short-term rates to persist over a 
long time, it might cancel or scale down the investment project. Suppose the firm intends 
to finance the project with a short-term loan. In this case, it will expect to continue paying 
the loan for some time into the future and thus roll over the debt at higher interest rate. 
Similarly in the case of long-term financing, the firm will pay higher long term interest rates. 
The latter stems from the expectation theory of the yield curve which states that an 
increase in the short term interest rate which is expected to persist will have bigger impact 
on the long term interest rates than an increase which is expected not to persist. Thus, 
long lived persistence in the latter case increases the effectiveness of monetary policy.     
 
(3)  Uncertainty faced by policy makers about the economy and the effect of monetary 
actions. Sack (2000) argues that the central bank might engage in interest rate smoothing; 
when there is uncertainty about the parameters of the economy or when the structure of 
the economy is changing. Similarly, Orphanides (2003) argues that monetary authorities 
often respond gradually to shocks taking into account that they might contain noise. 
Furthermore, Favero and Milani (2001) and Castelnuovo and Surico (2004) suggests that 
model uncertainty has been an important consideration for the Federal Reserve Bank. 
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Therefore, it is advisable for a central bank to move the policy rate gradually until the 
uncertainty subside.  
 
The implication of persistence on inflation and output is however different. Gerlach and 
Tillmann (2010) for instance contends that monetary policy is viewed as effective when its 
persistence on inflation is short lived in contrast to long lived persitence. The intuition is 
that the central bank is able to achieve its objective of fighting inflation in a very short time 
when persistence is short lived. On the contrary when the persistence of inflation is long 
lived, the central bank is only able to achieve its objectives after a long period of time and 
thus considered as ineffective (Gerlach and Tillmann, 2010). While there have been a 
number of studies on interest rate smoothing; we are not aware of any study that has 
examined the implications of interest rate smoothing on the persistence and transmission 
of a monetary and a technology shock. Thus, this chapter examines the impact of interest 
rate smoothing on the persistence and transmission of a monetary and a technology 
shock. Before doing this, I need to develop a macroeconomic model which will be used in 
this exercise. The model is presented below.     
 
2.1  The Model 
 
This section present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium closed economy model, 
characterized by monopolistic competition in the goods market. I follow Galí (2008), 
however a through elaboration is contained in Galí (2008, Chapter 3), Woodford (2003, 
Chapter 3) and Walsh (2010, Chapter 8). I extend Galí (2008) by modifying the Taylor 
rule to include lagged interest rate similar to Rotemberg and Woodford (1991). Moreover, 
the model is extended further to include a Taylor rule comprising of past values of 
inflation, output and interest rate.  
 
The model is comprised of households, corporate sector and the central bank. 
Households supply labour to firms, purchase goods for consumption and hold bonds. 
Firms hire labour and specialize in the production of a single good which is an imperfect 
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substitute for other goods. Thus, firms have monopoly power in setting prices in the spirit 
of Calvo (1983). Households and firms optimize in order to maximize their respective 
utilities and profits. The central bank decides the monetary policy stance. It is assumed 
further that the financial market is complete and hence households can insure 
themselves from idiosyncratic risks.   
2.2 Household Preferences 
In this section I present the demand side of the model, the optimality conditions and 
log-linearization thereof. The preferences of the household over consumption and leisure 
are assumed to be identical. The utility of the household in period t  is given by:  
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where  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.   denotes the elasticity of labor 
supply, it captures the sensitivity of employment/labor supply to changes in the wage. A 
big   implies a small elasticity that is a big wage change is required to induce an 
increase in labor supply.  tN  stand for the household‘s labor supply at time .t  tE  
denotes the expectation at time ,t  while   is the intertemporal discount factor 0 1  . 
tC  is a Dixit-Stiglitz type aggregator of a composite consumption of goods: 
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 2.2.2                                                              
 
where ( )tC i  denotes the amount of good i  consumed by the household in period t . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that there exist a continuum of goods indexed on the interval 
 0,1 . 1   is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within 
the continuum. A bigger   means more competitiveness, while a small   denotes a 
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higher degree of imperfect competition.  The household budget constraint in nominal 
terms is given by:  
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where ( )tP i  represents the price of the good i , tB is the quantity of one period, 
nominally riskless discount bond bought in period t  and matures in period 1t  , tQ is its 
price. tW  represents the wages paid for labor, tT  stands for other incomes including 
shares in the firm at time .t  The household optimization problem can be split into two 
stages: In the first step the household allocates its consumption bundle in order to 
minimize the total expenditure which is required to achieve the desired level of the 
consumption index tC . The second step consists of the household choosing its optimum 
consumption and labor supply. Solving the first step yields the demand function3:  
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4. The total consumption 
expenditure can be expressed as:    
1
0
t t t tP i C i di PC . Given that, the household budget 
constraint can be re-written as:  
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The household maximizes the utility function  2.2.1  with respect to the budget 
constraint  2.2.5 . The optimality conditions can be written as5:  
                                                          
3
 Appendix (A). 
4
 Appendix (A). 
5
 Appendix (B). 
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The marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption is equal to the real 
wage.
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Linearization of optimality conditions6 is presented below, where from  2.2.6  we get: 
                                                         2 . 2 . 8
 
From  2.2.7  we get:  
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where the logt ti Q   is the nominal interest rate at time t , log    is the discount 
rate, while 1 1t t tp p     is the inflation rate between period t  and 1.t    2.2.9  states 
that the marginal utility of consumption today is equal to the discounted future marginal 
utility of consumption and the real interest rate. I also add an ad-hoc log-linearized money 
demand function. 
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demand for real balances, ty  stands for log of output, and ti  represent the nominal 
interest rate.
                                 
 
 
2.3  The Corporate Sector 
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In this section I present the production side of the model, which is comprised of the 
production technology, the link between the marginal cost, nominal wage and inflation, 
the aggregate price dynamics, optimal price setting, the relationship between the 
marginal cost and output gap and the New Keynesian Phillips curve.  
2.3.1  Production Technology 
 
It is assumed that there is a continuum of monopolistic firms and each firm produces a 
differentiated good .i  The production function uses one input which is labor. A specific 
firm production function is assumed to be:  
 
    ,t t tY i AN i   2.2.11  
 
where  0,1i  represent an index specific to the firm.  tY i and  tN i denotes the output 
and the labor input specific to firm i at time .t  tA  
is a technology/ labor productivity which 
is assumed to be common to all firms. It is assumed that there is a productivity shock 
 logt ta A  which follows an AR (1)
7 process.  
 
1 ,
a
t a t ta a     2.2.12  
 
where  0,1a  . From (2.2.11)  the aggregate production function can be written as: 
 
 .t t tY AN              (2.2.13)  
 In log terms, the above can be expressed as:    
 
t t ty a n    2.2.14  
                                                          
7
 Autoregressive of order 1.  
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2.3.2  Link between the Marginal Cost, Nominal Wage and Inflation. 
 
To derive the marginal cost, we begin with the derivation of the total cost.  The latter is 
derived by multiplying the total labor hours with the real wage. From (2.2.13)  the total 
labor hours can be expressed as: .tt
t
Y
N
A
 
  
 
 Therefore, total cost can be defined as: 
t t
t
t t
W Y
TC
P A
  
   
  
.  
The marginal cost is therefore given by: 
*t t
t t t
t t
W Y
TC P A
Y Y

 
 
 
1t
t t
W
P A
  
   
  
.   
The above can be written more compactly as: 
1t
t
t t
W
MC
P A
  
   
  
.
.
In logs the expression 
above can be written as:  
 
t t t tmc w p a     2.2.15  
 
The marginal cost is an increasing function of the nominal wages, and a decreasing 
function of technology improvement and prices.  
2.3.3  Aggregate Price Dynamics 
 
The price-setting is staggered following Calvo (1983). In each period a firm faces a fixed 
probability 1  of adjusting its price, irrespective of how long it has been since the last 
time it changed its price. However, a fraction   of firms keep their prices unchanged. 
Therefore,   is an index of price stickiness. The dynamics of the aggregate price is an 
average price of firms changing their prices as well as those that leave their prices 
unchanged which can be presented as follows: 
    
1
1
11 *
1 1 ,
t
t t t
B
P P i di P






 
   
  

  
 2.2.16
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where tP  stands for the aggregate price level,  0,tB   denotes the set of 
non-optimizing firms in period ,t while 
*
tP  denotes the optimal price chosen by firms 
which has the chance to set new prices.
 
    
1
11 1*
1 1t t tP P P
 
 
 

   
  
     
 Dividing by 1tP  both sides we get:  
 
1
1 *1 1
1
1 1
1
1t t t
t t
P
P P
P P
     
 
    
 
 
1
1 *1 1
1
1 1 1
1t t t
t t t
P P P
P P P
  
 
  

  
 
   
 
 
 
1
1 1*
1 1
1t t
t t
P P
P P
 
 
 
 
  
     
   
 
 
1
*
1
1
1 ,tt
t
P
P

  



  
     
   
 
 2.2.17
 
 where, 1t t tP P    is the inflation between time 1t  and .t  A log linearization of 
 2.2.17  around the zero inflation steady state yields.  
        * 11 exp(log exp(log( ) exp(log 1 1t t tP P           
 
        *1 exp(log exp(log( ) exp(log 1 1t t          
 
where 
* *
1t tP P   . Thus, 
     
*
1 1 1t t
   
  
 
  
      
 
 which is:
 
  * 11t t tp p                                                       2 . 2 . 1 8   
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2.2.18  states that inflation will rise if and only if firms having a chance of adjusting their 
prices decide to charge prices which are on average above the average prevailing prices.  
2.3.4  Optimal Price Setting8  
 
A firm faced with the decision to set the price today must do so taking into account that the 
newly reset price might affect future profits given the fact that there is a probability k  
that such a price may hold in period k  ahead. Thus, a firm given a chance to re-optimize 
in period t  will select
*
tP  which maximise the current market value of its profits, while the 
set price remains effective. Thus it maximizes the following function. 
    * *max , / /
0
,
t
k
t t t k t t k t t k t k tP
k
E Q P Y Y

   

 
 
  
 2.2.19
                                        
subject to a sequence of demand constraints 
*
\ ,
t
t k t t k
t k
P
Y C
P

 

 
  
        
 2.2.20
                                                                                                                    
for 0,1,2,......k   where  *tP is the price selected by the optimizing firm.   .t k  is  
the cost function, while /t k tY  is the output in period t k . ,t t kQ  denotes the stochastic 
discount factor or present value operator which is equal to the one which is faced by 
consumers .k t k t
t t k
C P
C P
 

 
 
 
 
The first order condition for the optimal price can be written as: 
 *, \ \
0
0,k t t t k t k t t t k t
k
E Q Y P 

  

   
                                      
 2 . 2 . 2 1
 
where, 
1


 

 is the markup measuring the distortion caused by monopolistic 
competition. 
'
\ \( )t k t t k t k tY    is the marginal cost in period t k for a firm which reset its 
price. In a world of perfect competition, firms would be able to set their prices equal to the 
marginal cost and the desired markup  * \.t t tP M . Thus the essence of price stickiness 
                                                          
8
 Appendix (D). 
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is to preclude firms from selling their goods at the desired markup. Dividing  2.2.21   by 
1.tP  
*
, \ \ 1,
0 1
0,k tt t t k t k t t k t t t k
k t
P
E Q Y MC
P


    
 
   
    
   

                           
 2.2.22
 
where \ \ /t k t t k t t kMC P    is the real marginal cost in period t k for a firm which last 
reset its price in period .t   1, /t t k t k tP P     is the gross inflation between period 1t   
and .t k  It is assumed that in the zero inflation steady state 
*
1/ 1,t tP P   1, 1t t k   . 
This implies further that * .t t kP P  Moreover, \t k tY Y  is constant and \t k tMC MC   
given that the firm will produce the same quantity of output. A first order Taylor expansion 
of (2.2.22)  around the zero inflation steady state yields:
   
     t k\* t1 1
0
1
k
t t t t k t
k
p p E mc p p 

 

     
 
 2.2.23
 
 
where t k \ \ \\t log .t k t t k t t k tmc mc mc mc M mc           Assuming a constant return to  
scale  t k\t t k , 2.2.23mc mc  can be presented as:
 
 
     t k*
0
1 ;
k
t t t k
k
p E mc p 

 

  
 
 2.2.24
 
 
 
A firm given an opportunity to adjust its price will set the price as a markup over a 
weighted average of its current and expected marginal costs. Combining  2.2.24  with 
the optimal price  2.2.18  we derive the inflation equation.  
  
 
 
 1 t ,t t tE mc       2.2.25
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where 
  1 1 


 
  measures the elasticity of inflation to the real marginal cost. 
(2.2.25)  states that changes in the current inflation will be driven by contemporaneous 
movements in the real marginal cost and the expected future inflation.   
 
2.3.5  Relationship between the Marginal Cost and the Output gap. 
 
The output gap is defined as the difference between output realized under nominal 
rigidities ty  and the natural output .
n
ty  The latter refers to output that would have been 
realized if prices were fully flexible. The marginal cost is related to output as follows:  
From  2.2.15  the economy‘s marginal cost is defined as:    
t t t tmc w p a             
From t t t tw p c n     the household utility optimization: 
.t t t tw p n c              
Using the goods market equilibrium condition t ty c . 
  ,t t t t tmc y a y a       
2.2.26   
   1 .t t tmc y a                                                        2 . 2 . 2 7  
In equilibrium output is at its natural level. In this case, the marginal cost is constant at its 
steady state value: :mc    Substituting this and the natural output into  2.2.27 , we 
get:  
   1 .nt tmc y a                 2.2.28  
It is assumed that the policy preference of the firm is to keep the marginal cost constant in 
the case of flexible prices. Thus, setting  0mc   implies that nty  becomes: 
1
.nt ty a

 
 
  
               
 2.2.29
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 2.2.29 states that when prices are flexible, equilibrium output will be proportional to the 
productivity shock .ta To derive the marginal cost gap we deduct  2.2.27 from  2.2.28 :  
       t 1 1 ,nt t t tmc y a y a               2.2.30  
 t ,nt tmc y y     
 t ,tmc y     2.2.31  
where ty  denotes the output gap. 
Combining  1 t ,t t tE mc      and  2.2.31  we derive the New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve9
 
 
 1 ,t t t tE y       2.2.32  
where  .       
(2.2.32) states that inflation will be determined by excess demand represented by the 
output gap as well as the expected inflation. 
  
 
 
2.4  Equilibrium  
 
In the preceding section I present the goods market equilibrium of the model. The goods 
market clearing requires that
  
   t tY i C i ,  0,1i  for all i , t . 
Defining the aggregate output as 
1 11
0
( ) ,t tY Y i di

 

  
  
 

  
 
                                                          
9
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It follows that goods market clearing condition in the economy is:  
.t tY C  
Taking logs on both sides we get: 
.t ty c  
 2.2.33
 
 
Substituting  2.2.9  into  2.2.33  we derive: 
    1 1
1
.t t t t ty E y i  

    
 
 2.2.34
 
Subtracting the natural output from  2.2.34 : 
    1 1 1 1
1
,n n n nt t t t t t t t t t ty y y E y y i E y y 

   
  
          
        
   1 1
1
( ) ,nt t t t t t ty E y i E r

                                             
       
(2.2.35)  
where  1n n nt t t tr E y y     is the natural interest rate (Wicksellian interest rate) refers 
to the interest rate determined by real factors in the economy. This tells us that the output- 
gap is proportional to the deviations between the real and the natural interest rates. Using 
 2.2.29  the natural interest rate can be expressed as: 
 
1
1
.nt t t tr E a a

 
 

 
   
 
  2.2.36
 
It follows that the natural interest rate is determined by changes in technology. After 
presenting the goods market equilibrium, output gap and the natural interest rate, I now 
introduce central bank, which is represented by the monetary policy rule.  
2.5  Monetary Policy Rule(s)  
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This section presents the monetary policy rate rule(s) of the central bank. In particular, I 
assume a Taylor rule (non smoothing policy rule), where the interest rate responds to: 
contemporaneous inflation and the output gap.  
t t y t ti y v                                                               2.2.37      
where ti  represent the policy rate, tv  is a shock to interest rate, which is assumed to 
follow an AR (1) process 1
v
t v t tv v   .    and y  are the coefficients on inflation and 
output respectively. This rule does not capture the tendency of central banks to smooth 
the interest rate. Thus, I model interest rate smoothing by allowing the contemporaneous 
interest rate to responds to the past value of the interest rate, contemporaneous inflation 
and the output gap. This gives us a Taylor rule with lagged interest rate (smoothing policy 
rule) which follows:  
 
 1 1 ,yt i t i t t ti i y v                    2.2.38  
r  is an interest rate smoothing parameter. Moreover the policy rule can be described as 
leaning against the wind in the sense that both the coefficients of inflation and the output 
gap are positive, i.e. the central bank raises the policy rate when either inflation or the 
output gap is above its target.  
 
McCallum (1997) however criticises the Taylor rule considered above based on the fact 
that it requires the central bank to use current output and inflation data when setting the 
policy interest rate, given that such data may not be available then. Woodford (1999) 
states that, current output and inflation data may be unobservable by the central bank for 
two reasons: Firstly, economic data are more often collected retrospectively. Besides, 
data collection requires processing before the inherent information about the economy 
can be distilled.  Secondly, even if the data was observable immediately the political 
process of responding to them takes time. To take this constraint into account, we extend 
the model further by supposing that the central bank instead responds to the output gap 
and inflation variations with a lag of one quarter. Thus, we modify the rule in 2.2.38  to the 
Backward looking Taylor rule as:       
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 1 1 11 ,t i t i t y t ti i y v               2.2.39  
 
Woodford (1999) argues that using a policy rule similar to  2.2.39  would make the 
operations of the central bank more transparent to the public if the latter had such lagged 
data. Likewise, it will be easier for the public to detect when the central bank has deviated 
from the rule.        
2.6  Model Calibration and Solution 
 
The complete model can be presented by six endogenous variables and two shocks:  
Output gap:     1 1
1 n
t t t t t t ty E y i E r

                                     2 . 2 . 3 5
 
Ad-hoc Money Demand: t t t tm p y i                                        2 . 2 . 1 0
 
Phillips Curve:  1t t t ttE y                                                2.2.32
 
Monetary Policy Rules:  
Taylor rule:                   t t y t ti y v                              2 . 2 . 3 7     
Taylor rule with lagged interest rate:  1 1t i t i t y t ti i y v                 2 . 2 . 3 8    
Backward looking Taylor rule:   1 1 11 ,t i t i t y t ti i y v               2.2.39   
 
Monetary Policy Shock:        1
v
t v t tv v   .                            2 . 2 . 3 7 
Technology Shock:             1
a
t a t ta a                               2 . 2 . 1 2 
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Table 1  Parameter values used in calibrating a Closed Economy Model10. 
Parameter Value Description 
  0.99  The discount factor 
  1 Coefficient of risk aversion 
  1 Elasticity of labour supply 
  4 Sensitivity of interest rate to money demand 
  0.75  Measure of price stickiness 
  6 Elasticity of demand 
i  0.9 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to  
interest rate (value as in Galí & Gertler 2007) 
  1.2 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to 
inflation(value as in Rotemberg & Woodford 
1999) 
y  0.06 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to 
the output gap (value as in Rotemberg & 
Woodford 1999) 
v  0.5  Persistence of the monetary policy shock 
a  
0.9
 
Persistence of the technology shock 
Parameters for the Backward looking Taylor rule 
i  0.9 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to  
interest rate (value as in Galí & Gertler, 2007) 
y  0.08 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to  
the output gap (value as in Rotemberg & 
Woodford, 1999) 
  1.27
11 Sensitivity of the central bank wrt the inflation 
rate ( as in Rotemberg & Woodford, 1999) 
                                                          
10
 The model was solved numerically using the Dynare algorithm in Matlab. Most model parameters are as in Galí (2008) 
unless stated otherwise.   
11
 The inflation and output parameters are higher in Backward Looking Taylor rule compared to the Taylor rule. This can be 
explained by the fact the monetary authority has to aggressively respond to past inflation and output gap varibles to ensure 
determinancy (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2000).   
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2.7  Results 
 
This section presents the results of the impact of interest rate smoothing on the 
persistence of a monetary and technology shock using the impulse response functions. 
More specifically, Sub section 2.7.1 presents the comparison of the impulse responses 
of a monetary policy shock between the Taylor policy rule  2.2.37 and Taylor with a 
lagged interest rate policy rule  2.2.38  and the backward looking Taylor rule  2.2.39 .  
Sub section 2.7.2  compares the impulse responses to a technology shock under the 
three policy rules. Sub section 2.7.3 concludes. 
   
2.7.1  Monetary Policy Shock  
 
The impulse responses to a monetary policy shock of about 0.25 basis points are 
depicted in Figure 1. The dotted line denotes the impulses from a policy rule of a Taylor 
rule with lagged interest rate, the marked line symbolise the Taylor rule. The backward 
looking Taylor policy rule is represented by the bold line. The model predicts that a 
positive monetary shock induces an increase in the nominal and the real interest rate. 
The resultant increase in the real interest rate causes a decline in the current output 
relative to the future expected output, because economic agents consider current 
consumption to be cheaper than the future consumption. This subsequently leads to a 
decrease in the output gap and inflation in the next period. Money supply decline, and 
thus the model predicts a liquidity effect similar to Galí (2008).  
However, the impulses from the Taylor with lagged interest rate and backward looking 
Taylor rule (interest rate smoothing) are more persistent than those of Galí (2008) or the 
Taylor rule. When the central bank follows a Taylor rule (contemporaneous policy rule), 
this model predicts that the impulses to a monetary policy shock persist for eight periods 
and a half. The impulses persist further (ten periods and a half) when the central bank 
follows the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate or the backward looking Taylor rule. The 
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innovations return gradually to the steady state in the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate 
or backward looking Taylor rule.   
Thus, in this model an interest rate smoothing policy rule (Taylor rule with lagged interest 
rate or backward looking Taylor rule) induces long lived persistence compared to a 
contemporaneous policy rule (Taylor rule). The Taylor rule with lagged interest rate 
compounds the impact of the shock on most of the variables in the period which follows 
the shock.  The backward looking Taylor rule induces a more severe impact on the 
money supply, real interest rate and nominal interest than the Taylor rule with lagged 
interest rate and the Taylor rule respectively. A detailed analysis of the response of each 
variable is presented in the rest of this section.  
As explained earlier, the nominal interest rate increases following the monetary shock. 
The immediate effect (first period after the shock) of the Taylor with lagged interest rate 
rate is to moderate the impact of the shock on the nominal interest rate to 3 basis points 
(annualised) from 4 basis points (annualised) in the Taylor rule. The backward looking 
Taylor policy rule tends to compound the impact of the shock on the nominal interest rate 
to 1 per cent annualised. The persistence increase from eight and half in the Taylor rule 
(non interest rate smoothing policy rule) to approximately ten periods and half in the 
Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and backward looking Taylor policy rule (interest rate 
smoothing rules).  
Similarly, the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate intensifies the increase in the real 
interest rate to 4 percent annualised from 6 basis points annualised in the Taylor rule. 
The backward looking Taylor policy rule intensifies the increase in the real rate to 4 per 
cent annualised. The Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking 
Taylor policy rule compound the impact of the monetary shock on inflation. In the period 
which follows the shock, the decline in inflation increases to minus 5 per cent annualised 
in both policies from a relatively lower decline of minus 4 basis points annualised in the 
Taylor rule.  
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A one per cent increase in the policy rate reduces the output gap by minus 1.3 per cent 
when the central bank follows a Taylor rule. The impact is increased further to minus 
10.5 per cent and 10 per cent in the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the 
backward looking Taylor rule respectively. The contraction in the money supply increase 
to minus 16 and 18 per cent annualised in the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and 
the backward looking Taylor policy rule respectively from minus 3 per cent annualised in 
the Taylor rule. The persistence increases from seven periods (Taylor rule) to ten 
periods and half in the Taylor with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor 
rule respectively.  
The persistence of the policy rate is the same in all the policy rules. Thus, the high 
persistence observed on variables in the Taylor with lagged interest rate and the 
backward looking Taylor rule can be ascribed to the lagged interest rate which enters the 
policy function of the central bank. To summarise, the persistence of the monetary policy 
shock is truncated in a Taylor rule compared to the Taylor with lagged interest rate and 
the backward looking Taylor rule. Moreover, it eases the impact of the shock on 
variables. Interest rate smoothing policies (Taylor with lagged interest rate or backward 
looking Taylor rule), increases the persistence of the monetary policy shock, and 
increases the impact of the shock on variables. Based on the persistence and volatility of 
inflation therefore, the Taylor rule is considered superior to the Taylor with lagged 
interest rate or backward looking Taylor rule.        
2.7.2  Technology Shock  
Figure 2 show the impulse responses to a 10 per cent technology shock. The shock 
reduces the nominal interest rate, inflation, the output gap while it increases the money 
supply. Similar to the monetary shock, the model predicts a liquidity effect. Except on the 
real interest rate, the persistence of a technology shock tends to be truncated in the 
Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor policy rule. This is 
contrary to a monetary policy shock in which the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and 
the backward looking Taylor policy rule protract the persistence.  
48 
 
Likewise, the effects of the shock on these variables tend to be mixed. For instance, the 
Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule tend to 
increase the impact of the technology shock on the output gap, while it eases the impact 
on the nominal interest rate. However, the effects of the shock on the real interest rates 
and money supply tend to be divergent in the Taylor rules compared to the two interest 
rate smoothing policy rules (Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and backward looking 
Taylor rule). A detailed analysis of the impact and persistence of the shock on each 
variable is presented below.  
After the shock, the decline in the nominal interest rate eases from minus 3 per cent in 
the Taylor rule to minus 3 basis points in the Taylor with lagged interest rate policy rule. 
The impulse persistence extends beyond 20 periods in both the Taylor rule and the 
backward looking Taylor rule. In the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate however, the 
impulse persist for six periods only. The decline in inflation decrease to minus 2.4 per 
cent and 2.2 per cent in the Taylor with lagged interest rate and the backward looking 
Taylor rule from minus 2.5 per cent in the Taylor rule. The persistence is also reduced 
considerably to 10 periods in the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and backward 
looking Taylor policy rule. On the other hand, the persistence extends beyond 20 periods 
in the Taylor rule.  
The output gap decline further by 6 per cent and 5 per cent in the Taylor with lagged 
interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule respectively, from minus 2 per cent in 
the Taylor policy rule. Similarly, the persistence of the output gap declines to 10 periods 
in the Taylor with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule. In the Taylor 
rule however the output gap persists beyond 20 periods. The money supply growth 
declines significantly by minus 6 per cent in the backward looking Taylor policy rule as 
well as the Taylor with lagged interest rate policy rule from an expansion of 8 per cent in 
the Taylor rule. The persistence is however long lived and persists beyond 20 periods in 
both policy regimes. Unlike the case of a monetary policy shock, the persistence of the 
shock is long lived in the in the Taylor with lagged interest rate and the backward looking 
Taylor rule compared to the Taylor rule. Accordingly, based on the persistence and 
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volatility of inflation, the Taylor with lagged interest rate and backward looking Taylor rule 
are considered as superior to the Taylor rule given that they reduce the persistence and 
volatility of the shock. This tends to suggest that a policy maker faces a trade off as to 
which policy rule to select. In case of a monetary policy shock, the Taylor rule is superior 
in terms of reducing the persistence and volatility of the shock on inflation, while in case 
of a Technology shock, the interest smoothing policy rules (Taylor rule with lagged 
interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule) are superior to the Taylor rule.    
2.7.3   Conclusion   
 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the impact of interest rate smoothing on the 
persistence of both a monetary and technology shock in a DSGE model. It can be 
concluded that, in this model, interest rate smoothing rules (Taylor with lagged interest 
rate or the backward looking Taylor rule) elongates the persistence of a monetary shock, 
while it truncates the persistence of a technology shock. Moreover, the Taylor rule with 
lagged interest rate compounds the impact of a monetary shock on the nominal interest 
rate, inflation, the output gap and money supply. The impact of the backward looking 
Taylor policy rule on the same variables is similar except on the nominal interest rate. 
The Taylor rule on the otherhand shortens the persistence of a monetary policy shock.  
Assuming that the objective of the central bank is to reduce the persistence and volatility 
of the shock on inflation, the Taylor rule is considered superior to the Taylor rule with 
lagged interest rule or the backward looking Taylor rule when the econonomy is hit by a 
monetary policy shock. On the contrary, a positive technology shock reduces the 
nominal interest rate, inflation, the output gap while it increases the money supply. 
Moreover, interest smoothing rules tend to truncate the persistence of the technology 
shock. Thus, the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor 
rule is considered superior to the Taylor rule when the economy is faced with a 
technology shock. Galí (2008) obtained short lived persistence due to a monetary policy 
shock and long lived persistence due to technology shock, similar to those displayed in 
the Taylor rule.  
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Figure 1  Impulse Responses to a Monetary Shock 
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Figure 2  Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock 
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Appendix (A)  Derivation of (2.2.4). 
The household maximizes total expenditure on good: 
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In order to solve the maximization problem, we first set out the Lagrangian Function: 
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The End. 
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Appendix (B)  Derivation of (2.2.6 2.2.7).  
     
The household maximizes utility:
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The  End.  
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Appendix (C)  Derivation of (2.2.8 2.2.9).  
 
Linearizing the optimality conditions  
 
Consumption/labor choice (2.2.6)  
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Present and future consumption choice (2.2.7)  
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Appendix (D)  Derivation of (2.2.21 2.2.25).   
 
 
The firm wants to maximize the profit function 
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Substituting for the sequence of demand constraints, we get. 
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We can re-write the above equation as  
   *, \ \
0
. 0,k t t t k t k t t t k t
k
E Q Y P 

  

  
 
 
 2.2.21  
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We log-linearize the optimal price setting equation about the zero inflation steady state. 
To do so we, re-write the equation above in terms of variables which have well defined 
steady state and divide by 1.tP  
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where \ \ /t k t t k t t kMC P   is the real marginal cost in period t k for a firm which last 
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Log-linearizing around the zero inflation steady state.  
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where    log ( ).M   
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Assuming constant return to scale  t k\t t k , 2.2.23mc mc  can be presented as:
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2.8  Model solution (Analytical) 
 
Derivation of the output gap  
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Chapter 3  Cost Push Shock and Monetary Policy Rules. 
 
3.0  Introduction and Literature Review. 
 
This chapter aims to address the question of which monetary policy rule (targeting rule or 
instrument rules) performs better in the presence of a cost push shock. It is motivated by 
the great moderation (the period from 1993 to 2006) which was characterised by low and 
stable inflation in developed economies. Credit to this is attributed to the inflation 
targeting framework which was adopted by many countries, developed, developing and 
emerging markets. Scott (2010) for instance records that a total number of 26 countries 
had implemented Inflation Targeting by March 2010. This has prompted renewed 
interest on research in monetary policy rules and their effects on the economy. For 
instance Clarida et al. (1999) states that this area of research has been inspired by the 
empirical findings of the short-term non-neutrality of monetary policy and developments 
in the theoretical frameworks such as sticky price dynamic general equilibrium models 
which are used to evaluate policies. 
 
A number of studies have examined the performance of different monetary policy 
regimes. For instance, King and Wolman (1999), Goodfriend and King (2001) and 
Woodford, (2003) suggest that a policy which targets inflation strictly will maximise 
welfare in a closed economy setting. Aoki (2001) addresses the question of an open 
economy facing sector specific supply shocks. He shows that a policy which fully 
stabilise the inflation in the sticky price sector is the optimal monetary policy because it 
also maximizes household welfare. He suggests that the central bank should target core 
inflation (inflation in the sticky-price sector) rather than a broad measure of inflation. 
Additionally, his model predicts that policies which stabilize the output gap or the core 
inflation are complementary.  
 
Clarida et al. (2001) argue that when the exchange rate path through is perfect, 
monetary policy should allow the exchange rate to float and rather target domestic 
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inflation. Their work was an extension of Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler 
(1999) carried over to a small open economy. They present a normative analysis of 
monetary policy within a simple optimization-based closed economy framework and 
derive the optimal policy rule. They show that using their parameterization, the design of 
monetary policy for the small open economy is isomorphic to the problem of the closed 
economy.  
 
  
Similarly, Galí and Monacelli (2002) and Galí 2005 contend that a policy which targets 
domestic inflation is optimal in the open economy. They develop and analyse a tractable 
optimizing model of a small open economy with staggered price setting as in Calvo 
(1980). They show that the equilibrium dynamics for that model economy is a canonical 
representation of a closed economy. The only difference between the small open 
economy model and its closed economy counterpart is due to two features: first, some 
coefficients, i.e. the degree of openness and substitutability of goods produced in 
different countries depend on parameters which are specific to small open economy, and 
second, the natural levels of output and interest rates in the small open economy are 
generally a function of both domestic and foreign disturbances. 
 
In addition, they show how the welfare level of alternative monetary policy rules can be 
evaluated. The loss function of the model is similar to the corresponding closed economy 
and penalizes fluctuations in domestic inflation and the output gap. They use the model 
to analyse the properties of three alternative monetary regimes for the small open 
economy namely, a domestic inflation-based Taylor rule, a CPI-based Taylor rule, and 
an exchange rate peg. Also, the analysis shows the presence of a trade-off between 
stabilizing the output gap and domestic inflation on one hand and the nominal exchange 
rate and the terms of trade, on the other. They demonstrate that a policy of domestic 
inflation targeting, which simultaneous stabilizes both domestic prices and the output 
gap, requires larger volatility of the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade relative 
to the simple Taylor rules or an exchange rate peg.  
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On the contrary Benigno and Benigno (2003) argue that the literature which suggests a 
similar optimal monetary policy prescription between an open economy and a closed 
economy to implement the flexible-price allocation depend on the assumption that the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is unity. Still, policy makers 
may implement the flexible-price allocation under special restrictions on the structural 
parameters only, for instance in cases where the bias to inflate (associated with 
monopolistic competition) exactly offsets the deflationary bias (to manipulate the terms of 
trade in one's favour). They contend that in a more general preference specifications, 
even a policy maker operating under commitment or discretion will have an incentive to 
depart from implementing the flexible-price allocation. They attribute this to the fact that 
in the open-economy, a policy maker may have either an inflationary or deflationary bias.  
 
To derive the results they use a model where markets are complete, nominal rigidities 
are in the form of one-period price contract, and prices are set in the currency of the 
producer. Also, they suggest that monetary policy coordination may bring efficiency. 
Sutherland (2002a) correspondingly shows that when monetary policy is coordinated, 
the welfare arising from international risk-sharing is relatively higher than the welfare 
level when there is no risk-sharing in the financial markets. His paper uses an 
approximation method to address the welfare analysis when the elasticity of substitution 
is different from unity.  
 
Smelts and Wouters (2002) argue that optimal monetary policy should take into account 
the exchange rate volatility. They show that the central bank should aim at minimizing a 
weighted average of the domestic and import price inflation, in order to minimise the 
resource costs associated with the staggered price setting. Their paper examines the 
effects of imperfect exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary policy in a 
linearized open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to euro area 
data. Imperfect exchange rate pass through is modelled as sticky import price behaviour. 
They estimate the degree of domestic and import price stickiness by reproducing the 
empirical impulse response of a monetary policy and exchange rate shock conditional on 
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the response of output, net trade and the exchange rate. Similarly, De Paoli (2009) says 
that the optimal monetary policy in a small open economy is not isomorphic to a closed 
economy. She shows that under a general specification and where the steady state of 
output is inefficient, the optimal monetary policy is the exchange rate targeting. She 
describes welfare in a small open economy and assumes that the utility-based loss 
function in a small open economy is a quadratic expression in the real exchange rate, 
output gap and domestic inflation. Domestic inflation targeting (price stability) is optimal 
only under a particular parameterization, and where price stickiness is the only distortion 
in the economy. 
 
The common feature between all the studies reviewed in this chapter is their use of a 
welfare based method of evaluation. In a theoretical model it is relatively easy to include 
the cost push shock in the analysis of optimal policy rule. Practically however, the 
welfare maximising strategy becomes difficult and complex to implement. This is true 
even in the case where the loss function is simple. The optimal policy may entail 
responding to variables which cannot be measured or observed. Thus the monetary 
authority might find it impractical to follow an optimal policy. In this case it may be helpful 
to evaluate the performance of simple targeting and instrument rules using impulse 
response functions and volatility analysis. This is the aim of this chapter as well as point 
of departure from similar papers.  
 
I build on Galí and Monacelli (200812) who use a small open econony. I extend their 
model by including a cost push shock and a world output shock. Furthermore, I broaden 
the analysis by comparing how the results compares in the Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(1998), rules commonly known as the CGG(+1) and the CGG(+4) rules. The 
forward-looking instrument rules tend to capture the behaviour of most central banks 
quite well. For instance, Svensson (2000) recommends that in an attempt to control 
inflation a few years ahead, central banks had to adopt forward looking rules. Moreover, 
instrument rules in which the policy rate is restricted to respond only to the deviations of 
                                                          
12
 The monetary policy rules in particular the domestic inflation targeting and the consumer price inflation 
targeting rules were derived from Galí and Monacelli (2002). 
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the variables to their target level and lagged interest rate or past variables as specified in 
Chapter 2 are meant for a closed economy such as USA (Svennson, 1998). Thus, I 
consider Forward looking rules given that I am modelling a small open economy. In the 
next section I present the model used in the analysis of monetary policy rules in the 
presence of a cost push shock. 
 
3.1  The Model. 
 
Here I present a model for a small open economy characterised by complete asset 
markets, where both domestic and foreign goods are consumed; even though all goods 
can be traded internationally. There is no international coordination between this 
economy and the world economy. The world economy consists of a continuum of small 
open economies similar to the one modelled here, represented by the unit interval. Given 
that each small economy is of measure zero, its performance does not have any impact 
on the rest of the world. It is assumed here that different economies have identical 
preferences, technology and market structure, however they are subjected to imperfectly 
correlated productivity shocks. Firms are identical across countries with a constant return 
to scale.  
 
In the next section I present the demand side of the model for a small open economy.  
Specifically, I present the preferences of the representative household, the composite 
consumption index, the domestic and imported goods indexes, the domestic and foreign 
inflation indexes, the overall consumer price index (CPI). The budget constraint faced by 
the household, the optimality conditions and their log-linearization is also shown.  
 
3.1.1  Household Preference. 
 
A household is assumed to maximize the following utility function 
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The consumer obtains utility from consumption tC  and receives disutility from work, 
represented by working hours .tN    stands for the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution while   denotes the elasticity of labor supply, capturing the sensitivity of 
employment/labor supply to changes in the wage. 0E  is the expectation as at time 0   
while 
t  is the intertemporal discount factor 0 1  . tC  is a composite consumption 
index as: 
      
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            3 . 1 . 2 
where 
,H tC denotes the consumption basket of home produced goods, ,F tC stand for the 
consumption basket of foreign produced good but in the domestic economy.  0 
denotes the degree of substitution between domestic foreign and domestic goods 
respectively. In this model   is finite, i.e. the two goods are imperfect substitute of each 
other. An infinite   implies that the goods are perfect substitutes. 0  represents the 
bias towards the consumption of the home produced goods and thus a measures the 
openness of the economy. CH,t  is an index of consumption of domestic goods, which is 
given by the (constant elasticity of substitution) CES-function,CF,t  is similarly an index of 
consumption of imported goods, also characterised by the CES-function. 
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where j  represent a variety of goods, ,i tC  is an index of the different goods imported 
from country i  characterised by a CES-function, while  denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between imported goods produced in different countries. 1   measure the 
elasticity of substitution between goods produced within an economy.   
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The domestic and foreign price indexes are given as: 
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For all  , 0,1 ,i j where ,H tP denotes the domestic price index, given by the CES-function, 
,i tP is a CES-aggregator or price index of goods imported from country .i The consumer 
problem is to maximise total expenditure on home produced goods as well as foreign 
produced goods13. The ensuing demand functions for each category of goods are: 
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The demand for good j  is inversely related to its price relative to other goods and total 
demand. The optimal allocation of expenditures on imports by country of origin can be 
presented as: 
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For all  0,1i  and where  
1
1 11
, ,
0
F t i tP P di
    denotes the price index of imported 
goods in terms of the domestic currency. The total expenditure on foreign goods can be 
expressed as: PF,tCF,t.  Thus, total expenditure on both home and foreign goods can be 
expressed as: 
 
                                                          
13
Appendix (E). 
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The optimal allocation of expenditure between domestic and foreign goods can be 
written as14:  
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where tP  is the overall consumer price index (CPI) i.e. weighted average of both the 
domestic and foreign prices, expressed as: 
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The budget constraint is given by: 
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where 
, 1t tQ  is the stochastic discount factor for the one-period-ahead nominal payoffs 
relevant to the domestic household. 1tD   is the nominal payoff on the bond in the period 
1t  for the from a portfolio of assets held at the end of period .t  tW  is the nominal wage, 
tT  is tax. The optimality condition is given by: 
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The consumption Euler equation 
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 Appendix (F). 
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  is the gross return on a riskless one period discount bond which pays one   
unit of the domestic currency in the next period 1t  . The optimal conditions can be 
log-linearized as: 
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log    is the time discount rate. 
 
After presenting the household preferences, I now present how the domestic inflation is 
linked to the consumer price inflation (CPI), the real exchange rate and the terms of 
trade. 
3.1.2  The Link between Domestic Inflation, CPI Inflation, Real Exchange Rate and 
Terms of Trade.  
 
The bilateral terms of trade between the domestic economy and country i  is defined as 
the price of country 'i s goods in terms of the home goods: 
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The effective (multilateral) terms of trade are therefore: 
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Log-linearize equation  3.1.11  around the steady state15. 
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where 
, ,t F t H ts p p   represent the log effective terms of trade, or the price of foreign 
produced goods in terms of home produced goods. The first difference of  3.1.20 is 
given by:  
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which states that domestic inflation and CPI inflation are linked by the changes in the 
terms of trade. Assuming that the law of one price holds16 between imports and exports 
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 Appendix (G). 
16
 The price of a good is the same once converted into the same currency. 
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t i tp p di   represents the log world price index.  
Combining  3.1.22 with the log of  3.1.18 we derive. 
, , , .t t F t t F t H te p p s p p
       
, .t t t H te p s p
     
, .t t H t te p p s
     
*
,t t t H ts e p p              3.1.23  
 
which states that the terms of trade is a linear function of the nominal exchange rate, the 
world price and the prices of domestically produced goods. Defining the bilateral 
exchange rate between the home country and country i  as the ratio of the two 
countries‘ CPIs, but expressed in terms of the domestic currency as:  
 
,
,
i
i t t
i t
t
e p
Q
p

                                                        
 3.1.24
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Taking logs  
 
,
i
it i t t tq e p p                                                       
 3 . 1 . 2 5 
 
The log effective real exchange rate is17: 
 
1
,
0
t i tq q di                                                           3 . 1 . 2 6                                      
 
1
,
0
i
i t t te p p di     
 
,t H t ts p p     
  1 .t tq s                                                         3 . 1 . 2 7 
 
3.1.3  International Risk Sharing. 
 
The international financial markets are complete and there is perfect capital mobility. 
Therefore, domestic residents can purchase either domestically or foreign denominated 
bonds, a condition which prevails to foreign residents as well. Schmitt-Grobe and Uribe 
(2003) states that models with either incomplete or complete markets give similar 
dynamics at business cycle frequencies. Therefore, the choice between complete or 
incomplete assets assumption should rather be dictated by the convenience of 
computation. The complete market assumption and the perfect capital mobility leads two 
results namely international risk sharing and uncovered interest parity condition. 
Consequently, the expected nominal returns on bonds will be the same in each country 
as follows: 
1
i
i t
t t t i
t
e
R R E
e 
 
  
 
           3.1.28   
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To derive the international risk sharing we assume that the Euler equation of the foreign  
economy is assumed to be: 
 
1
1 1
i i i
i t t t
t t ti i i
t t t
c p e
R E E
c p e




 
       
      
       
   3.1.29  
  
Combining   3.1.29   with   3.1.14  and substituting for the real exchange rate18  
1 1
1 1 1
i i i
t t t t t
t t ti i i
t t t t t
c p c p e
E E E
c p c p e
 
 
 
 
  
               
            
               
                      3.1.30  
 
1
,
i
t t i tC C Q
                                                         3 . 1 . 3 1 
where  1
1 1
,
i
i t
t
t
i t
C
E
C Q

 

 
 
  
 
 
 is a constant which depends on the initial foreign assets 
position. Assuming a zero net foreign asset holding, and an ex-ante identical 
environment: 1 .i i     Thus taking logs of both sides of  3.1.31 yields19:  
 
1
,
i
t t i tc c q                                                         
 3 . 1 . 3 2 
* 1 .t t tc c s


 
   
 
                                                    3 . 1 . 3 3 
The home consumption is related to the world consumption through the terms of trade. 
 
3.1.4  Uncovered Interest Parity and the Terms of Trade. 
 
The complete international financial markets assumption implies that the equilibrium 
price of a riskless bond denominated in the currency of country i is given by  
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 , , 1 , 1 .ii t t t t t i te Q E Q e  The equation for the domestic bond price is stated as:  , 1 ,t t t tQ E Q   
where  Qt
i
  denotes the price of the bond expressed in the currency of country i . 
Combining the two expressions yields the uncovered interest parity as follows20 
 
  , 1 , 1 , 0it t t t t i t i tE Q Q Q e e                                             3 . 1 . 3 4 
 
Taking logs on both sides and aggregating over .i  
 
 * 1 ,t t t ti i E e                                                         3 . 1 . 3 5 
 
which is the uncovered interest parity condition stating that domestic interest rate is a 
function of world interest rate and the expected appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate of the domestic currency. Combining  3.1.23  with  3.1.35 we get:    
*
1 1 1 , 1 ,t t t t t t t t t t H t H tE s s E e e E P P E P P

                                     3.1.36  
       * * 1 1 1t t t t t t t t ts i E i E E s                                       3 . 1 . 3 7 
The terms of trade of trade are pinned down in a perfect foresight steady state. It follows 
that lim   0.t TT E S   Solving forward we get: 
    * *0t k t k t k t k t kks E i i 

   
                                        3 . 1 . 3 8 
The terms of trade are an expected sum of the real interest rate differential between the 
home market and the world market. 
3.2  Firms 
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In the ensuing section I present the production side of the model. More precisely, I 
present the production technology of the firm. I also describe the price setting behavior of 
the firms and present the optimal price for the optimizing firm.  
3.2.1  Production Technology 
 
Each country has a continuum of monopolistic firms, each firm produces a differentiated 
good .j  A firm in the domestic economy produces a differentiated good with a linear 
technology represented by the production function: 
 
   t t tY j AN j                 3 . 1 . 3 9 
 
where t aa  1 ;t ta   and where  0,1j stand for a firm-specific index. The real 
marginal cost in terms of domestic prices is assumed to be common across domestic 
firms and given by: 
 
, ,t t H t tmc w p a        3.1.40  
where  log 1 ,    while  is an employment subsidy.  
 
3.2.2  Price Setting Behavior of the firm 
 
A representative firm set the price of its produce to maximise profit. In the domestic 
economy, firms set prices in a Calvo (1983) fashion. Consequently, prices are staggered; 
creating rigidities in the economy. According to the Calvo pricing strategy only a fraction 
1   of domestic firms are able to change the prices of their production. The remaining 
fraction of firms  maintain their prices unchanged. The aggregate domestic price level 
is therefore a combination of two factions of firms, optimising firms  1 H  and 
non-optimising firms  H  as shown in  3.1.41 below. 
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 
1
1 1 1
, , , 11 ,H t H H t H H tP P P
                  3.1.41  
 
where ,H tP  is the price of optimising firms while , 1H tP   is the price level of firms which do 
not adjust their prices. Log-linearizing  3.1.41 becomes21: 
 
  , , , 11 .H t H H t H tp p p                                               3 . 1 . 4 2 
 
An optimising firm  j  chooses a new price ,H tP  to maximise the present value of its 
dividends: 
 
         ,max , ,0 ,H t
k d n
t t t k t k H t t kp j k
E Q Y j P j MC j

  
              3 . 1 . 4 3 
 
subject to the budget constraints 
 
      1, ,, ,0
, ,
H t H td
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H t k H t k
P P
Y j C j C j di y
P P
  
   
 
   
        
   
                 3.1.44  
 
for  0,1,2,k   where k is the stochastic discount factor, nt kMC  is the marginal cost. 
Thus  , dH t t kP Y  is the total revenue; while  n dt k t kMC Y  are the total costs. The first order 
condition for the price optimisation can be written as22: 
   
, ,0
0
1
k d n d
t t t k t k H t t k t kk
E Q Y P MC Y




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  
     
                            3 . 1 . 4 5 
where, 
1


 
 
 
stands for the mark-up over the marginal costs. Log-linearizing   
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 3.1.45  around the steady state inflation yields: 
 
   , ,t k
0
1 .
k
H t H t H H t k
k
p E mc P 



                                   3 . 1 . 4 6 
 
A firm sets the price as a mark-up over a weighted average of the expected future 
marginal costs. The optimal price setting of firms yields a rule for the development of the 
domestic inflation.  
 
, , 1 ,H t t H t H tE mc    
                                              3 . 1 . 4 7 
where  
  1 1H H
H
 


 
   
The domestic inflation is forward looking.   
 
After describing the optimal price setting behaviour of the firm, in the next section, I 
present the goods market equilibrium conditions in a small open economy. It should be 
noted that unlike in the previous chapter, total consumption in a small economy 
comprises of the consumption of the domestic produced goods and the consumption of a 
foreign produced goods. This analysis culminates into the dynamic aggregate output 
equation in the small open economy. The section also presents the trade balance, the 
marginal cost and inflation dynamics. The later subsection also presents the link 
between the marginal costs, the terms of trade, world output and domestic output. The 
section ends with New Keynesian Phillips Curve augmented with the cost push shock 
intended to induce a trade-off which policy makers face when stabilising output or 
inflation. The rest of the section is presented below: 
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3.3  Equilibrium Conditions 
 
3.3.1  Aggregate Demand and Output Determination 
 
3.3.1.1  Consumption and Output 
 
In equilibrium the domestic production tY  of good  j  must be equal to domestic 
consumption  
, ( )H tC j  and foreign consumption , ( ) :
i
H tC j   
 
   1, ,0( ) .
i
t H t H tY j C j C j di                                3 . 1 . 4 8 
Inserting    3.1.6 , 3.1.7  and  3.1.10 into  3.1.48 yields23: 
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  3.1.49  
Defining the aggregate domestic output as: 
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The real exchange is defined as 
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Substitute   ,i tS  for the bilateral terms of trade 
,
,
i
F t
H t
P
P
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 
 
 and  itS  for the effective 
terms of trade
,
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. tY  becomes: 
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Log- linearizing  3.1.51 around the steady state gives: 
,t t ty c s


            3.1.52  
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where   1 1       , ts


 are the terms of trade effect. 
For a generic country ,i  3.1.52  can be written as .i i it t ty c s


   
Aggregating over all countries we derive the world market clearing condition. 
1 1 1 1 1
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 3.1.53  is derived by assuming that 
1
0
0,its di  and where ty
  and tc
  are world output 
and consumption indexes expressed in log terms. Combining the domestic goods market 
equilibrium condition  3.1.52 with the international risk sharing  3.1.33 and substituting 
for the world output condition  3.1.53 , the aggregate output condition in terms of world 
output can therefore be written as: 
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Combining  3.1.56 with the consumption Euler equation  3.1.16 , and the terms of 
trade  3.1.21  we derive the dynamic aggregate output equation. 
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  *1 1 1
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where 1  .  
 
This implies that the degree of openness as expressed by    has an influence on the 
sensitivity of domestic output to changes resulting from the real interest rate.  
 
3.3.1.2  The Trade Balance 
 
We define the net exports as the difference between total production and total 
consumption in relation to the steady state output :Y  
,
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A first order approximation around a symmetric steady state:  
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t t t tnx y c s                                                             3.1.63  
Substituting t ty c in equation  3.1.63  with  3.1.52  
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  3.1.65  
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 3.3.2  Marginal Cost and Inflation Dynamics 
 
 
3.3.2.1  Aggregate Output and Employment 
 
The relation between employment, technology and output can be written as24: 
.t t ty a n                                                                  
(3.1.66)  
The marginal cost and inflation dynamics is given by:   
, .t t H t tmc w p a                                                    3 . 1 . 6 7 
Inserting the log-linearized FOC of the household‘s optimising expressed as the 
intratemporal consumption  3.1.15  as well as the adjusted formula for the terms of 
trade25  3.1.20  into  3.1.67 .   
 
 1 .t t t t tmc y y s a   
      
                                     3 . 1 . 6 8   
 
The marginal cost is an increasing function of the terms of trade and world output. The 
real wage is influenced through the wealth effect on labor supply as a result of the impact 
of these variables on domestic consumption. Changes in the terms of trade have a direct 
effect on the product wage for any given level of consumption wage. Technology has 
direct effect on labor productivity. Domestic output has an effect on employment as well 
as the real wage for a given output.  Substituting for the terms of trade term, we derive:  
     * 1 .t t t tmc y y a                    3.1.69  
Domestic output affects the marginal costs through its resultant impact on employment 
  the terms of trade given by  .  On the other hand, world output also affects the 
                                                          
24
 Appendix (J). 
25
 Appendix (J). 
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marginal costs through its effect on consumption; captured by    and the terms of trade 
of trade   . The sign of the impact is however ambiguous. In case where    , 
the impact of the world output on marginal cost will tend to be positive.  From  3.1.69  
the natural output can be written as26: 
     * 1 ,nC t t tm y y a                                          3 . 1 . 7 0
 
                                                3 . 1 . 7 1 
 
where, *
0 *
1
, 0,a t t
v
a y 
  
 
     
 
       
  
 
3.3.2.2  The New Keynesian Phillips Curve  
 
Inserting the real marginal cost gap into  3.1.47 we derive the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve27: 
 
, , 1 ,H t t H t tE y    
                                                3 . 1 . 7 2 
where  H       
 
The implication of  3.1.72  is that there is no short run trade-off between stabilizing the 
output gap and inflation. Blanchard and Galí (2007) term the above phenomenon as the 
divine coincidence. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argue that in the New Phillips curve, as 
represented in  3.1.72 inflation should lead output over the cycle. A rise in current 
inflation indicates that output will rise in the subsequent period and vise-versa and that a 
disinflation policy should be cost less. This is in sharp contrast to Ball (1993 and 1994b) 
                                                          
26
 Appendix (J). 
27
 Appendix F 
*
0 * ,
n
t a t ty a y   
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who argues that a disinflation is costly. To capture the trade-off between inflation and the 
output gap, we introduce an exogenous cost push shock similar to Clarida et al (1999, 
2002). This changes equations  3.1.13 to become: 
 
    1 ,w tt t t
t
W
C N
P
 
 
        
 3.1.73
 
where wt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process 1 .
w w
t w t t      Clarida et al 
(1999,2002) states that the shock stands for any variations that may affect the marginal 
cost and consequently break the relationship between the marginal cost and the output 
gap.  Taking logs both sides of  3.1.73 gives us:
 
,wt t t t tn c w p                     3 . 1 . 7 4 
 
, , 1 ,H t t H t t tE y u     
    
 3.1.75  
The above equation states that there is a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and the 
output gap as indicated by the cost push variable.
 
where ( ) .wt tu        
 
 
3.3.2.3  The Dynamic IS equation  
 
From  3.1.59 , the IS equation can be written as28: 
 
  *1 1
1
;t t t t t ty E y r E y

 

                                           3 . 1 . 7 6 
Defining the natural output as  
                                                          
28
 Appendix (J). 
86 
 
 
  *1 1
1n n n
t t t t t ty E y r E y

 

                                           3 . 1 . 7 7 
 
The output gap can be written as29:  
 
 1 1
1
,t t t t t t ty E y i E r



                                              3 . 1 . 7 8 
where the real rate  tr  is defined as: 
  * 11t a t t tr a E y

  

  
   
 


      

                             3 . 1 . 7 9                                               
To close the model I now present the monetary policy rule(s) of the central bank. 
 
3.4  Monetary Policy Rules 
 
Domestic Inflation Targeting: 
, 0.H t                                   3 . 1 . 8 0 
Consumer Price Targeting:  0.tP                                      3 . 1 . 8 1 
Fixed Exchange Rate(PEG):  0.te                                     3 . 1 . 8 2 
Taylor Rule:                
, .t H t y t ti y v                            3 . 1 . 8 3 
CGG(+1)                    1 , 1 ,1t i t i H t y t ti i y v                     3 . 1 . 8 4 
CGG(+4)                   1 , 4 ,1t i t i H t y t ti i y v                      3 . 1 . 8 5 
where ti  stands for the interest rate of the central bank, tv represent the shock to the 
interest rate. It is assumed, tv follows an AR(1) process 1 .
v
t v t tv v    The parameters 
, y and r are coefficients of inflation, output and interest rate respectively.   
 
                                                          
29
 Appendix F. 
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3.5  The foreign economy 
 
The foreign economy is assumed to be exogenous to the small open economy. It is 
described by one equation: 
t yxy 
 
*
1 .
y
t ty 

                                                    3 . 1 . 8 6 
For 0,1,2....t  The developments of the foreign output is described by an AR(1) process 
for 0 1yx   and the production shock 
*
.
y
t . 
3.6  Linearized model 
 
The complete model can be presented by 7 endogenous variables and three shocks 
given as:  
1. Domestic Inflation:  , , 1 .H t t H t t tE y u                                  3.1.75  
2. Output gap:     1 1
1
.nt t t t t t ty E y i E r



                                 3.1.78
 
3. Real interest rate:   * 11 .t a t t tr a E y
 
  

 
   
 


      

            3 . 1 . 7 9
 
4. Real exchange rate:  1 .t tq s                                             3.1.27
 
5. Terms of Trade:     0 .t t t k t t k t k t t kks E i E i E 
  
   
    
                 3 . 1 . 3 8
 
6. CPI Inflation:
  ,
.t H t ts                                                   
 3 . 1 . 2 1
 
7. Policy rules:
   
 
    
Domestic Inflation Targeting: 
, 0.t H ty                                3 . 1 . 8 0 
Consumer Price Targeting:  0.tP                                     3 . 1 . 8 1 
Fixed Exchange Rate(PEG):  0.te                                    3 . 1 . 8 2 
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Taylor Rule:                
, .t H t y tti y                             3 . 1 . 8 3 
CGG(+1)                    1 , 11t i t i H t y ti i y                       3.1.84  
CGG(+4)                   1 , 41t i t i H t y ti i y                       3 . 1 . 8 5 
                       
8. Technology shock: t aa  1 .t ta                                            
 3 . 1 . 3 9
 
9. Cost push shock: t uu  1 .t tu                                              
 3 . 1 . 7 3
 
10. Foreign output shock: t yxy 
 
*
1 .
y
t ty 

                                     
 3 . 1 . 8 6
 
Having presented the linearised version of the small open economy model. I solve the 
model in Dynare version 4.2, using parameter values presented in table 2. In the next 
move I present the results of the model.  
4  Results 
 
In this section I present the results of the model. First I present and discuss the impulse 
response functions and the macroeconomic volatility of variables, and then I conclude. 
4.1  Impulse response functions 
 
Figure 3, shows the results of a positive innovation to technology/productivity under the 
three targeting rules, where the smooth line represent the DIT, the dotted line stand for 
the CIT and the lines with rectangular marks is the PEG. The domestic inflation and the 
output gap are constant in the DIT rule. The impulse of the output gap and inflation are 
very similar under the PEG and the CIT rules i.e. both variables decline in response to a 
positive shock in technology. The shock brings a persistent reduction in the nominal 
interest rate; which is required to support the expansion in output. The only difference 
between the CIT and DIT is the decline in the nominal interest rate which is 
instantaneous in the case of the latter and muted in the CIT.  
89 
 
Figure 4, depicts the impulse responses to a positive innovation in the cost push shock in 
the targeting rules. The shock causes a reduction in the output gap in all targeting rules. 
By construction, the domestic inflation is constant in the DIT while it increases in the CIT 
and PEG. The nominal interest rates increase to tame domestic inflation in the CIT and 
DIT. The only noticeable difference however is that, the increase in the nominal interest 
rate is inertial in the CIT. Figure 5, displays the impulse responses due to a positive 
innovation in the foreign output. Similar to the domestic technology, the output gap and 
domestic inflation is flat in the DIT rule. However, in the CIT and PEG both the output 
gap and the domestic inflation increase with the PEG displaying the significant increase. 
The nominal interest rate decreases in all the three policy rules.    
Figure 6, shows the impulse responses to a technology shock under instrument rules. 
The line with rectangular marks is the Taylor rule, the line with the triangular marks 
stands for the CGG(+1) while the line with stars represent the CGG(+4). Accordingly, the 
innovation causes a decline in the output gap and the domestic inflation in all instrument 
rules this is similar to the CIT and PEG. The central bank engineers an increase in the 
interest rate in response to the decline in the output gap and domestic inflation. The only 
difference between the instrument rules is that the decline in both the output gap and 
domestic inflation is relatively bigger in the CGG(+4) and the CGG(+1) and smaller in the 
Taylor rule in the short run. This can be explained by the fact that in the Taylor type rule, 
the nominal and real interest rate increase less when contrasted to the CGG(+1) and 
CGG(+4).    
Figure 7, presents the impulse responses to a positive innovation to the cost push shock. 
The reaction of the domestic inflation and output gap is similar to that of the targeting 
rules, i.e. the output gap decreases while inflation increases. In the CGG(+1) and 
CGG(+4) policy rules however, the output gap first increase before declining. This can 
be explained by the fact that the increase in the nominal interest rate is not adequate 
enough in the forward looking targeting rules compared to the Taylor rule as evident from 
the moderate increase in the nominal interest rate in the latter. Figure 8, displays the 
impulse responses due a positive innovation in the foreign output. The output gap and 
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domestic inflation decline in the CGG(+1) and CGG(+4) while they remain constant in 
the Taylor rule. This can be ascribed to the relatively small decrease in the nominal 
interest rate. The central bank reduces the nominal interest rates to increase 
consumption with a view that the output gap will pick up.   
 
4.2  Macroeconomic volatility 
 
Table 3, contains the volatility of the various monetary rules due to a technology shock. 
The DIT seems to be the policy which simultaneously reduces the volatility of the output 
gap and domestic inflation. These results are however similar to the findings of Galí and 
Monacelli (2002) and Galí (2008). The CGG(+4) seems to increase the volatility of the 
output gap and domestic inflation the most.  This is due to the fact that both the output 
gap and domestic inflation are much volatile in the CGG(+4) than in any other rule. 
Similar to Galí and Monacelli (2002) and Galí (2008), the PEG produces much volatility 
of the output gap and inflation. Given a fixed exchange rate, it is impossible for the 
monetary authority to lower the nominal interest rate or to allow the currency to 
depreciate in response to an increase in output. Consequently, the volatility of the output 
gap and domestic inflation tend to increase more in the PEG. Among instrument rules, 
the Taylor rule performs relatively better than both the CGG(+1) and CGG(+4).  
This scenario can be accounted for by the fact that the forward looking rules respond to 
forecasted inflation, while the Taylor rule responds to contemporaneous inflation. Table 4, 
presents the volatilities of the various monetary policy rules in response to a cost push 
shock. Unlike in the case of a technology shock, there is no single policy which can 
stabilise the domestic inflation and the output gap simultaneously. The targeting rule 
displays the minimal volatility of the domestic inflation, with the DIT as the best 
performing rule. Similar to the technology shock, the volatility of the domestic inflation is 
very high in the CGG(+4).The CGG(+1), however shows the minimal volatility of the 
output gap, compared to all other rules.  
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Among the targeting rules, the PEG has the lowest volatility of the output gap. The 
volatility of the output gap appears to be very significant in the CGG(+4) than for any 
other rule. Thus the policy maker would face a dilemma between minimising domestic 
inflation or the output gap in the presence of a cost push shock. Accordingly a policy 
maker who is pro stabilising the domestic inflation would prefer the DIT to minimise the 
volatility of the domestic inflation at the expense of high volatility of the output gap. On 
the contrary, a policy maker who is pro output gap stabilisation would prefer the CGG(+1) 
which minimises the volatility of the outputgap, at the expense of high domestic inflation 
volatility.       
Table 5, presents the volatilities following a foreign output shock. By construction the DIT 
shows the lowest volatility of the output gap and domestic inflation compared to any 
other rule. Among the targeting rules, the PEG shows relatively high volatility of the 
output gap and domestic inflation while the CIT is in the middle. In the CIT, the domestic 
inflation is not constant and hence explains the difference in volatility of the output gap 
and domestic inflation, compared to the DIT.  
Domestic inflation is part of the CPI inflation; therefore by targeting consumer price 
inflation, the CIT rule tends to stabilize domestic inflation as well.  For the PEG however, 
it is not possible to stabilize the CPI and this explains the high output gap and domestic 
inflation in the PEG in contrast to the CIT. Similar to the domestic technology shock and 
cost push shock the CGG(+4) exhibits a relatively high volatility of the domestic inflation 
and output gap compared to all other rules followed by the CGG(+1). Among the 
instrument rules, the Taylor rule displays the lowest volatility of the output gap and 
domestic inflation.   
In terms of rankings the DIT is superior when the economy is hit by a technology shock 
or foreign output shock. Thus, the DIT would be prefered among all other rules 
considered. The PEG would be inferior among the targeting rules. Among instrument 
rules, the Taylor rule is superior than the CGG(+1) and the CGG(+4) in terms of 
minimising the volatilities of both the domestic inflation and the output gap. When the 
economy is hit by a cost push shock the DIT is only superior in terms of stabilising the 
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domestic inflation, but at the expense of high output gap volatilities. The CGG(+1) 
emerges as the superior rule in terms of minimising the volatilities of the output gap.    
4.3 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to compare the performance of targeting rules and instrument 
rules given three shocks, technology shock, foreign output shock and a cost push shock. 
In particular, a comparison is made between the DIT, CIT, PEG, the Taylor (1993) and 
the forward looking rules CGG(+1) and the CGG(+4).   
The chapter uses the impulse response function as well as the volatility of the output gap 
and domestic inflation as the yardstick of the evaluation. I show that the results of Galí 
and Monacelli (2002) and Galí (2008) that the DIT policy is superior in the presence of a 
technology shock, extends to a foreign output shock. The Taylor rule is superior 
compared to its forward looking counterparts. In the presence of a cost push shock the 
DIT is only superior in stabilizing the domestic inflation. The CGG(+1) becomes the best 
policy in minimising the volatilities of the output gap. The CGG(+4) tend to increase the 
volatility of the output gap and domestic inflation the most and thus is ranked as least 
desirable policy rule given this model and calibration.  
The intuition of these results is that the central bank faces a policy dilemma as to which 
policy rules is superior in terms of stabilising both the output gap and domestic inflation. 
The dilemma is caused by the nature of the shock which hits the economy. When the 
shock is caused by a technology shock or foreign output, the policy maker would prefer 
the DIT rule. However, if the shock is caused by a cost push factor, the policy maker 
would prefer the DIT rule to stabilise the domestic inflation or the CGG(+1) to minimise 
the volatilities in the output gap. In practise however policy makers cannot alter policy 
rules with each shock hitting the economy and hence faces a policy dilemma in particular 
when faced with a cost push shock.    
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Figure 3  Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock: Targeting Rules. 
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Figure 4  Impulse Responses to a Cost Push Shock: Targeting Rules. 
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Figure 5  Impulse Responses to a Foreign Output Shock: Targeting Rules. 
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Figure 6  Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock: Instrument Rules 
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Figure 7  Impulse Responses to a Cost Push Shock: Instrument Rules. 
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Figure 8  Impulse Responses to a Foreign Output Shock: Instrument Rules. 
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Table 2  Parameter Values used in calibrating a Small Open Economy Model30. 
Parameter Value Description 
  0.99  The discount factor 
  1 Coefficient of risk aversion 
  3 Elasticity of labour supply 
  1 Substitution between foreign and domestic goods 
  0.4 Trade openness measure 
  0.75  Price stickiness measure 
  6 Elasticity of substitution between differentiated 
goods within an economy 
  1 Elasticity of substitution between imported goods 
  1.5 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to 
inflation(value as in Taylor, 1993) 
y  5/4 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to the 
output gap (value as in Taylor, 1993) 
yx  0.86
 Persistence of the foreign shock 
a  
0.9
 
Persistence of the technology shock 
u  
0.86 Persistence of the cost push shock 
Parameters for the Forward Looking rules 
i  0.91 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to  
interest rate (value as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 
1998) 
y  0.25 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to  
the output gap (value as in Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler, 1998) 
  1.31 Sensitivity of the central bank with respect to  
the inflation rate (value as in Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler, 1998) 
                        
                                                          
30
 Most of the parameter values are derived from Gali (2008), Gali and Monacelli (2002 ) unless if stated 
otherwise. 
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Table 3  Volatility due to a Technology Shock. 
                       
 DIT CIT PEG Taylor CGG(+1) CGG(+4) 
Output gap 0.00 0.28 0.42 0.15 0.57 0.80 
Domestic 
inflation 
0.00 0.19 0.33 0.30 0.52 0.77 
Consumer 
Inflation 
0.31 0.00 0.20 0.31 0.44 0.76 
Nominal 
Interest rate 
0.32 0.10 - 0.47 0.05 0.02 
Nominal 
Depreciation 
0.57 0.43 0.00 0.48 0.30 0.29 
Output 0.95 0.75 0.62 0.79 0.50 0.39 
 
 Table 4  Volatility due to a Cost Push Shock. 
                       
 DIT CIT PEG Taylor CGG(+1) CGG(+4) 
Output gap 2.25 2.03 1.87 2.06 1.54 4.65 
Domestic 
inflation 
0.00 0.32 0.62 0.85 2.39 7.48 
Consumer 
inflation 
0.48 0.00 0.37 0.85 2.48 8.66 
Nominal 
Interest rate 
0.31 0.15 - 1.02 0.40 0.44 
Nominal 
Depreciation 
1.35 1.22 0.00 1.24 0.92 2.79 
Output 2.25 2.03 1.87 2.06 1.54 4.65 
 
Table 5  Volatility due to a Foreign Output Shock. 
                                           
 DIT CIT PEG Taylor CGG(+1) CGG(+4) 
Output gap 0.00 1.08 1.73 0.60 5.03 16.13 
Domestic 
inflation 
0.00 0.88 1.70 2.76 5.55 14.56 
Consumer 
Inflation 
1.29 0.00 1.02 3.42 8.24 19.20 
Nominal 
Interest rate 
1.93 2.60 2.78 4.21 1.08  0.92 
Nominal 
Depreciation 
3.67 3.32 0.00 4.03 6.20 10.47 
Output 4.59 4.03 3.63 5.19 8.91 12.48 
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Appendix (E)  Derivation of (3.1.6 3.1.7).  
 
The household minimise expenditure on home good 
   
1
, ,
0
H t H tP j C j dj
             
 3 . 1 . 8                           
subject to the constraint  
1 11
, ,
0
H t H tC C j d j

 

  
  
 

    
 3.1.3  
To solve the constrained maximization problem, we write the Lagrangian. 
      
1 11 1
, , , ,
0 0
H t H t t H t H tL P j C j dj C j d j C

 
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 
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 : 2E  
      
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1 111
, , ,
0
H t t H t H tP j C j dj C j
 
 
  
 
      
 

     
 E :3  
                          
 
 ,
, ,
H t
H t H t
t
P j
C j C



 
  
   
 : 4E  
 
 
1 1
1 ,
, ,
0
H t
H t H t
t
P j
C C dj

 
 

 
    
    
    
 

      
 : 5E
 
   1 11, , ,0H t H t t H tC C P j dj


 
  
   : 6E                                                  
   
1
1 1 1
, ,
0
t H t H tP j dj P
 

   
            : 7E   
 
 ,
, ,
,
H t
H t H t
H t
P j
C j C
P

 
   
 
         3.1.6  
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The household minimise expenditure on foreign good 
   
1
, ,
0
i t i tP j C j dj                                                    3 . 1 . 8 
subject to the constraint  
1 11
, ,
0
i t i tC C j d j

 

  
  
 
                         3 . 1 . 4 
To solve the constrained maximization problem, we write the Lagrangian. 
     
1 11 1
, , , ,
0 0
i t i t t i t i tL P j C j dj C j d j C

 

 
 
       
 
                         :8E     
F.O.C 
 
     
1
1 111 1
, , , ,
0
,
1
0
1
i t t i t i t
H t
L
P j C j dj C j
C j

 
 
 

 

  
 
                  
 
      : 9E  
     
1
1 111
, , ,
0
i t t i t i tP j C j dj C j
 
 
  
 
      
 
                                  : 1 0E  
  
 ,
, ,
i t
i t i t
t
P j
C j C



 
  
 
                                              : 1 1E  
 
1 1
1 ,
, ,
0
i t
i t i t
t
P j
C C dj

 
 

 
    
    
    
 
                                       : 1 2E  
              
 
1
1 1 1
, ,
0
t i t i tP j dj P
 

   
                                              : 1 3E   
 
 ,
, ,
,
i t
i t i t
i t
P j
C j C
P

 
   
 
                        3 . 1 . 6
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The household minimise total expenditure on all foreign goods  
1
, ,
0
i t i tP C di                                                          : 1 4E  
subject to the constraint that the bundle of goods we buy must yield a given aggregate 
consumption
1 1
1
, ,
0
F t i tC C di

 

  
   
 
                                      (3.13)   
To solve the constrained maximization problem, we set the Lagrangian. 
                                
1 1
1 1
, , , ,
0 0
i t i t t i t F tL P C di C di C

 

 
 
  
     
   
                                  : 1 5E           
F.O.C  
1
1 11 11
, , ,
0
,
1
0
1
i t t i t i t
i t
L
P C di C
C

 
  
 

  
 
      
               
                   :16E  
1
1 11
1
, , ,
0
i t t i t i tP C di C
 
 
  
 
  
    
   
                                          : 1 7E  
,
, ,
i t
i t F t
t
P
C C



 
  
 
                                                    : 1 8E  
1 1
1 ,
, ,
0
i t
F t F t
t
P
C C di

 
 

 
    
        
 
                                         : 1 9E  
  1 1 1, , ,0F t F t t i tC C P di

 
  
  
                                         : 2 0E                                                             
         
1
11 1
, ,0t i t i F t
P d P

                                                   : 21E  
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,
, ,
,
i t
i t F t
F t
P
C C
P

 
  
  
   3.1.7  
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Appendix (F)  Derivation of  3.1.10 3.1.16  
 
The second problem faced by the consumer is to maximise the consumption expenditure 
given the constraint that the amount he or she buy must yield the total consumption: 
 
1
1 1 11
, ,1t H t F tC C C


 
   

  
   
 
                                      3 . 1 . 8 
Subject to the constraint  
  
, , , ,H t H t F t F t t tP C P C PC                                                  3 . 1 . 9                                               
 
Formalise with the lagrangian multiplier 
 
, ,, ,H t F t tLC C C   
1
1 1 11
, , , , , ,1 H t F t t H t H t F t F t t tC C P C P C PC


 
    

  
        
 
  :1F   
FOC for the domestic good 
 
,H t
L
C



 
 
1 11 1 1 1
, ,
1 1
1
, ,
1
1
1
1 0
H t F t
H t t H t
C C
C P


  
  

 

 


 


  


  
   
    
 
   
 
                           : 2F
 
,H t tP      
1
1 1 1 11 1
1
, , ,1 1H t F t H tC C C
  
   
  
    
   
 
                   : 3F                
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,H t tP      
1
1 1 1 11
1
, , ,1 1H t F t H tC C C
  
   
  
 
 
   
 
                    : 4F  
FOC for the foreign good 
 
,F t
L
C



 
1 1
11 1 1
, ,
1 1
1
, ,
1
1
1
0
H t F t
F t t F t
C C
C P


 
  

 

 


 


 


  
   
    
 
  
 
                          : 5F    
    
,F t tP    
1
1 1 11
1
, , ,1 H t F t F tC C C
 
  
  

 
  
 
                         : 6F  
 
,H t tP   
1 1 1
,1t H tC C
  

                                            : 7F  
   ,, 1
H t
H t t
t
P
C C




 
   
 
              :8F   
  ,,
F t
F t t
t
P
C C




 
  
 
                                         : 9F      
 
Substituting the solutions for  ,H tC and  ,F tC into  3.1.2 .  
    
1
1 1 1
1
, ,
1 1
H t F t
t t t
t t
P P
C C C


  
  
   
 
  
         
          
          
 
    :10F  
        
1 1 11
1 1 1
1 1
, ,
1 1
H t F t
t t t
t t
P P
C C C

  

     
    
 

         
       
    
 
        : 1 1F  
                       
107 
 
  
1 1 1
, ,
1 1
H t F t
t t
P P

  
 
 
       
      
     
                                   : 1 2F  
      
1
1 1 1
, ,1t H t F t tP P P
                                           :13F  
      
1
1 1 1
, ,1t H t F tP P P
                 3.1.11   
    ,, 1
H t
H t t
t
P
C C
P



 
   
 
   3.1.10  
   ,,
F t
F t t
t
P
C C
P



 
  
 
   3.1.10  
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Utility Maximization 
The household maximizes utility:
1 1
0
0 1 1
t t t
t
C N
E
 

 
 

 
 
  
  subject to the constraint:
 , 1 1t t t t t t t t t tPC E Q D D WN T    
.
                                                                                           
To solve the maximization problem, we first set out the Lagrangian Function: 
 
   
1 1
0 , 1 1
1 1
t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
C N
L D W N T PC E Q D
 
 
 
 

  
    
          
      
    : 1 4F  
 : 0t t t
t
L
C P
C
 

 

                                                 : 1 5F  
       t t tC P
                                                      : 1 6F    
       1 1 1t t tC P
                                                    : 1 7F  
 1 1
1
t t t
t t t
C P
C P




 

 
  
 
                                                  : 1 8F  
 : 0t t t
L
N W
N
 

  

                                                 : 1 9F  
       t t tN W
                                                     : 2 0F                                                               
 t t t t
t t t t
N W W
C P P




                                                     : 2 1F  
 tt t
t
W
C N
P
                                                           3 . 1 . 1 3     
 
, 1 1
1
: ( ) 0t t t t t
t
L
EQ
D
   


  

                                        : 2 2F  
, 1 1( )t t t t tEQ                                                   : 2 3F  
  1, 1
t
t t t
t
EQ




                                                      : 2 4F  
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Substitute for 1t
t


  
 1, 1
1
t t
t t t
t t
C P
Q E
C P






   
   
   
                                       : 2 5F  
Divide both sides by  
, 1t tQ    
 1
1
1 t tt t
t t
C P
R E
C P





   
   
   
              3 . 1 . 1 4 
where
, 1
1
t
t t
R
Q 
                                                     : 2 6F  
or    
1 1
1
1
1 t tt t
t t
C P
E Q
C P



 


   
   
                                              
 : 2 7F  
Taking log the Euler equation  : 27F .  
1
1
1
t t
t
t t
C P
Q
C P






   
   
   
 
Taking logs   
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln lnt t t t tQ C C P P                                                             
Solving for tC                                                  
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln lnt t t t tC C Q P P                                                                  
    1 1
1
t t t t t tc E c i E  

    
      
 3.1.16
   
Where 
 1 1 1
ln ;t t t t ti Q p p       and ln    
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Appendix (G): Derivation of  3.1.19 3.1.27  
 
 
,
,
F t
t
H t
P
S
P
                                                           :1G  
    
1
1 1 1
,0 i t
S di                                                        : 2G  
  
1
1 1 1
,0
1 ln 1 lnt i ts s di
                                                  : 3G   
   
1
1 1
,0
1 ln 1 ln 1t i ts s di
                                            : 4G  
      1
,0t i t
s s d i                  3 . 1 . 1 9 
 
Log- linearizing the CPI equation  3.1.11 around a steady state where , :H t FP P P   
   
    
   
1
1
1
1 ,1 1 1 1 1
,
1 11
1 1
1 1
H t
t
F t
P P P
P P P P P
P P P


    

 
   
  



    

   
                 
                          
    , ,1 H t F tP P P P P                                           : 5G     
  , , ,t H t H t F tp P P P                                                 : 6G   
  , , ,t H t F t H tp P P P                                                 : 7G   
 
,t H t tp P s                                                       
 3 . 1 . 2 0  
  1, , ,0 iF t i t i tP e P di                                                      :8G   
 1, , ,01 ln 1 ln iF t i t i i tP e d P di                                             : 9G  
,F t t tP e p
                                                           :10G  
, , ,t t F t t F t H te p p s p p
                                                 :11G  
,t t t H tp s p
                                                         :12G  
,t t H t tp p s
                                                         :13G  
,t t t H ts e p p
                                                         3.1.23  
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Defining the bilateral exchange rate between the home country and country i  as the 
ratio of the two countries‘ CPIs, but expressed in terms of the domestic currency as: 
,
,
i
i t t
i t
t
e p
Q
p

                                                        
 : 1 4G  
Taking logs  
i
it it t tq e p p                                                        : 1 5G     
The log effective real exchange rate is: 
1
,
0
t i tq q di                                                          : 1 6G                                                  
Insert   
 1 ,0 it i t t tq e p p di                                                 : 1 7G      
1 1 1
,
0 0 0
1 ln 1 ln it i t t tq e di p di p di                                         
: 1 8G  
  
,t H t ts p p                                                       : 1 9G  
 
, ,t H t H t ts p p s                                                 
 : 2 0G  
 1t tq s                                                         3.1.27   
The End 
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Appendix (H)  Derivation of  3.1.31 3.1.38  
 
From  3.1.29  the Euler equation of the foreign economy is: 
1
1 1
1
i i i
t t t
t t i i i
t t t
C e P
R E
C e P




 
     
     
     
                                         3 . 1 . 2 9 
The Euler for the domestic economy is given by  3.1.14 . 
1
1
1 t tt t
t t
C P
R E
C P





     
     
     
                                            3 . 1 . 1 4 
Divide the two Euler Equations   
   
1
1
1
1 1
1
t t
t t
t t
i i i
t t t
t t i i i
t t t
C P
R E
C P
C P e
R E
C P e









 
     
    
     
     
    
     
                                         :1H  
 
    
Rewrite the above as:  
1 1 1 1
1
i i i
t t t t t
t i i i
t t t t t
C P C P e
E
C P C P e
 
   

     
    
     
                                       : 2H  
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   
1 1
1 1
i i
t t
i
it t
t t t i i
t tt
t
P e
C P
C E C
P eC
P


 
  
 
   
   
  
                                       
 : 3H  
  , 11
1 ,
i
i tit
t t t
t t i t
QC
C E C
C Q



  

   
   
                                           
 : 4H  
 
1
1
,1
1 , 1
it
t t t i t
i
t i t
C
C E C Q
C Q



 
  
  
   
  
                                          
 : 5H  
 
1
,
i
t t i tC C Q
                                                       3 . 1 . 3 1      
1
1
1 , 1
t
t
i
t i t
C
E
C Q 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                    
 : 6H  
   
Take log of  3.1.31 . 
1
,log log log log
i
t t i tC C Q

                                             : 7H  
,
1
,it t i tc c q

                                                         :8H  
1
0
1i
t tc c di

 
  
 
   
1
t t tc c q

     
                                                       
 : 9H
 
1
t t tc c s


     
 
                                                    3 . 1 . 3 3  
 
The complete international financial markets assumption implies that the equilibrium 
price of a riskless bond denominated in the currency of country i is given by  
 , , 1 , 1 .ii t t t t t i te Q E Q e  The equation for the domestic bond price is stated as:  , 1t t t tQ E Q  , 
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where  Qt
i
  denotes the price of the bond expressed in the currency of country i . 
Combining the two expressions yields the uncovered interest parity as follows: 
 
   
1
, 1 , 1 , , 1
i
t t t i t i t t t t t tE Q e e Q E Q Q

                    : 1 0H  
 
  , 1 , 1 , 0it t t t t i t i tE Q Q Q e e                                  3 . 1 . 3 4 
, 1 , 1 ,1 ln 1 ln 1 ln 1 ln 1 ln 1 ln0
i
t t t t t i t i tE Q Q Q e e                           : 1 1H  
where1 1 ,1 1i it t t ii Q i Q      :                                        :12H  
 1t t t ti i E e

                        3 . 1 . 3 5
Where1 ,1 it t t ii Q i Q
    :                                            
*
,t t t H ts e P P                                                       
 : 1 3H
  
*
1 1 1 , 1 ,t t t t t t t t t t H t H tE s s E e e E P P E P P

                                     3 . 1 . 3 6 
1 1 1 1t t t t t t H t t ts E e E E E s 

                                             : 1 4H  
   1 1 1t t t t t t Ht t ts i E i E E s                                             3 . 1 . 3 7 
 In the steady the terms of trade are pinned down, thus it follows that lim 0.T t TE s    
We can thus solve forward the above equation. 
     
     
1 1 1 2
1 2 2 3 2 3
t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
s i E i E E i
E i E i E i
  
  
   
   
 
     
      
                                 
 : 1 5H
 
 
    0t t t k t t k t k t t kks E i E i E 
  
   
        3.1.38   
 
 
 
 
The End. 
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Appendix (I)  Derivation of (3.1.41-3.1.47) 
 
The domestic price level is given by: 
 
 
1
1 1 1
, , ,1H t H H t H H tP P P
                  3.1.41  
 
where ,H tP  is the price of optimising firms, while , 1H tP   is the price level of no optimising 
firms. Log-linearizing  3.1.41 gives:  
 
1
1 1 1
, , , 11H t H H t H H tP P P
           
           
1
1 1
, , , 11 1 1 * 1 * 1H H t H H H H t H H H tP P P P P
                   
  , , , 11H t H H t H tp p p                                          3.1.42     
 
The firm  j  wants to maximize the following function 
 
        
, , ,( )
0
H t
k d nmax
H t t t k t k H t t kp j
k
E Q Y j P j MC j

  

 
                             3 . 1 . 4 3                 
                           
Subject to a sequence of demand constraints 
,
,
( )
H td
t k t k
H t k
P
Y j y
P

 

 
   
                                                      
 3 . 1 . 4 4 
0,1,2k 
                                                                                                
If all firms undertake the same maximization process, we can drop the  j  and write 
 3.1.43  as: 
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   
, , ,
0
H t
k d n dmax
H t t t k H t t k t k t kp
k
E Q P Y MC Y

   

 
 
                                   
 :1I
 
Substituting for the sequence of demand constraints. 
 
,
1
, ,max
, ,
0 , ,
H t
H t H tk n
H t t t k t k H t k t k t kp
k H t k H t k
P P
E Q Y P MC Y
P P
 

 

    
  
     
               

             
 : 2I  
The first order condition with respect to the optimality price 
,H tP  is:  
 
 
,
,
, ,
, 1
0
,'
, ,
1
1
1
H t
t k H t k
H t k H t kk
H t t t k
k
H tn
t k t k
H t k H t k
P
Y P
P P
E Q
P
MC Y
P P






 

 
  

 
 
   
          
  
   
     
    

                           
 : 3I
 
    , ,',
0 , , ,
1
1
H t H tk n
H t t t k t k t k t k
k H t k H t k H t
P P
E Q Y MC Y
P P P
 
  
 

   
  
     
                

          
 : 4I  
    ',
0 ,
1
1 0k d n dH t t t k t k t k t k
k H t
E Q Y MC Y
P
  

   

  
     
   

                           
 : 5I
 
  ', ,
0,
1
0
1
k d n d
H t t t k t k H t t k t k
kH t
E Q Y P MC Y
P
 



   

      
            

                     
 : 6I
 
 
  ', ,
0
0
1
k d n d
H t t t k t k H t t k t k
k
E Q Y P MC Y




   

   
    
   

                            
 3 . 1 . 4 2
 
 
We can re-write the above equation as  
   , ,
0
. 0k dH t t t k t k H t t k
k
E Q Y P m 

  

   
                                     
 : 7I    
where, 
1
m




 stands for the mark up due to monopolistic competition. 
'n d
t k t k t kMC Y     is the nominal marginal cost. Log-linearizing the optimal price setting 
 .12I about the zero inflation steady state. First we re-write it in terms of variables with 
well-defined steady state and then divide by , 1.H tP   
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, ,
,
0 , 1 , , 1
. 0
H t H t kk d t k
H t t t k t k
k H t H t k H t
P P
E Q Y m
P P P




 
   
   
    
   

           
 :8I
 
This can be presented as:  
,
, \ 1,
0 , 1
. 0
H tk d
H t t t k t k t k t t t k
k H t
P
E Q Y mMC
P


    
 
   
     
   

           
 : 9I
 
where \ \ ,/t k t t k t H t kMC P   is the real marginal cost in period t k for a firm which last 
reset its price in period t .  1, , , 1/t t k H t k H tP P      is the gross inflation between 1t  and 
.t k  It is assumed that in the zero inflation steady state , , 1/ 1;H t H tP P   . This implies 
further that , .H t H t kP P  Moreover, 
d
t kY Y  (constant) and .t kMC MC   Furthermore,  
,
kt k t
t t k
t t k
C P
Q
C P






 
  
                                                    
 : 1 0I
 
Thus we re-write  (2.2.23)  as, ignoring \t k tY   
  , ,/
0 , 1 , 1
. 0
k H t H t k
H t t k t
k H t H t
P P
E mMC
P P




  
  
  
  

                                  
 : 1 1I
 
We log-linearize the equation above around the zero inflation steady state.  
Where the first order Taylor expansion on ˆexp( )tx  around zero is given by: 
 
 ˆ 0
ˆexp
ˆ ˆexp( ) exp(0) 0
ˆ t
t
t x t
t
x
x x
x


   

                                      
 : 1 2I  
      ˆ ˆexp exp 0 exp 0 0t tx x                                               : 1 3I
 
 ˆ ˆexp 1t tx x   
Applying the Taylor formula proceeds as follows: 
       , , 1 / , , 1
0
exp exp 0;
k
t H t H t t k t H t k H t
k
E P P MC P P 

   

     
          
 : 1 4I
 
where    log ( ).m   
       t k\, , 1 , , 1
0
t1 1 0
k
t H t H t H t k H t
k
E p p mc p p

  

      
               
 : 1 5I
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where t k \ \ \\t log .t k t t k t t k tmc mc mc mc M mc                               : 1 6I
 
Re- arranging the terms  
       , , 1 , , 1
0 0
t k
k
H t H t H t H t H t k H t
k k
E p p E mc P P 
 
  



    
               
 : 1 7I
           
 
 , , 1 , 1t k ,
0
1
k
H t H t H t H H t k H t
k
p p E mc P P 

  

                             : 1 8I  
To gain some intuition about the factors which determine the price setting of the firm we 
can present  .18I as: 
   , ,
0
t k1
k
H t H t H H t k
k
p E mc P  



                                      3 . 1 . 4 6              
Alternatively  .18I can be written as: 
      , , 1 ,t1kH t H t H t H H tp E p mc p                                  : 1 9I  
 
     , , 1 , ,t1 , 1
k
H t H t H t H t H t H H tp p E p p mc                            : 2 0I   
 
Combine the equation above with the log-lineralised version of the domestic price level.  
  
, , 1 t
1 1H H
H t t H t
H
E mc
 
  


 
                                       : 2 1I
 
 
, , 1 ,H t t H t H tE mc    
                                                  3 . 1 . 4 7 
 
where 
  1 1H H
H
H
 


 
   
 
The End. 
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Appendix (J)  Derivation of  3.1.49 3.1.79  
 
In equilibrium the domestic production of good   tY j   must be equal to domestic 
consumption  
, ( )H tC j  and foreign consumption , ( ).
i
H tC j   
    1, ,0( )
i
t H t H tY j C j C j di                               3 . 1 . 4 8 
To derive the equilibrium output we undertake the following: Insert  3.1.10 into  3.1.6
i.e.   ,, 1
H t
H t t
t
P
C C
P



 
   
 
  
 
 
 , ,,
,
1
H t H t
H t t
H t t
P j P
C j C
P P
 

 
   
     
  
                                  .1J  
      
 , ,
,
1
H t H t
t
H t t
P j P
C
P P
 

 
   
      
  
                                    .2J  
The demand for good  j in country  i is obtained by nesting up across different 
demand layers in country  i is a function of country  i . First we take into account the 
fact that the consumption of domestically produced good  j in country  i is a function 
of country i ‘s consumption of goods produced in the domestic economy, given as in
 3.1.6 : 
  
 ,
, ,
,
H ti i
H t H t
H t
P j
C j C
P

 
   
 
                                            .3J  
Country i ‘s consumption of goods produced in the home economy is a function of 
country i ‘s consumption of foreign goods, given as in  3.1.7 multiplied by the exchange 
rate: 
,
, ,
, ,
H ti i
H t F ti
i t F t
P
C C
e P

 
   
 
                                                 .4J  
From  3.1.9 the optimal consumption of imported goods can be expressed as:  
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,
,
i
F ti i
F t ti
t
P
C C
P



 
   
 
                                                   .5J  
Combining  .3, .4& .5J J J sing the demand functions the above can be expressed as: 
 
 , , ,
,
, , ,
i
H t H t F ti i
H t ti i
H t i t F t t
P j P P
C j C
P e P P
 

 
    
         
    
                             .6J  
  
 
 
1, , , ,
0
, , ,
( ) 1
i
H t H t H t F t i
t t ti i
H t t i t F t t
P j P P P
Y j C C di
P P e P P
  
 
          
                    
         3 . 1 . 4 9 
Plug  3.1.49  into the aggregate output equation 
1
1
1
0
( )t tY Y j dj





 
  
 
   
 
 
 
1 1
1 1, , , ,
0 0
, , ,
1
i
H t H t H t F t i
t t ti i
H t t i t F t t
P j P P P
Y C C di dj
P P e P P

 
   
 
 
  
 
         
                      
  
   .7J   
 
 
 
1 1
1 1, , ,,
0 0
, , ,
1
i
H t H t F tH t i
t t ti i
H t t i t F t t
P P PP j
Y dj C C di
P P e P P

  
 
            
                         
 
   
 .8J
 
 
    
1 1 1, , , 1
, ,
0 0
, ,
1
i
H t H t F t i
t t t H t H ti i
t i t F t t
P P P
Y C C di P P j dj
P e P P
  
  
 
 
     
                
 
 
 .9J
 
 
1, , , ,
0
,
1
i i
H t i t F t F t i
t t ti
t H t t
P e P P
Y C C di
P P P
  
 
       
                

                    
 . 1 0J  
The real exchange is defined as  
,
i
i t t
t
e P
P
 
  
 
  which is equivalent of  
,
i
F t
i
t
P
P
 
  
 
  but given 
that the CPI is instead for country  i  thus the real exchange rate can be expressed as  
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 , .i tQ

  
   
1, , ,
,
0
,
1
i
H t i t F t i
t t i t t
t H t
P e P
Y C Q C di
P P
 

 
    
      
      

                      
 . 1 1J  
Substitute   ,i tS   for  
,
,
i
F t
H t
P
P
 
 
 
 
  the bilateral terms of trade; and  itS   for  ,
,
i t
H t
e
P
 
 
 
 
  
the effective terms of trade.  
   
1,
, ,
0
1
H t i i
t t t i t i t t
t
P
Y C S S Q C di
P

  
 

            

                       
 . 1 2J  
   
1
1,
, ,
0
1
H t i
t t t i t i t
t
P
Y C S S Q di
P

  
 

    
       
  

                      
 . 1 3J  
Assume 
, 0i tS di    
   
1
1,
, ,
0
1
H t
t t i t i t
t
P
Y C S Q di
P

  
 

    
       
  

                        
 . 1 4J  
Log linearize around the steady state 
   
1
1
, ,
0
1
1t i t i t
p
Y y C S Q di
p p

  
  

   
     
   
                         . 1 5J  
1
t t t ty c s q  

 
    
                                            
 . 1 6J  
Insert the real exchange rate  3.1.27 into the equation above. 
 
1
1t t t ty c s s   

 
     
                                       
 : 1 7J  
   1 1
t t t
v
y c s
   


      
                                 
 : 1 8J  
t t ty c s


               3 . 1 . 5 2 
  1 1      
                                            
 :19J  
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For a generic country i   3.1.52  can be written as i i it t ty c s


   
Aggregating over all countries we derive the world market clearing condition. 
1 1 1 1 1
* *
0 0 0 0 0
i i i i i i
t t t t t t t ty y di c s di c di s di c di c
 
 
 
       
 
                    3 . 1 . 5 3 
 *
1
t t t ty c s s
 
 

                                                  3 . 1 . 5 4  
Substitute *tc  for  ty  as in  3.1.53  
* 1
t t t ty y s s
 
 

  
                                              
 : 2 0J  
 
*
1
1 1
t t ty y s

 
 
 
                                               
 : 2 1J
 
* 1
t t ty y s

                                                         3 . 1 . 5 5
 
  1 1



 

 
                                                  
 : 2 2J
 
 1 1 1
1
t t t t t t t ty E y i E E s

 
 
                                        3 . 1 . 5 7
 
 
 1 1 1
1
t t t t t H t t ty E y i E E s
 
 
  

                                    3 . 1 . 5 8 
 
  1 1 1       
                                                 
 
    * *1 1 1 1
1
t t t t t H t t t t t ty E y i E E y y y y

  
 
   

                  
      
 
  *1 1 1
1
t t t t t H t t ty E y i E E y

 

                                      3 . 1 . 5 9 
The Trade Balance 
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Defining the net exports as the difference between total production and total consumption 
in relation to the steady state output :Y  
,
t
t t
H t
t
p
y c
p
nx
Y


                                                           
 3 . 1 . 6 0 
A first order approximation around a symmetric steady state 
       ,2
1 1 1
t t t t H t
P
Y Y
PPnx Y Y C C C P P PC P P
Y Y P P p

 
         
         
 . 2 3J
 
,H tt t t
t
P PY Y C C P P
nx
Y C P P
  
   
                                    
 3 . 1 . 6 1
 
,t t t t H tnx y c p p                                                        
 3 . 1 . 6 2
 
t t t tnx y c s                                                            3 . 1 . 6 3 
t t tnx s s



 
                                                        
 3 . 1 . 6 4
 
1t tnx s



 
  
                                                          
 3 . 1 . 6 5 
Equilibrium- Marginal cost and Inflation dynamics 
Market clearing in the labor market requires  
1
0
( )t tN N j dj            
.24J
 
( )
( ) tt
t
Y j
N j
A
 
  
 
                                                            : 2 5J  
Substituting the market clearing condition and the domestic consumption demand into 
 3.1.39  
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( )t
t
t
Y j
N dj
A
 
  
                                                              
 : 2 6J
 
1
,
0
( )H tt
t
t t
P jY
N dj
A P

   
    
   

                                                  
 : 2 7J
 
t t t tn y a d                                                               
( : 28)J
 
where 
1
,
0
( )
ln 0
H t
t
t
p j
d dj
p
  
   
   
   up to first order approximation. 
Thus the relation between employment, technology and output can be written as: 
t t ty a n                 
( 3 . 1 . 6 6 ) 
The domestic inflation is given by 
  
, , 1 t
1 1H H
H t t H t
H
E mc
 
  


 
 
                                 
 : 2 9J  
where 
  1 1H H
H
H
 


 
                                               : 3 0J
 
   ,t t t t H t tmc w p w p a      
                                    
 : 3 1J  
 
1
t t t t t t tmc c s y a s a

   

          
 
                           
 : 3 2J
  
 
 1t t t t tmc y y s a   
      
                                     
 3 . 1 . 6 8
  
   * 1t t t t t tmc y y y y a           
                             
 : 3 3J
 
      
     * 1t t ty y a             
                         
 3 . 1 . 6 9
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In flexible price  nty and the marginal costs is  mc   . Thus  3.1.69  can be written 
as: 
     * 1nC t t tm y y a                                          3 . 1 . 7 0
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     
 
  
                                        
 : 3 4J  
 
Using 
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
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 : 3 5J
 
 
 
*
0 * ;
n
t a t ty a y                                                     3 . 1 . 7 1 
 
where, 
*
0 *
1
, 0,a t t
v
a y 
  
 
     
 
       
                      
 : 3 6J
  
 
 
The New Keynesian Phillips curve 
 
Defining n
t t ty y y   as the domestic output gap. The real marginal cost gap is derived 
by subtracting  3.1.69 from  3.1.70 . 
 t tmc y                                                       : 3 7J  
 
, , 1 ;H t t H t tE y    
                                                3 . 1 . 7 2 
 H                                                               
126 
 
 
The Dynamic IS Equation/Output gap  
 
 Defining the real interest rate as 1t t t tr i E   and insert into  3.1.59  
  *1 1
1
t t t t t ty E y r E y



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Define the natural output as  
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Subtract  3.1.76  from  3.1.77  
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Solving for the real interest rate. 
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The End. 
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Chapter 4  Monetary policy rules in developing countries (A case study of 
Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Namibia, Peru, Philippine, South Africa and Thailand). 
 
This chapter empirically examines whether developing countries observe the Taylor rule 
in setting their interest rates or responds to changes in international interest rates (US 
interest rate). Its trajectory is as follows. Section 4.0 presents the introduction and the 
literature review. The estimated monetary policy reaction function is presented in 4.1, the 
econometric methodology follows in 4.2. The chapter uses the GMM econometric 
procedure to estimate the monetary policy rule(s). In addition the Hodrick-Prescott 
method is used to filter the data. Section 4.3 discusses the data, sources and the 
transformations. Section 4.4 to 4.11 presents the monetary policies followed in each 
country and discusses the estimation results, 4.12 conclude.  
4.0  Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest to compare how central banks 
actually set their policy rates against the prediction of the Taylor rule which was first 
proposed in 1993. The rule recommends that interest rates should be altered taking into 
account the deviation of inflation from a target as well as the output gap. The need for 
increased monetary discipline in developing market economies has been advanced 
given their relatively high inflation and low policy credibility. For instance, Calvo and 
Mishkin (2003) discuss why developing market economies are susceptible to ―sudden 
stops‖ of capital inflows and frequent collapse of the exchange rate. They attribute such 
crises in developing market economies to weak institutional credibility. Thus, they 
suggest that central banks in developing economies should adopt inflation targeting (IT) 
which would make it harder to follow an ―overly expansionary monetary policy‖.  
 
Taylor (2002) recommends emerging economies to adopt rule based monetary policies. 
He contends that following a systematic approach in setting interest rates would 
enhance the probability of economic agents anticipating the effects of monetary policy. 
Thus, the increased predictability of the central bank behaviour is expected to amplify the 
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transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy. Taylor (2002) recommendations 
seem to be the path adopted by an increasing number of central banks in developing 
economies in the last two decades. For instance, Paez-Farrell (2007) contends that the 
methods and conduct of monetary policy tend to have converged, with many developing 
countries adopting an explicit or implicit inflation targeting framework.  Moreover 
Maria-Dolores (2005) states that a number of developing countries have implemented 
market oriented instruments such as short term interest rates. This is also evident in our 
sample given that all the countries selected use the short term interest rate as a tool for 
monetary policy while six have introduced inflation targeting. Despite, for the increase in 
the number of developing countries using market oriented instruments, the empirical 
evidence on the significance of interest rate rules in these countries remains limited and 
a very recent phenomenon. This can be ascribed to the nascence of central bank 
independence in developing countries.   
 
A few recent studies on developing economies however contain imperative findings. In a 
study involving East Asian countries, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000) 
concludes that following the adoption of inflation targeting, countries in East Asia now put 
more emphasis on controlling inflation as well as setting the interest rate taking into 
account the expected inflation. Filosa (2001) finds that emerging market economies tend 
to respond strongly to the exchange rate; however the study did not examine the 
importance which these countries attach to price stability. In particular, he estimates The 
Taylor rule type for countries such as Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Korea and Malaysia 
using data from 1980 to 1999. Among other things he shows the following: (1) The 
estimated monetary policy function in Chile, Mexico, Korea and Malaysia is similar to the 
Taylor rule. (2) Monetary policy did not accommodate inflation in Chile and Malaysia, 
while it was accommodative in Mexico and Korea. (3) The Taylor rule is incapable of 
explaining the short-term interest rate behaviour of Brazil and Peru. (4) Monetary 
authorities reacted strongly to changes in the exchange rate in all countries reviewed.   
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Similarly, Corbo (2002) concludes that Latin American countries tend to consider other 
objectives apart from inflation when setting their interest rates. He examines monetary 
policy rules for five countries namely Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Peru 
using quarterly data from 1990 to 1999. In addition to the Taylor rule, he includes other 
objectives which the respective central bank articulates in their policy documents. His 
results can be summarised as follows: For Chile, interest rates are determined by the 
inflation gap and the current account gap. The output gap is insignificant in the reaction 
function of the central bank. The coefficient on the inflation gap is less than unity.  
 
The interest rate in Colombia, responds to changes in inflation, unemployment rate and 
exchange rate, with the inflation coefficient less than unity. For Costa Rica, the interest 
rate responds to inflation (coefficient less than one) and the output gap. The results for 
Peru show that the concern of the monetary authority during this period includes the 
stabilisation of inflation, output gap and exchange rate. Similar to other countries the 
central bank accommodates inflation. In Africa, Boamah (2012) concludes that the 
estimated Taylor rule for Ghana suggests a weak relationship between the policy rate 
and inflation. Thus the results imply that the central bank of Ghana was expansionary in 
the period between 1993 to 2011.   
 
Moreover, it is often argued that changes in interest rates in major countries tend to have 
imperative consequences on other countries. For instance, the 1999–2000 hikes in U.S. 
interest rates were replicated in interest rate increases in other industrial and developing 
economies (Frankel et al. 2004). This episode has also been true in past global 
monetary tightening 31 . Additionally, there exists ―fear of floating‖ which prevents 
countries from allowing the exchange rate to move freely (Calvo and Reinhart, (2000, 
2001 and 2002) and Hausmann et al. (2001). Calvo and Reinhart (2000) suggest that the 
dynamics of some critical variables of emerging economies shows that they try to 
intervene in order to minimise exchange rate volatility. They document evidence from a 
number of emerging countries, which can be summarised as:  
                                                          
31
 Frankel et al (2004) argues further that in developing economies for instance such episodes were proportionally larger than those 
experienced in the U.S. This can be attributed to the currency risks associated with the rise in the Fed funds rate. 
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(a) the exchange rate variability of these economies is lower compared to true 
floaters.  
(b) the foreign reserves variability is high, implying that policy makers in emerging 
markets tend to lean against the wind through interventions in the foreign 
exchange markets. 
(c) the short-term interest rates volatilities is high, signifying that monetary policy 
reacts to exchange rate changes. 
(d) the correlation between the exchange and interest rates is positive, which they 
interpret to mean that the central banks respond to exchange rates.   
 
There are three main reasons why emerging economies might evade excessive 
exchange rate fluctuations. First, the pass-through of devaluation is considered to be 
large in emerging economies (Ortiz, 2000). Second, devaluation may deteriorate the 
balance sheets of both banks and firms (Filosa, 2001). Therefore, substantial 
fluctuations in the exchange rate may cause financial crises and profound recessions, in 
addition to inflation. Third, for countries with a large external debt, devaluation may 
deteriorate the fiscal position of the country at large. Hence, many countries despite the 
kind of exchange rate regime are technically ‗‗importing‘‘ the monetary policy of 
major-countries, much as those with pegs. Frankel et al (2004) suggests that interest 
rates in developing countries with flexible exchange rates might sometimes be more 
responsive to the U.S. interest rates than countries with fixed-exchange rates.  
 
A peculiar characteristic of the existing literature illustrates that most researchers tend to 
focus on either individual country or regional experiences. The exception is Filosa, (2001) 
who examines the interest setting of developing countries across two regions. This 
chapter studies the interest rate behaviour of three regions (Latin America, East Asia and 
Southern Africa, using data from 1999 to 2010. Also, the countries selected in East Asia 
in this chapter are different to those of Filosa (2001). The chapter‘s intention is to obtain 
some preliminary evidence about interest rate setting behaviour in developing 
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economies. More particularly, it tends to determine whether developing countries in the 
sample take into account developments in the US interest rate when setting their 
monetary policies. To answer this question the chapter estimates the Taylor rule which 
includes the US interest rate as an additional variable in addition to the forecasted 
domestic inflation and the output and past interest rate. Before estimation however, I 
provide the motivation for the proposed monetary policy reaction function.    
4.1  The monetary policy reaction function  
 
The framework I set up is relevant for a central bank which has autonomy to determine 
the direction of its monetary policy. This tends to fit well with the countries in the sample, 
given that seven of them have flexible exchange rates, and hence have control over 
domestic monetary policy formulation. The policy reaction function assumes the 
existence of short run or temporal nominal rigidities in the form of prices or wages. With 
nominal regidities, the monetary authority affects the real interest rate and the real 
exchange rate by varying the nominal interest rate. Despite that there is a debate over 
the details, imperfect prices and wages bring about a positive short-run relationship 
between output and inflation. This short run trade-off may constrain how the monetary 
authority manages its policy given that reducing inflation may entail output reduction, 
depending on the intensity of nominal stickiness.   
 
As in Clarida et al. (1998), we assume that the central bank uses the bank rate as the 
operating instrument of monetary policy. Their policy rule is a generalisation of the 
backward looking Taylor 1993 rule in which the central bank responds to forecasted 
inflation and output rather than past inflation. In the case of the Taylor 1993 rule, relevant 
explanatory variables may be omitted from the interest rate rule. In case where some of 
those variables are correlated with the error term, the orthogonality conditions will be 
violated and thus leading to the rejection of the model asymptotically. By encorporating 
expected inflation the reaction function makes it possible to link the estimated 
coefficients and the objectives of the central bank. Moreover, assuming that the central 
bank respond to forecasts of inflation and output ensure that we encorporate a realistic 
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feature of central banks, that it takes into account a wide-range of information. 
Furthermore, we believe that policy makers are more conserned about medium and 
longer-term trends in inflation and thus a quarter ahead forecasts seems to be a good 
indicator of medium term trend in inflation. I however, make two modifications to their 
rule: First I replace the output with the expected output as in Javanovic and Petreski 
(2012). Second I include the U.S. interest rate, to test the claim by Frankel et al (2004) 
that interest rates in developing countries with flexible exchange rates might sometimes 
be more responsive to the U.S. interest rates in addition to domestic economic 
considerations. The resultant monetary policy function is as follows:  
 
   0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 ,t t t t t ti i USrate E E y u                                            4 . 1                     
 
where i  is the nominal interest rate, 1ti  represent the interest smoothing term, 
 1 0,1 .   The reasons for smoothing interest rate changes include the fear of loss of 
credibility which might be sparked by large policy reversals, the need for consensus 
building to support a change in policy and fear of disrupting capital markets. 
1t   is the 
expected inflation and 1ty  is the expected output.  If the coefficient 3 1  , the target real 
interest rate changes to stabilise inflation and the output (assume 4 0  ). Alternatively, 
when 3 1,   it moves to accommodate deviations in inflation. Despite, for the central 
bank increasing the nominal interest rate in response to a rise in inflation, it does not 
increase it very much to prevent the real interest rate from declining. tUSrate  stand for 
the U.S.interest rate, while tu is the exogenous random shock to the interest rate, 
assumed to be i.i.d. Furthermore, I modify  4.1 by including the interest rate for South 
Africa and use it to estimate the Taylor rule for Namibia. This is due to the fixed 
exchange rate between the two countries. The resultant Forward lookingTaylor equation 
for Namibia can be expressed as: 
 
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 ,t t t t ti i USrate y SArate                                         4 . 2                                 
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4.2  Methodology 
 
4.2.1  Econometric procedure 
 
The equations  4.1  and  4.2  were estimated by the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) developed by Hansen (1982) to mitigate endogeneity in the variables which 
might cause inconsistency in ordinary least squares (OLS). Endogeneity refers to the 
scenario where some or all explanatory variables may be determined by the dependent 
variable(s) or where a shock might affect both the dependent and independent variable. 
For instance a shock which affects the nominal interest rate might have similar effect on 
inflation given that the two variables are linked up through the Fisher‘s equation. In this 
case the assumption that the estimators are exogenous (i.e.) determined outside the 
model is violated.  
Consequently, the assumption of zero conditional mean may not hold. Using OLS in this 
case makes the estimates inconsistent and thus produces spurious regression results. 
To account for this problem, the common modus operandi in the literature is to use the 
General Methods of Moments–Instrumental Variable (GMM-IV) estimation approach. 
This approach entails that to obtain GMM estimate, we must write the moment conditions 
as orthogonality condition between the residuals and instrumental variables. That is we 
have to choose instrumental variables which are strongly correlated with the explanatory 
variables of the model (right hand side variables) but not correlated with the residuals. As 
for the instrumentation I used lagged values of the regressors. This approach is 
commonly used in the New Keynesian literature, for instance Clarida et al. (1998 p. 1044) 
uses four lagged values of the regressors to instrument for the expected inflation and 
output in the reaction function of Germany, Japan and USA. 
This kind of instrumentation is acceptable as long as the error term is not correlated with 
past values of the regressors (Javanovic and Petreski, 2012). Using lags for monetary 
policy implies that the central bank is forward looking (rational), given that lags serve as 
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indicators of future values (Tchaidze and Carare, 2005). It also suggests that the central 
bank take into account all available information when making monetary policy decisions. 
Consequently, forecast errors are not correlated with available information (Boivin, 2006 
and Clarida et al. 2000). The Forward looking Taylor rule(s) were estimated country by 
country as in Clarida et al. (1998), using Eviews 6. I also selected four lags of the 
regressors as instruments similar to (Clarida et al. 2000). The validity of the instruments 
was checked with the J statistic. As for the Weighting Matrix: I selected the Time series 
(HAC), to ensure that the GMM estimates were robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form. 
 After estimating the baseline Forward looking Taylor rules  4.1  and  4.2 , I extend 
the analysis to a case where the central bank have pursued policies to maintain 
exchange rates within reasonable bounds, while retaining some degrees of monetary 
controls. This scenario may best describe the monetary policy formulation of central 
bank of Peru. In this case, the exchange rates may have influenced monetary policy 
independent of the information they possess about inflation and output. Including the 
exchange rate in the baseline model also serves as a robust check measure intended to 
verify whether the baseline results holds in the presence of additional parameters. I 
estimate the alternative model in the same way as the baseline, however I expand the 
parameter vectors to include the coefficient of the exchange rate and expand the 
instrument list to include lagged values of the exchange rate.  
4.2.2. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Filter 
 
In this section I describe the method which was used to decompose series into a trend 
and stationary components32.  Hodrick and Prescott (1997) developed a linear filter 
which computes the smoothed series of tx  of ty  by minimizing the variance of ty  
around tx  taking into account a penalty that limits the second difference of .tx  The HP- 
filter is one of the measures used to obtain cyclical movements about the trend in 
                                                          
32
 I used this method to create the gaps of the variables.   
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macroeconomic time series variable. The underlying assumption for this filtering method 
is that the non-stationary fluctuations in a time series are captured by its smooth as well 
as the slow moving trend. One of the reasons contributing to its popularity as a 
detrending tool is its simplicity as well as its ease of use. The filter‘s other beauty is its 
ability to capture and slowly track the changing trends of the long term economic 
behaviour of the variable as well as its usefulness to measure business cycles. For 
example, suppose the series ty consist of a trend component tx  and a cyclical 
component tc : 
t t ty x c                                                            4 . 3 .                     
 
To isolate the cyclical component, the HP Filter minimizes: 
     
212
1 11 2
;
T T
t t t t t tt t
y x x x x x

  
                                    4 . 4                      
 
where T  represents the number of observations while   is a penalty or trade-off 
parameter. Accordingly,  4.4  has two different terms, the first term serves as a 
measure of fitness of the time series, while the second is a measure of smoothness. 
Thus similar to many other smoothing measures the HP Filter entails a trade-off between 
goodness of fit and smoothness. The larger the penalty parameter, the smoother the 
series. For instance when the value of 0,   the series will be equal to the original 
series. In contrast as diverges towards infinity the series approximates a linear trend. 
For quarterly data it is suggested to use a value of 1600.    
4.3  Data, sources and transformations.   
 
I used quarterly data for the period beginning 2000 to 2012, when most of the countries 
in the sample migrated to inflation targeting33. The only exceptions were Botswana and 
                                                          
33
 Brazil, 15 July 1999; The Phillipines, January 2000; Chile and Thailand, May 2000; South Africa, 2000; 
Peru 24 January 2002.  
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Namibia where the beginning period was 1999, when there was significant changes in 
monetary policies of those countries. The data were obtained from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), apart from that of 
Namibia which I obtained from the Bank of Namibia. The data consisted of five variables: 
inflation, the output gap, interest rate, the US interest rate and the exchange rate. More 
specifically I used the consumer price index (CPI) per centage change as a measure of 
inflation, the industrial production seasonally adjusted as a proxy for output, the discount 
rate for the interest rate. The latter was due to the fact that not all countries report the 
bank rate. Also I used the market rate (US Dollar per national currency) as the measure 
of the exchange rate.  
 
To derive the output gap I used the log of the seasonally adjusted industrial production 
obtained by the HP filter to create a potential output series. The output gap was then 
calculated as the difference between the log of the original series of the seasonally 
adjusted output and the potential output obtained from the HP filter. GMM requires data 
to be stationary, thus we initially examined the integration properties of the data. To 
induce stationarity, I followed (Javanovic and Petreski, 2012) and used the gap (cycle) of 
the variables34, obtained by the HP filter35. After filtering these variables became 
stationary (table 7-14). This approach is different from Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000 p. 
154) who treat the interest rate as a stationary variable even if the null of a unit root is 
hard to reject.         
 
4.4  Botswana 
 
4.4.1  Monetary policy in Botswana 
 
Botswana became part of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) subsequent to independence 
in 1966 along with Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia (then South West Africa) and South 
                                                          
34
 The exception is the output gap which is already stationary. 
35
 This process is similar to the procedure which derived the output gap. 
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Africa. The RMA entailed using the South African rand as the common currency. 
Moreover, monetary policy was an exclusive mandate of the South Africa Reserve Bank 
(SARB). The Bank of Botswana (BoB) was established in 1976, primarily to conduct 
monetary and exchange rate policy given a rise in export revenue. Therefore, monetary 
policy regimes in Botswana can be dichotomised into two main regimes.  
 
The first regime covers the period 1976 to 1989. The monetary policy goals of the first 
regime were monetary stability and economic growth. During the first regime the BoB 
used direct tools of monetary policy such as regulating the borrowing and lending 
interest rates, credit limits and required reserves. Furthermore, the exchange rate was 
often used to achieve competitiveness as well as to reduce the impact of imported 
inflation. The significance of interest rate as a monetary policy tool was minimal, given 
that they were kept low to encourage investment.  
 
However the increase in financial flows primarily due to mining sector created a large 
current account surplus and excess liquidity in the financial system. The latter made the 
monetary policy tools blunt. For example, commercial banks held high reserves 
exceeding the minimum legal reserve requirement of the BoB, thus rendering the 
reserve ratio ineffective. On the other hand, the low levels of interest rate encouraged 
excessive borrowing for unproductive investment and consumption (Bank of Botswana, 
2005). Consequently inflation increased to double digit levels, while the real interest rate 
tended to be very low and sometimes negative thus discouraging financial savings. 
The use of the exchange rate as a tool to control inflation and promote competitiveness 
also created a conflict (Galebotswe and Tlhalefang, 2013). Accordingly, a depreciation of 
the exchange rate improved the competiveness of exports and increased imported 
inflation. In the beginning of 1990, a second regime was introduced following the 
recommendations of a joint study of the Bank of Botswana and the World Bank 
(Galebotswe and Tlhalefang, 2013).     
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The second regime was characterised by the removal of credit controls and interest rate 
ceilings as well as abandonment of the use of the exchange rate. Besides, the focus of 
monetary policy also changed towards the maintenance of price stability. In 1991, the 
BoB introduced indirect monetary policy tools such as the central bank rate and open 
market operations (OMO). The former comprised of auctioning of the 14-day and 91-day 
Bank of Botswana certificates (BoBCs) on a weekly and monthly basis primarily to mob 
up excess liquidity from the financial system. Unlike in the first regime, the lending and 
deposit interest rates of commercial banks were determined by demand and supply 
forces.  
 
The central bank rate served as the signal for the future course of the market interest 
rates; however the auctioning of the BoBCs was the main operational instrument of 
monetary policy. In 1998, a monetary policy committee (MPC) was set up to oversee the 
conduct of monetary policy of the Bank. The committee meets 6 times a year and 
publishes an annual Monetary Policy Statement (MPS). The latter is a transparent 
framework describing the conduct of monetary policy in Botswana. The BOB sets the 
central bank rate given its assessment of the economy.   
 
In 2002, the Central Bank announced for the first time its inflation objectives. 
Accordingly, the BOB announced an annual inflation target of between 4-6 per cent. 
Galebotswe and Tlhalefang 2013, states that the objective was specified as an annual 
average of 12 month changes in the Consumer Price Inflation (CPI). However, the focus 
of the Central Bank is on ―core inflation‖ excluding the prices of fuel and administered 
prices which are considered to be highly volatile (Bank of Botswana, 2010). In 2006, the 
Central Bank increased the horizon for the annual inflation target to 4-7 per cent and 
introduced a medium term (3 year horizon) target of 3-6 per cent. Furthermore, BoB 
decided to restrict the purchase of BoBCs to commercial banks only in 2006. In the 
middle of 2008, BoB abandoned the annual inflation targets arguing that price stability 
can be achieved reasonable in the medium term. According to Bank of Botswana (2010), 
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the indirect tools improved the role of interest rates in the monetary transmission 
process.  
4.4.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule  
 
Economic literature posits a positive correlation between the interest rate, the output gap 
and the international interest rate. The intuition is that the central bank increases its 
interest rate when either of the variables increases and vice versa. On the contrary the 
literature postulates a negative relationship between the central bank interest rate and 
the exchange rate, i.e. the central bank lowers its interest rate when the exchange rate 
rate appreciates and vice versa.  
 
The results of the estimated Forward looking Taylor rule suggest that the interest rate in 
Botswana responds to the U.S. interest rate, past interest rates and expected inflation 
(table 15). Other things being equal an increase in the U.S. interest rate of about 1 per 
cent causes an increase in the Botswana interest rate of about 0.10 basis points. 
Similarly, an increase in inflation of about 1 per cent induces the central bank to hike the 
interest rate by about 0.07 basis points ceteris paribus. The coefficient of the expected 
inflation parameter was however less than unity which is prescribed by the Taylor 
Principle. This tends to suggest that monetary policy in Botswana was expansionary 
during the period under review.  
 
Moreover, the estimated Forward looking Taylor rule shows that the Bank of Botswana 
changed interest rate smoothly with the smoothing parameter estimated at 0.7 per cent. 
The expected output gap was insignificant despite displaying the expected sign. The 
latter can be explained by the fact that developing countries tend to react to supply 
shocks rather than demand shocks. The explanatory power of the equation was very 
high with the adjusted Rsquared of 74 per cent. The J-statistic of 9.15 with the probability 
of 0.68 does not reject that the overidentifying restrictions were satisfied.  
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The results from the estimated Forward looking Taylor rule augmented with the 
exchange rate tend to confirm that interest rate in Botswana respond to variations in the 
U.S. interest rates (table 16). The exchange rate appeared with the correct negative sign 
and significant. The central bank of Botswana tended to lean against the wind, i.e. raised 
the interest rate when the exchange rate depreciated. The explanatory power of the 
equation improved slightly to 79 per cent. Similarly, the J-statistic did not reject that the 
overidentifying restrictions were satisfied.  
 
4.5  Brazil 
 
4.5.1  Monetary policy in Brazil 
 
The monetary policy in Brazil has a history of foremost changes in response to key 
developments in the economy. Price freezes and government intervention were some of 
the initial instruments used to stabilize the economy during the high inflation of the 1980s. 
However these measures proved futile. In 1993, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was 
appointed as the Minister of Finance with a mandate to control the hyperinflation in the 
economy. Working in collaboration with a team of economists, he fashioned and 
implemented the Real Plan36 in 1994. To accomplish and maintain price stability, the 
Real Plan introduced a new currency which was pegged to the U.S. dollar. In addition, 
quarterly targets for the monetary aggregates were introduced while the exchange rate 
was allowed to float in July 1994. The former was aimed at inducing confidence in the 
economy by signalling that there would be no inflationary financing of the government 
deficit.  
 
Furthermore, a policy of high interest rates was introduced giving rise to a significant 
inflow of foreign capital and subsequent appreciation of the currency. In December 1994, 
                                                          
36
 A stabilisation plan consisting of the following: (1) A fiscal strategy which created the Social Emergency Fund 
and other long term reforms, (2) Monetary reforms which introduced a new unit of account which later became 
the national currency, (3) A “big bang” approach to liberalise the economy and the adoption of a new foreign 
exchange policy. 
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the Mexican currency crisis triggered outflow of capital from Latin American countries. 
This subsequently caused a significant reduction in foreign reserves which consequently 
increased the balance of payment problems in Brazil. In response to this development,   
Brazilian authorities introduced exchange rate bands which acted like a crawling peg in 
March 1995 (Otker-Robe and Vavra, 2007). This was intended to mitigate the exchange 
rate volatility brought about by the flexible exchange rate. In addition, the monetary 
authority increased the nominal interest rates and announced tariffs in specific sectors 
(Banomo and Terra, 2001). The increase in interest rate however raised the public debt 
obligations, worsened the fiscal deficit, and subsequently constrained growth and 
investment (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999). 
 
The Brazilian fiscal position deteriorated further in 1998, due to the increase in the 
speculative attacks on the currency following the Russian crisis. On the 13 January 1999, 
the crawling peg arrangement was replaced with an exchange rate band with explicit 
rules of intervention, also known as ―endogenous diagonal band‖ (Otker-Robe and Vavra, 
2007). Following a very sharp depreciation however, the exchange rate was allowed to 
float on January 15, 1999. Brazil subsequently introduced Inflation Targeting (IT) in June 
1999, replicating the British IT model. It comprises of the National Monetary Council 
(CMN) consisting of the Minister of Finance, Minister of Planning and the president of the 
BCB. The president of Brazil appoints all the members of the CMN. The role of the CMN 
is to among other things set the inflation targets, regulate the financial system as well as 
approve the main norms related to monetary and exchange rate policies. The Minister of 
Finance initially proposes the inflation targets.   
 
In June of each year, the CMN set up the inflation targets as well as the corresponding 
tolerance level for the next two years. The inflation target is based on the extensive 
national consumer price index (IPCA). i.e. headline inflation index. However, there is a 
provision for the IT to vary within the range of between 2.0 or 2.5 per centage points 
above and below the central point target. The main reason for tolerating variations in 
bands is to help the Central Bank realise the set inflation target in the event of supply 
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shocks. The Central Bank of Brazil Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) executes 
monetary policy.  
 
When the inflation over or undershot the set target, the governor of the BCB is mandated 
to explain to the Minister of Finance. The explanation must include the reasons why the 
targets were missed and the measures put in place to bring it back to the target. The 
COPOM set the Selic interest rate (the interest rate for overnight interbank loans) which 
remains fixed between regular meetings. The committee publishes the minutes on the 
BCB website and to the press eight days after each meeting. Moreover, the COPOM 
publishes the BCB inflation report at the end of each quarter. The latter is intended to 
inform the public about the goals, design, and implementation of monetary policy.   
 
Following the financial crises of 2008, the Central Bank of Brazil adopted quantitative 
easing measures to mitigate the effects of the crises. These measures were 
characterised by the auctioning of U.S. dollars with a plan to buy them back at a later 
date, loan reserve auctions and currency swap contracts. Consequently, the Central 
Bank injected R$13.2 billion into the financial markets. By the end of October 2008, the 
value of the currency trade agreement between the FED and the BCB stood at US$30 
billion. Other initiatives involved freeing the mandatory reserves, easing credit rules and 
reduction of taxes on financial transactions (IOF).               
4.5.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule 
 
The estimated Forward looking Taylor rule for Brazil states that the interest rate 
responded to the expected output gap and the U.S. interest rate (table 15). However, the 
U.S. interest rate appeared with a negative sign while the coefficient of the expected 
output gap was overstated. Surprisingly the coefficient of the expected inflation appeared 
with a wrong sign and insignificant. The degree of interest rate smoothing was 0.97 per 
cent. The estimated equation explained about 55 per cent of the changes in the Brazilian 
interest rate. The J–statistic again did not reject that the overindentifying restrictions 
were satisfied.   
143 
 
 
On the other hand, the Forward looking Taylor rule with the exchange rate tends to 
suggest that that the bank rate in Brazil responded positively to the expected output gap 
and negatively to the exchange rate. The U.S. interest rate was significant but with a 
wrong sign, while the coefficient on the expected inflation appeared with the correct sign 
despite that it remained insignificant. The degree of interest rate smoothing was 0.83 per 
cent. The estimated equation explained about 52 per cent of the changes in the Brazilian 
interest rate. Similarly the J–statistic did not reject that the overindentifying restrictions 
were satisfied.   
4.6  Chile 
 
4.6.1  Monetary policy in Chile 
 
The Central Bank of Chile (CBCh) pegged the exchange rate to the U.S. dollar in 1979, 
thus providing a nominal anchor for monetary policy. The fixed exchange rate regime 
was however abandoned in June 1982 subsequent to a major financial crisis attributed to 
a large shift in U.S. monetary policy. In August 1984 the exchange rate was floated 
within narrow bands. The latter gave the CBCh some room to undertake active monetary 
policy. In 1985 however, the constraints caused by the debt crisis rendered monetary 
policy ineffective. Consequently, balance of payments considerations prevailed over 
inflation or output stabilisation goals. 
 
The Brady Plan37 of 1989, which eased the external debt hangover in major economies 
of Latin America, brought hope and optimism in the financial markets in the early and 
middle 1990s. This was augmented by the recovery in global growth and commodity 
                                                          
37
 A plan which was designed to address the debt crisis of the Least Developing Countries of the 1980’s. The 
principles of the plan were first articulated by the U.S. Secretary of Treasury Nicholas F. Brady in March 1989. The 
debt crisis started in 1982, when a number of countries particularly in Latin America were unable to service 
commercial bank loans due to the high interest rates compounded by low commodity prices. Under the plan 
debtor countries and their commercial bank creditors engaged in rescheduling and restructuring of sovereign as 
well as private sector debt on the premises that the debt problem was a temporary phenomenon which would end 
when the economy rebound.  
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prices as well an accommodative38 monetary policy stance of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Bank. Consequently, there was a surge of capital flows in Latin American Economies. 
Laban and Larrain (1994) posit that Chile received the largest share of the private capital 
inflows as a per centage of GDP among the five biggest economies of Latin America in 
1989 and 1990. In December 1989, the new Central Bank legislation was enacted with 
greater emphasis on the central bank independence and price stability. However, with 
the inflation rate in double digit figures by then, reducing it to single digit levels was 
considered the most pressing objective of the Central Bank.  
 
The other challenge that confronted policy makers then was the need to reduce the 
inflow of foreign capital, necessitating economic authorities to deliberate various options 
at the time (Bianchi, 2009). As a solution, the Central Bank of Chile announced 
unremunerated reserve requirement on capital, known as the encaje inflows in June 
1991. Accordingly, 20 per cent of certain capital inflows were deposited at the central 
bank in an account which earned no interest for the period of the investment or one year, 
which ever was deemed the shortest. The encaje was increased to 30 per cent in May 
1992, and extended to cover a wide range of capital inflows. The objective of imposing a 
tax on foreign credit was to prevent the exchange rate from breaching the set bands as 
well as to pursue an independent monetary policy. Following a wave of financial 
liberalisation, the encaje was lowered further to 10 per cent in June 1998 before being 
abandoned in September.  
  
Given the risk posed by the depreciation of the exchange rate, the Central Bank feared 
that the loss of a nominal anchor might transmit a severe depreciation path-through to 
inflation. Consequently, the bands were increased during the first half of 1999, before the 
exchange rate was floated in September the same year. The Central Bank further 
announced the migration to inflation targeting. The IT was however fully implemented in 
May 2000, when the CBCh formally adopted established procedures for regular 
                                                          
38
 This was in response to the minor recession of the 1990 in the United States of America. 
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monetary policy meetings, forecasting tools and models. Moreover, the CBCh began 
publishing periodic inflation reports including explicit inflation forecasts.  
 
Chile‘s inflation target since 2001 has been defined as a 2% to 4% target range, centred 
around 3% annual inflation. Monetary policy responds to the deviations between the 
CBCh‘s inflation forecast (and the gap between actual and potential output) from the 3% 
inflation target over the 24-month policy horizon. The operational target of the central 
bank is the overnight interest rate on interbank loans while the monetary policy 
instruments include standing facilities, the legal bank reserves and open-market 
operation (OMO).  
 
The latter serves as the main instrument for managing liquidity together with repurchase 
and reverse-repurchase operations. Reserve requirements have not been changed 
since 1980 and hence not used as a monetary policy instrument. Within the IT regime, 
foreign exchange interventions have been restricted to cases where the real exchange 
rate diverted significantly from its equilibrium and considered as damaging to the 
economy. Thus far from September 1999 to date, foreign market operations were 
conducted four times in August 2001, October 2002, April 2008 and January 2011. The 
process of conducting foreign currency operations begins with the central bank 
announcing explicitly the quantities of the currency involved as well as the duration. 
Since 2007, the main monetary policy objective was to keep the annual CPI inflation at 
around 3% with the tolerance range of one per centage point.  
 
Following the 2007-2008 financial crises, inflation shot to 9% in the middle of 2008 due to 
high global food and energy prices. In response, the Central Bank tightened the 
monetary policy stance subsequently increasing the appreciation of the peso. Further the 
Central Bank intervened in the currency market given the evidence then that the real 
exchange rate diverted from its long run equilibrium level. In early 2009, the monetary 
policy rate was reduced aggressively consequently reaching the lower bound. To ease 
monetary policy further, a non-conventional stimulus was implemented. In particular, the 
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Central Bank offered a fixed interest rate and six month repos (the Facilidad de Liquidez 
a Plazo, or FLAP) (Carriere-Swallow and Garcia-Silva, 2013). Following the recovery 
from the crisis, the monetary and fiscal stimuli were withdrawn in 2010.         
 
4.6.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule. 
 
The estimated Forward looking Taylor rule for Chile suggests that expected inflation and 
the U.S. interest determined the interest rate (table 15). For instance, other things being 
held equal, an increase in expected inflation of about 1 per cent causes an increase in 
the interest rate of about 0.43 basis points. Similar to Botswana, the coefficient of the 
expected inflation was however less than unity and did not satisfy the Taylor principle. 
This tends to suggest that the central bank policy was inflationary during the period 
under review.  
 
On the other hand a 1 per cent increase in the U.S. interest rate leads to an increase in 
the central bank rate of about 0.56 basis points other things being equal. The coefficient 
of the interest rate smoothing was 0.30. The estimated equation explains about 73 per 
cent of the variation in the central bank policy rule. The J–statistic did not reject that the 
overindentifying restrictions were satisfied. Including the exchange rate in the Forward 
looking Taylor rule confirmed the significance of the U.S. interest rate in the central bank 
policy rule of Chile (table 16). Though appearing with the correct negative sign, the 
exchange rate was insignificant.    
   
4.7  Namibia 
 
4.7.1  Monetary policy in Namibia 
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After the First World War, the financial system of Namibia was deeply integrated into that 
of South Africa39.  In 1961, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) opened a branch in 
the Namibian capital Windhoek. The functions of the latter were restricted to the 
issuance of South African currency, administration of exchange controls and provision of 
banking and clearing services to commercial banks (Mushendami, 2010). The Bank of 
Namibia was created in 1990, following the attainment of the country‘s political 
independence, with the exchange rate subsequently pegged to the South African Rand 
under the Common Monetary Area (CMA).   
Accordingly the monetary policy of Namibia is to maintain fixed exchange rate parity 
between to the South African Rand40. Tjirongo (1995) suggests that monetary policy 
arrangement in Namibia is similar to a currency board given the fact that it requires that 
the issuance of domestic currency (Namibia Dollar41) to be supported by foreign assets. 
Furthermore, the monetization of the fiscal deficits is not allowed. Unlike the 
conventional currency board a central bank oversees the monetary system in Namibia. 
The former performs the normal central banking functions using the repo as the primary 
instrument of monetary policy. The Bank of Namibia uses the repo rate as the primary 
instrument of monetary policy. The Bank of Namibia adjusts the repo rate in line with 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) monetary policy stance, and also taking into 
account the level of international reserves (Bank of Namibia, 2008).  
Notwithstanding the above, the Bank of Namibia kept the central bank repo rate variant 
from the repo rate of South Africa since 1999. Other market operations available at the 
Bank of Namibia include the call account, the seven-day repurchase transactions and 
the Bank of Namibia bills. The call account is used for banking institutions to place funds 
with the Bank of Namibia at an interest rate which varies. The meagreness of 
government securities, led to the introduction of the Bank of Namibia bills in April 2007. 
The bills have been issued every after two weeks predominantly to assist banking 
institutions meet their statutory liquidity requirements.  
                                                          
39
 Namibia was a colony of South Africa until 1990. 
40
 The South African Rand is still a legal tender together with the Namibia Dollar. 
41
 The Namibia Dollar was first issued in 1993. 
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In July 2008, the Bank of Namibia introduced the seven day refinancing facility which is 
based on the repurchase agreements (repos) as the main tool of accommodating 
banking institutions at an interest rate equivalent to the prevailing central bank rate 
(repo). The central bank can use the repo facility to either increase short-term liquidity or 
create a shortage. The latter may occur when the central bank expects that further 
injection of liquidity might create unnecessary capital outflow and consequently put 
undue pressure on the level of the official reserves. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 had 
minimal direct impact on the Namibian financial sector, partially attributed to 
conservative lending practices of commercial banks which limited their exposure to the 
crisis. To mitigate the spill over effects of the financial crisis however, the government 
undertook counter-cyclical fiscal expenditure programmes in particular capital 
investment in economic and social infrastructure.               
4.7.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule. 
 
The estimated Forward looking Taylor rule for Namibia suggests that the interest rate 
responds to changes in the South African interest rate and the U.S. interest rate (table 
15).For instance an increase in the South African interest rate of about 1 per cent causes 
a hike in the central bank policy rate of about 0.83 basis points which is close to one. The 
significance of the South African interest rate was expected and could be explained by 
the free capital mobility between Namibia and South Africa. On the other hand an 
increase in the U.S. interest rate of 1 per cent leads to an increase in the central bank 
policy rate of about 0.04 basis points. The coefficient of the expected output gap was 
statistically insignificant, while the expected inflation appeared with a wrong sign.  
The explanatory power was very high at 0.95 per cent. Including the South African 
exchange rate in the estimated Forward looking Taylor rule confirms the significance of 
the U.S. interest rate in the central bank reaction function of Namibia (table 16). 
Expected inflation and the South African exchange rate were significant, despite the sign 
of the former which remained wrong. The expected output gap was still insignificant. The 
J-statistics did not reject the hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions were satisfied. 
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The significance of the U.S. interest rate tends to suggest that the central bank of 
Namibia took into account other factors when making monetary policy decisions. Thus 
the results tend to challenge the impossible trinity theory which suggests that a country 
with a fixed exchange cannot have independent monetary policy.    
  
4.8  Peru 
 
4.8.1  Monetary policy in Peru 
 
The persistent high inflation as well as macroeconomic imbalances during the 1970s and 
1980s culminated in Peruvian households holding foreign currency (financial 
dollarization) as a store of value. In August 1985, the Peruvian authorities implemented 
measures which were intended to enforce the conversion of foreign assets into local 
assets (Hardy and Pazabasioglu, 2006). Consequently, dollarization dropped sharply by 
almost 80 per cent to 12 per cent in 1987 (Bofinger, 2009).  
 
The restrictions on holding foreign currency however, brought macroeconomic instability 
such as low levels of financial intermediation, fall in the incomes of residents when 
measured in foreign currency, capital flight and loss of credibility (Bofinger, 2009). 
Consequently, authorities lifted the restrictions of holding foreign currency in 1988 and 
thus the dollarization re-emerged during the early 1990s. As a policy response, the 
Peruvian authorities introduced a number of financial, monetary and fiscal reforms to 
address the problem which brought restored macroeconomic stability (Rossini et al, 
2011).   
 
In response to the disinflation, the monetary policy of Peru followed a monetary targeting 
framework from 1991 to 2001, without any obligation to either the exchange rate or 
interest rate (Bofinger, 2009). The Central Bank of Peru (BCR) approved the adoption of 
an explicit inflation targeting (IT) framework on the 24 January 2002. The annual inflation 
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target was set at 2.5 per cent which was reduced to 2 per cent at the beginning of 2007. 
The tolerance margin range has been set at 1 per cent. The reduction in the inflation 
target was done in attempt to reduce the vulnerabilities ascribed to the dollarization and 
hence to reinforce the confidence in the domestic currency. Consequently, the average 
inflation has been 2.7 per cent during the period under review.   
 
The targeted inflation of 2 per cent is one of the lowest in Latin America (Armas and 
Grippa, 2005). The BCR changes the reference short-term interest rate (the benchmark 
for the overnight interbank rates) to carry out monetary policy. Moreover, the central 
bank attempts to align the money market‘s interbank interest rate to the reference level. 
In particular the central bank carries out direct repos and rediscounts and provides an 
overnight deposit facility. Furthermore, the BCR injects or withdraws liquidity in the 
system through open market operations and foreign currency swaps. In 2007, currency 
swaps were introduced to inject domestic currency or withdraw foreign exchange 
particularly US dollars (Central Bank of Peru, 2009).   
 
Foreign exchange market interventions in Peru serve as a management tool to minimise 
extreme exchange rate fluctuations without announcing a predetermined path of level 
(Central Bank of Peru, 2008). Thus, the Peruvian monetary policy framework can be 
better described as an adjusted inflation targeting comprising of three pillars: Inflation 
targeting, liquidity management and dollarization risk control. A peculiar characteristic of  
Peruvian inflation targeting is the dollarized risk control, which is the main reason for 
including the financial stability (direct purchases and sales of foreign exchange) into the 
monetary policy framework.   
 
In addition, it supplies the market with hedging assets through the issuance of exchange 
rate indexed securities (CDRs), (Armas and Grippa, 2005). During the financial crisis of 
2007 to 2008 for instance, the BCR intervened three times in the foreign exchange 
market, firstly before the fall of the Lehman Brothers, secondly after the collapse of the 
Lehman and third following the announcement of the second quantitative easing of the 
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U.S. Federal Reserve Bank (QE2). In particular, the BCR purchased U.S.dollars before 
the collapse of the Lehman brothers, during the announcement of the fall and during the 
implementation of the QE2. Similarly, it sold U.S. dollars to the market during the last 
quarter of 2009, when the crisis was intense (Rossini et al, 2011). 
 
In addition, BCR uses the reserve requirements as an instrument of monetary policy. 
The BCR makes a distinction between the marginal reserve requirements and legal 
reserve requirements, whereby only the former is compensated. The central bank 
mandates commercial banks to hold a higher level of international reserves. In the first 
quarter of 2008 for instance, following a massive inflow of capital, the BCR increased the 
domestic and foreign currency reserve requirements and instrumented other measures 
to discourage non-resident investors from holding instruments issued by the central bank. 
As a result, the interest rates on the marginal reserve requirements for the domestic 
currency were increased from 6 to 25 per cent, while reserve requirements on foreign 
currency were raised from 30 to 49 per cent.  
 
Reserve requirements on deposits of non-residents were raised to 120 per cent. In 
addition, the central bank imposed a 4 per cent fee on sales or purchases of the central 
bank papers to foreign participants, i.e. (any participant other than local financial 
institutions). Subsequent to the quantitative easing undertaken by developed countries 
and its concomitant effects of increasing capital inflows in the second part of 2010, the 
BCR raised reserve requirements again (Rossini et al. 2011). This time reserve 
requirements in foreign currency were raised to 55 per cent.   
 
Besides, dollarization has an impact on the design of the inflation forecasting model. The 
projection model comprises of four elements: a Phillips curve, a monetary policy rule, an 
investment‐savings curve and an exchange rate equation (Bofinger, 2009). Notably the 
IS curve includes a US dollar interest rate to take account of dollarization, i.e. (to 
accommodate the fact that foreign interest rate variations affect the domestic demand 
decisions. The exchange rate equation comprises of an inertia term to take into account 
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the central bank‘s tendency to intervene in the exchange rate. Dollarization also implies 
that the inflation targeting has an escape clause to fight extreme exchange rate 
depreciation. Accordingly, the interbank interest rate is permitted to abandon the 
predetermined band in an event of severe depreciation or speculative attack (Amas and 
Grippa, 2005).         
     
4.8.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule 
 
All the variables in the central bank reaction function of Peru displayed the expected 
signs, however the expected output gap was insignificant. Accordingly, the central bank 
interest rule responds to changes in the U.S. interest rate, expected inflation and the 
past interest rate (table 15). Other things being held equal, a 1 per cent increase in 
expected inflation is expected to lead to a rise in the central bank rate of about 0.53 basis 
points. Similarly, a 1 per cent increase in the U.S. interest rate causes an increase in the 
central bank rate of about 0.56 basis points. These results were similar to those of 
Botswana and Chile. The explanatory power for the estimated central bank reaction 
function was very high, with the Adjusted R-squared of 0.89 per cent. The hypothesis 
that the model was overidentified could not be rejected. The results of the estimated 
Forward looking Taylor rule which include the exchange rate confirmed that the central 
policy rate responded to changes in the U.S. interest rates, expected inflation, the 
expected output gap and the exchange rate (table16). The latter tends to be overstated.     
 
4.9  Philippines 
 
4.9.1  Monetary policy in Philippines 
 
In the 1980s, the Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) used direct methods of monetary 
policy such as setting interest rates on bank deposits and loans. This policy was similar 
to Botswana‘s policy during the same period. The interest rate set by the central bank 
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was considered low and thus contributed to the financial chaos then. Thus the regulatory 
authorities embarked on a comprehensive financial sector reform.  
 
The reforms concentrated on liberalising the foreign exchange regulations and included: 
(1) Investors were given the liberty to buy foreign currency up to $1 million a year from 
the local banking institutions and invest it abroad without the approval of the central bank. 
(2) Limits on the repatriation of capital or remittances were abolished: (3) foreign banks 
were allowed to extend foreign currency denominated short term credit to domestic 
borrowers without seeking the approval of the central bank: (4) Domestic commercial 
banks were also allowed to issue both short and long-term foreign currency denominated 
loans without obtaining the approval of the central bank. (5) Interest rates were 
liberalised and deregulated in 1981-1983. The reforms were not implemented 
successfully due to political and economic crises until the latter part of 1980s.  
 
Following the financial sector reforms, there were large interest rate margins between 
the borrowing and lending rates. In addition interest rates on time deposits were variant. 
For example interest rates on six month deposits differed by 1 per centage point to the 
interest rate offered on twelve month deposits. During the same period the central bank 
used government securities as the primary monetary policy instrument. At the end of the 
of the debt crisis in 1983, the exchange rate was floated in October 1984 (Poon, 2010). 
In addition monetary aggregate (M3) was adopted as a signal of the monetary policy 
stance as well as a means to achieve price stability. This approach assumed the 
existence of a stable and predictable relationship between money, output, and inflation.  
Moreover, monetary targeting assumed that the central bank could control inflation by 
determining the level of money supply. On the contrary, Bayangos (2000) observes that 
the rise in M3 in 1993-1995 did not transmit to higher inflation in the Philippine.   
 
Similarly, Poon (2010) contend that the relatively high growth of M3 of about 40 per cent 
in the early part of 1995 did not cause an increase in inflation even after 8 to 12 months. 
In 1995, a new approach which emphasised price stability rather than a rigid observance 
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of monetary aggregate targets was adopted. Under the new framework, the BSP was 
allowed to exceed the monetary targets in instances where the actual inflation rate is 
kept within program levels. Moreover, policymakers began scrutinizing a larger set of 
economic variables such as changes in key interest rates, demand and supply factors, 
the exchange rate, domestic credit, among other variables before taking an appropriate 
monetary policy position.  
 
Following the crisis of 1997, the peso depreciated by more than 50 per cent. The 
subsequent rise in interest rate did not however make a significant impact to mitigate the 
impact of the depreciation. Consequently, monetary targeting was perceived as a less 
reliable tool of monetary policy in the Philippines. The Monetary Board of the BSP 
approved in principle the migration to inflation targeting as the new framework for 
carrying out monetary policy on 24 January 2000. Similar to other frameworks, the 
primary focus of the IT was to achieve price stability as the final objective of monetary 
policy.  
 
The central bank together with the government (through an inter-agency body) 
announces an explicit target for inflation to be achieved over a prescribed time period. In 
terms of assessment, the central bank compares the actual headline inflation against 
inflation forecasts. The BSP uses a host of monetary policy instruments at its disposal to 
achieve the inflation target such as adjustments in the BSP‘s key policy interest rates, 
rediscounting and reserve requirements. The BSP presents reports which among other 
things explain the policy decisions and provide an assessment of the inflation 
environment and outlook. Also, the central bank is mandated to explain to the public and 
market should it fail to meet the inflation target as well as measures to steer inflation 
towards the target level.   
 
At the time of adopting inflation targeting, the target inflation was defined as a range with 
one per centage point interval. However, in 2008 the target was redefined to a point 
target. Accordingly, the point target for 2008 was set at 4 per cent with a tolerance level 
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of one per cent both sides. For 2009 onwards the target was set at 3.5 per cent with a 
tolerance level of one per cent on both sides as well. In 2008, the central bank policy rate 
was raised by 100 basis points over a period of three month (June to August). This was 
done to mitigate the pressure of extra ordinary increases on inflation. However, by the 
end of December 2008, there was a downward shift in the inflation expectation on 
account of a host of factors such as easing commodity prices and a slowdown in 
expected economy activity. These developments laid the ground for easing monetary 
policy to support growth and also help the country to mitigate the effects of the financial 
crises (Guinigundo, 2010).                      
4.9.3 Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule. 
 
The estimated central bank reaction function of the Philippines suggests that the interest 
rate was determined positively by expected inflation, the expected output gap and 
interest rate in the previous period. Holding other things equal, a one per cent increase in 
expected inflation was expected to lead to a 0.27 basis points increase in the central 
bank policy interest rate. Similar to other countries, the estimated inflation coefficient was 
less than unity which is recommended by the Taylor Principle. The interest rate 
smoothing parameter was estimated at 0.34 per cent. The Forward looking Taylor rule 
augmented for the exchange rate on the other hand shows that the U.S.interest rates, 
expected inflation, expected output gap were positively correlated with the central bank 
interest rate in the Philippine, and negatively correlated with the exchange rate.    
 
4.10  South Africa 
 
4.10.1  Monetary policy in South Africa 
 
Monetary policy regimes in South Africa since the 1960s can be classified under three 
broad strands. The first which ceased in the early 1980s was the liquid asset ratio-based 
characterised by quantitative controls on interest rates and credit. Following the 
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recommendations of the De Kock Commission Reports (1978, 1985) a number of 
reforms were introduced from the early 1980s which subsequently culminated into the 
introduction of a cash reserve-based system in the middle of 1985 (Gidlow, 1995). SARB 
adopted inflation targeting in 2000 to enhance policy transparency, accountability and 
predictability.  
 
Presently, the inflation target aims to achieve a rate of increase in the overall consumer 
price index, excluding the mortgage interest cost (the so-called CPIX), of between 3 and 
6 per cent per year. Initially, the mandate of setting the target range was the prerogative 
of the Ministry of Finance. However, it is presently set by the National Treasury (a 
department of the Ministry of Finance), after consultation with the SARB. The final 
government decision is reached at Cabinet level. In 2001, the Inflation Targeting 
Technical Committee (ITTC) was established, with representatives from the National 
Treasury and SARB. The target for inflation has been modified several times. For 
instance in February 2000, the target for the calendar year 2002 was set as an average 
rate of increase in CPIX of 3-6 per cent per annum. This was extended every October of 
the following year to cover for 2003. The target for 2004 and 2005 was initially scaled 
down to 3-5 per cent for 2004 and 2005, but was subsequently raised up to 3-6 per cent, 
to mitigate exogenous shocks.  
 
A diverse number of changes were implemented from September 2001 and May 2005 to 
address a poorly functioning money market, which was due to a significant domination of 
a few large banks. These changes proved effective given that the participation in the 
market increased. In September 2005, the spread between the repo rate and interbank 
call rate was changed with a 100 basis point reduction in the repo rate. Presently, the 
repo rate is fixed to get rid of any vagueness in the SARB‘s policy. Moreover, daily 
auctions have been substituted with weekly repurchase auctions with a seven day 
maturity. To assist in tendering, an estimate of the average daily market liquidity 
requirement is announced before the auction. The latter began in May 2005. Moreover, 
the SARB can conduct further auctions to accommodate liquidity requirements as well as 
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to stabilize the interbank rates. In November 2003, the target range was changed from 
an average over the calendar to a continuous target of 3-6 per cent beyond 2006. This 
was done to mitigate potential interest rate volatility that might arise from a short target 
horizon.                       
4.10.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule 
 
The estimated Taylor rule for South Africa states that the central bank policy rate was 
determined by the expected inflation and past values of the central bank interest rate 
(table 15). For instance other things remaining unchanged, a 1 per cent increase in the 
expected inflation leads to an increase in the bank rate of about 0.47 basis points. The 
expected output gap and the U.S. interest rate were insignificant despite displaying the 
expected positive relationship. The interest rate smoothing parameter was very small 
estimated at 0.18 basis points. The equation seems to explain about 80 per cent of the 
variations in the dependent variable (central bank interest rate). The results were 
confirmed by estimating an equation which includes the exchange rate in the Forward 
looking Taylor rule.  The exchange rate appeared with the correct negative sign 
however it was insignificant (table16).  
4.11 Thailand 
 
4.11.1  Monetary policy in Thailand 
 
Central banking in Thailand dates back to the 1942‘s when the Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
was founded. Immediately after establishment, the BOT followed exchange rate 
targeting regime. In particular, from 1942 to 1984, the Baht was pegged to a basket of 
currencies, but was later replaced by the U.S.dollar in 1984. The BOT adopted a 
monetary targeting regime in 1997 in response to the pressure from the IMF. Thailand 
was under the IMF assistance program following the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The 
monetary policy objective then was to ensure macroeconomic stability and also to 
restore the confidence lost due to the failure of the fixed rate regime.  
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The BOT targeted domestic money supply, despite for a very short period and hence 
was abandoned. Following the end of the IMF program in May 2000, BOT launched the 
Inflation Targeting framework. The BOT targets the core inflation (excluding energy and 
fresh food). The target range is a quarterly average for inflation of between 0.5 to 3.0 per 
cent. The target is set annualy, first proposed by the BOT, with the concurrence of the 
Minister and endorsement of cabinet.  
 
Unlike other countries, Thailand‘s inflation targeting has no escape clause which protects 
the central bank in the event of energy or supply shocks. By targeting core inflation 
rather than headline inflation, the BOT puts emphasis on demand factors which it can 
influence. In 2005 and 2008 during high international oil price shocks, the BOT was 
assisted by the government in meeting its inflation targets. For instance, the Ministry of 
Commerce gave subsidies for energy and transport, and also put price controls on 
producers by way of decrees and monitoring. In 2009, an additional six measures were 
introduced to reduce the cost of living, which also had the objective of mitigating the 
impact of the crisis.   
 
4.11.2  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule 
 
The Forward looking Taylor rule for Thailand suggests that the central bank interest rate 
responded to the U.S. interest rate, expected inflation, past interest rate and the 
expected output gap (table 15). Other things being held unchanged, a one per cent rise 
in the U.S. interest rate led to an increase in the Thai interest rate amounting to 0.11 
basis points. Similarly, a one per cent increase in the expected inflation brings about a 
0.11 basis points rise in the central bank policy rate. The expected output gap was 
negative suggesting that the interest rate was pro cyclical in Thailand. The smoothing 
parameter was estimated at 0.76 per cent. The estimated equation explaines about 0.85 
per cent of the changes in the interest rate in Thailand, as given by the adjusted R 
squared value. The results from the Forward looking Taylor rule including the exchange 
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rate affirmed the significance of the U.S. interest rate in monetary policy function rule of 
Thailand (table16).    
4.12  Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines the hypothesis that developing countries tend to respond to 
changes in the international interest rates particularly the U.S. interest rate in setting their 
domestic interest rate. The chapter uses eight developing countries to address the 
research question. Among the selected countries 6 were inflation targeters. The 
empirical results from the Forward looking Taylor rule suggests that Botswana, Chile, 
Namibia, Peru, the Philippines and Thailand reacted to changes in the U.S. interest rate 
in setting their nominal interest rate. The only exception was South Africa.  
 
The empirical results show further that the coefficient of the expected inflation was 
significant in Botswana, Chile, Namibia42, Peru, the Phillippines, South Africa and 
Thailand but less than unity, thus violating the Taylor principle. This suggests that 
monetary policy in these countries was accommodative during the period under review. 
Hofman and Bogdanova (2012) attribute the accommodative bias of developing 
economies to resistance to the concomitant capital flows and exchange rate movements. 
For instance developing countries might tend to keep interest rates low to mitigate 
against the appreciation of the exchange rate. Keeping the interest rates lower than the 
prescribed Taylor‘s principle may partially explain the high inflation experience in 
developing countries.  
 
Furthermore, the coefficient on the expected output gap was insignificant in countries 
reviewed except in Brazil, Peru and the Philippines. This can be accounted by the fact 
that developing countries tend to respond more to supply shocks rather than demand 
shocks when changing the bank rate. The interest rate parameter ranged between 0.7 
per cent to 0.9 per cent. The J–statistic did not reject that the overindentifying restrictions 
were satisfied in all the estimated monetary policy reaction functions. The result from the 
                                                          
42
 The expected inflation coefficient however showed a wrong sign.  
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Forward looking Taylor rule augmented with the exchange rate confirms the results from 
the baseline estimation. Based on these results I conclude that developing countries 
tend to respond to past interest rates, expected inflation and the US interest rates. A 
regional comparison shows that changes in the U.S.interest rate had more profound 
effects on the interest rates in Latin American countries.    
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Chapter 5 Conclusions, contribution and futher research. 
 
This thesis contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy rules 
as follows. Firstly, it examines the implications of interest smoothing on the persistence 
of a monetary policy and technology shock. Secondly, it evaluates the performance of 
monetary policy rule (targeting or instrument rule) in the presence of a cost push shock. 
Thirdly, it investigates whether developing economies react to international interest 
rate(s) when setting their interest rates?  
 
The first objective is addressed in chapter 2, which attempts to examine the implication of 
interest rate smoothing on the persistence and transmission of a technology and 
monetary policy shock. Monetary policy is viewed as effective when its persistence on 
inflation is short lived in contrast to long live persistence. The intuition is that the central 
bank is able to achieve its objective of fighting inflation in a very short time when the 
persistence is short lived. On the contrary when the persistence of inflation is long lived, 
the central bank is only able to achieve its objectives after a long period of time and thus 
considered as ineffective (Gerlach and Tillmann, 2010). 
The chapter is based on Gali (2008) closed economy model. I extend the model and 
therefore contribute to the model by introducing two monetary policy rules, namely the 
Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor rule. Using the 
impulse response of inflation, I show that the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and 
backward looking Taylor rule (interest rate smoothing) protracts the persistence of a 
monetary policy shock, while it truncates the persistence of a technological innovation. 
The persistence due to a monetary shock from the Taylor rule is however shorter, while 
that from a technology shock is longer. 
Thus, Taylor rule is considered superior to the Taylor rule with lagged interest rule or the 
backward looking Taylor rule when the economy is hit by a monetary policy shock. On 
the contrary, the Taylor rule with lagged interest rate and the backward looking Taylor 
rule is considered superior to the Taylor rule when the economy is faced with a 
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technology shock. These results tend to suggest that a policy maker faces a trade off as 
to which policy rule to select.   
The second objective is addressed in chapter 3, which compares the performance of 
targeting rules and instrument rules given three shocks, technology shock, foreign output 
shock and a cost push shock. The chapter is based on Galí (2008) small open economy 
model. I extend the model and hence contribute to literature in three ways. Firstly, I 
include a cost push shock and a foreign output shock. Secondly, I model the DIT, and 
CIT rules as in Galí and Monacelli (2002). Thirdly, I include the forward looking Taylor 
rules as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998).   
Using the impulse response function as well as the volatility of the output gap and 
domestic inflation as the yardstick of the evaluation, I show that the results of Galí (2008) 
that the DIT policy is superior in the presence of a technology shock can be extended to 
a foreign output shock. That is DIT is superior when a foreign output shock hits the 
economy as well. The Taylor rule is superior to the CGG(+1) and CGG(+4). In the 
presence of a cost push shock, there is no single policy which stabilises both the output 
gap and domestic inflation.  
The DIT is only superior in stabilizing the domestic inflation while the CGG(+1)  
minimising the volatilities of the output gap the most. The CGG(+4) tend to increase the 
volatility of the output gap and domestic inflation and thus is ranked as the most inferior  
policy rule given this model and calibration. The intuition of these results is that the 
central bank faces a policy dilemma as to which policy rules is superior in terms of 
stabilising both the output gap and domestic inflation when the economy is hit by a cost 
push shock. When the shock is caused by a technology shock or foreign output, the 
policy maker would prefer the DIT rule.  
However, if the shock is caused by a cost push factor, the policy maker would prefer the 
DIT rule to stabilise the domestic inflation or the CGG (+1) to minimise the volatilities in 
the output gap. In practise however policy makers cannot alter policy rules with each 
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shock hitting the economy and hence faces a policy dilemma in particular when faced 
with a cost push shock.    
Chapter four answers the third objective and empirically test whether developing 
countries respond to international interest rates in setting their policy rates or observe the 
Taylor rule. The chapter draws mainly from Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Calvo and 
Reinhart (2001 and 2002), Filosa (2001), Corbo (2002), Frankel et al. (2004) and 
Boamah (2012). These studies show that emerging market economies respond to other 
factors such as the exchange rate in setting their interest rate policy in addition to 
inflation. This is attributed to the fear of floating which might be caused by among other 
things: lack of credibility, exchange rate path through to inflation and foreign currency 
liabilities which may prevent developing countries from undertaking independent 
monetary policies. Frankel et al (2004) argues for example that even developing 
countries with fully flexible exchange rate tend to import price stability from developed 
countries similar to countries whose exchange rates are fixed.  
 
My first contribution to literature in this chapter is that I examine the interest rate setting 
behaviour of central banks in three regions (Latin America, East Asia and Southern 
Africa, using data from 1999 to 2012. I build on Forward looking Taylor rule proposed by 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998). However, I make two modifications to their rule and 
thus contribute to literature as follows: First I replace the output with the expected output 
as in Javanovic and Petreski (2012). Second I include the U.S. interest rate, to test the 
claim by Frankel et al (2004) that interest rates in developing countries with flexible 
exchange rates might sometimes be more responsive to international interest rates in 
addition to domestic economic considerations.  
 
I show that developing countries respond to past interest rates, expected inflation and 
international interest rates (US interest rate) when setting their interest rates. The 
coefficient of the expected inflation is less than unity in all countries suggesting that 
developing countries tend to accommodate inflation. These results are similar to Corbo‘s 
for Latin American countries. A distinct finding of this chapter is the significance of the 
164 
 
US interest rate in the monetary policy rules of most countries, when they are all inflation 
targeters.     
 
Limitations and further research 
This thesis contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy rules 
by firstly examining the implications of interest smoothing on the persistence of a 
monetary policy and technology shock. Secondly, it evaluates the performance of 
monetary policy rule (targeting or instrument rule) in the presence of a cost push shock. 
Thirdly it investigates whether developing economies react to international interest rate(s) 
when setting their interest rates?   
 
There a number of constrains which the thesis did not address. In the second and third 
chapters, the extant research on the monetary policy tends to use welfare based 
measures of analysis to compare and rank various monetary policies. Moreover, since 
the 2007 financial crisis most central banks have expanded their mandates to include 
financial stability in addition to price stability. Thus it is recommended for future research 
to include welfare based measures and include financial stability objectives in the 
monetary policy rules of the central bank. In addition, chapter four could be expanded by 
including monetary aggregates to examine its significance in the monetary policy rules of 
developing countries.    
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                Botswana 
   i  y  e  
Mean 8.44 13.17 8.63 0.16 
Median 7.79 14.25 8.67 0.16 
Max 14.67 15.50 8.91 0.23 
Min 5.63 9.50 8.26 0.00 
STD. Dev 2.23 2.11 0.18 0.05 
Obser 56 56 56 56 
 
 
 
 
 
                Chile 
   i  y  e  
Mean 3.28 4.44 4.53 0.00 
Median 3.10 4.89 4.57 0.00 
Max 9.33 13.08 4.74 0.00 
Min -1.86 0.48 4.32 0.00 
STD. Dev 2.17 2.60 0.11 0.00 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Brazil 
   i  y  e  
Mean 6.50 14.62 4.61 0.47 
Median 6.20 14.75 4.62 0.48 
Max 16.85 26.50 4.75 0.64 
Min 0.00 0.00 4.41 0.26 
STD. Dev 2.97 4.93 0.10 0.10 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
                Namibia 
   i  y  e  
Mean 7.14 9.35 9.28 0.14 
Median 6.95 9.25 9.30 0.14 
Max 13.60 16.00 9.59 0.17 
Min 1.30 6.00 9.00 0.08 
STD. Dev 2.98 2.4 0.18 0.02 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
                Peru 
   i  y  e  
Mean 2.65 5.65 4.67 0.32 
Median 2.39 5.02 4.67 0.31 
Max 6.64 17.80 4.99 0.39 
Min -1.01 2.05 4.33 0.27 
STD. Dev 1.63 3.74 0.22 0.03 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
                Philippine 
   i  y  e  
Mean 4.16 5.40 4.51 0.02 
Median 3.86 4.58 4.55 0.02 
Max 10.28 13.80 4.75 0.02 
Min -1.01 3.11 4.15 0.02 
STD. Dev 2.24 2.00 0.16 0.00 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
                Thailand 
   i  y  e  
Mean 2.66 3.52 6.88 0.03 
Median 2.60 3.50 6.92 0.03 
Max 7.50 6.50 7.16 0.03 
Min -2.79 1.75 6.58 0.02 
STD. Dev 1.97 1.15 0.16 0.00 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
                South Africa 
   i  y  e  
Mean 5.87 8.83 4.79 0.13 
Median 5.67 8.00 4.60 0.13 
Max 13.42 13.50 14.49 0.17 
Min 0.43 5.00 4.48 0.08 
STD. Dev 2.93 2.60 1.37 0.01 
Obser 52 52 52 52 
Table 6  Data Statistics. 
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Table 7  Unit Root Tests: Botswana 
Variable ADF
43
 PP
44
 ADF-GLS
45
     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10
46
 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.05 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary 
Inflation >0.01 >0.05 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.01     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.10 <0.10 <0.05     Stationary 
US interest rate >0.10 >0.10 <0.10     Non- stationary 
US interest rate-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  Unit Root Tests: Brazil. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary 
Inflation >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 >0.10 <0.01     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.05 <0.01     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.05 <0.10 <0.05     Stationary 
 
  
 
                                                          
43
 Augumented Dickey-Fuller.(The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) with a maximum number of ten lags was 
used in the test. 
44
 Phillips-Perron 
45
 Dickey-Fuller Test with GLS Detrending. 
46
 P-Values. 
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Table 9  Unit Root Tests: Chile. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate <0.05 <0.01 >0.10   Probably-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.05 <0.01 <0.10     Stationary 
Inflation <0.01 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.05 <0.01 <0.01     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.05 <0.05 <0.05     Stationary 
 
 
Table 10  Unit Root Test: Namibia. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.05 <0.05 <0.05   Stationary 
SA Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
SA Interest rate-gap <0.05 <0.10 <0.05   Stationary 
Inflation <0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.05 <0.10 <0.01   Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.01   Stationary 
SA Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
SA Exchange 
rate-gap 
<0.10 <0.10 <0.05   Stationary 
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Table 11  Unit Root Tests: Peru. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Probably-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.05     Stationary 
Inflation <0.05 <0.01 <0.05     Stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.01     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.05 <0.05 <0.01     Stationary 
 
 
 
 
Table 12  Unit Root Tests: Philippine. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.01     Stationary 
Inflation <0.01 <0.05 <0.05     Stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 <0.05 <0.05     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.01     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.05 <0.05 <0.05     Stationary 
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Table 13  Unit Root Tests: South Africa. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.05 <0.10 <0.05     Stationary 
Inflation >0.10 <0.10 <0.10     Stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 <0.05 <0.05     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.01     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.10 <0.10 <0.05     Stationary 
 
 
 
Table 14  Unit Root Tests: Thailand. 
Variable ADF PP ADF-GLS     Decision 
Interest rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10   Non-stationary 
Interest rate-gap <0.10 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary 
Inflation <0.01 >0.10 >0.10     Stationary 
Inflation-gap <0.01 <0.10 <0.01     Stationary  
Output >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non- stationary 
Output gap <0.01 <0.01 <0.10     Stationary 
Exchange rate >0.10 >0.10 >0.10     Non-stationary 
Exchange rate-gap <0.05 <0.05 <0.01     Stationary 
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Figure 9  Inflation and Interest Rates (Bank Rate) 
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Table 15  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule. 
Country   
1 0.ti    1 0.t  
 
1 0.ty  
 
0.
US
Interest
Rate 
 
0.
SA
Interest
rate 
 
2
Adjusted
R
 
J
statistic
 
p J
 
Botswana  0.64  0.69 0.07 0.90  0.10 - 0.74 9.15 0.68 
 (-3.26)
47
 (11.84) (3.33) (1.28)  (3.26) -    
Brazil -0.03 0.97 -0.03 30.74 -0.48 - 0.50 7.14 0.84 
 (-0.13) (6.61) (-0.17) (5.49) (-2.83) -    
Chile 0.13 0.30 0.43 -2.56 0.56 - 0.73 7.74 0.80 
 (2.07) (3.01) (6.39) -(0.81) (4.54) -    
Namibia -0.07 0.09 -0.07 1.19 0.04  0.83 0.95 9.16 0.86 
 (-4.23) (2.15) -(4.23) (1.11) (2.30) (14.85)    
Peru -1.55  0.20 0.53 2.72 0.56 - 0.89 9.15 0.68 
 -(7.52) (2.09) (6.25) (1.44) (4.95) -    
Philippine -3.21 0.34 0.27 0.02 -0.07  0.59 7.86 0.79 
 (-8.45) (4.85) (6.23) (6.34) (-1.57) -    
South 
Africa 
-0.00 0.18 0.47 0.28 0.01 - 0.82 8.5 0.74 
 (-0.02) (2.33) (14.01) (1.42) (0.17) -    
Thailand 0.05 0.76 0.11 -3.62 0.11 - 0.85 7.2 0.83 
 (1.78) (13.92) (4.49) (-3.76) (4.22)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47
 t-statistics. 
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Table 16  Results of the Forward looking Taylor rule with the Exchange Rate. 
Country   
1ti   1t   1ty   US
Interest
Rate
 
0.
Exchange
rate 
 
2
Adjusted
R
 
J
statistic
 
p J  SA
Interest
rate
 
Botswana  0.04  0.64 0.10 0.42  0.07 -3.33 0.79 9.94 0.82 - 
 (1.95) (10.00) (4.49) (0.53)  (2.94) (-2.70)    - 
Brazil -0.04 0.83 0.10 32.15 -0.26 -11.85 0.52 8.89 0.88 - 
 (-0.31) (9.26) (1.04) (5.70) (-2.53) (-4.63)    - 
Chile 0.10 0.17 0.55 -6.95 0.76 -964.05 0.73 15.5 0.41 - 
 (0.73) (1.43) (4.91) (-1.00) (3.43) (-0.50)    - 
Namibia 0.01 0.04 -0.04 1.15 0.05  3.74 0.95 9.16 0.86 0.81 
 (0.56) (1.25) -(3.08) (1.23) (2.39) (1.58)    (19.37) 
Peru -0.08  0.35 0.46 4.59 0.49   -23 0.89 11.04 0.74 - 
 -(2.91) (6.07) (6.94) (4.35) (7.41) (-5.25)    - 
Philippine -2.11 0.31 0.20 0.02 0.13 -288.87 0.59 8.82 0.88 - 
 (-5.18) (4.65) (6.06) (5.02) (2.26) (-3.03)    - 
South 
Africa 
-0.02 0.29 0.38 0.13 0.03 -3.85 0.85 10.2 0.80 - 
 (-0.29) (5.09) (15.87) (0.87) (0.59) (-0.81)    - 
Thailand 0.02 0.64 0.13 -0.79 0.16 -199.68 0.84 9.3 0.85 - 
 (0.65) (11.30) (6.4) (-0.57) (4.66) (-2.61)     
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